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# Arms Talks Priority Urged by Fulbright

By George C. Wilson  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday urged President Nixon to conduct arms talks with the Russians before building the Safeguard antiballistic missile defense.

Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), in making that plea, said "it really bothers me more than anything else" that

the Soviet willingness to talk about arms limitations has not been exploited.

He said the Nixon Administration should "test the water" by going ahead with the talks. "If the Russians are unyielding," the Administration could press for the ABM.

Fulbright said the Russians "say they are in the mood" to conduct such talks. "I can't understand our reluctance," he said, adding that the Soviets were ready to meet with the previous administration in December.

His remarks came as David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, appeared before the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee to make the Pentagon case for building the ABM.

Fulbright will have another chance to question the Administration's foreign policies when Secretary of State William P. Rogers appears before the Foreign Relations Committee at 10 a.m. today. This session will be televised.

See ABM, A14, col. 1

ABM, From A1

Yesterday, in response to Fulbright's questions about the ABM, Packard said: "It's not my place to decide when arms control talks are going to be taken."

He added that "we are all working together" to slow down the arms race.

The Pentagon's No. 2 executive argued that protecting the ICBMs the United States already has in place would be less drastic than building new ICBMs or more Polaris submarines.

The Nixon Administration's Safeguard ABM would be built in stages, with actual operation not expected to start until 1974. But the President is seeking Congressional approval of the program this year.

Packard said the Pentagon did not consider Congressional approval of the Sentinel ABM binding on the revised missile defense system — now officially called Safeguard. Fulbright said he was relieved to hear that.

While yesterday's hearing was not as heated as the one last Friday when Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird took on his critics under TV lights in the Caucus Room of the Old Senate Office Building, the ABM issue itself is still hot.

Disarmament Subcommittee Chairman Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) will go on the offensive again Friday when Prof. Wolfgang Panofsky of Stanford University, a former member of the President's Science Advisory Board, will lead off the testimony.

Packard, when pressed yesterday by Fulbright to name independent scientists he had consulted in reaching the ABM decision, named Panofsky.

But Panofsky, who came into the hearing room after the exchange, told reporters that Packard had talked to him only in a "casual" way about the ABM defense.

Told about being named as a consultant, Panofsky said: "This upsets me very much. I have some real reservations about the engineering problems" on the ABM.

Gore, in calling Panofsky to testify, is thus challenging the depth of the Pentagon review of the whole ABM proposition.

While the ABM debate is straying off to such point-counterpoint testimony, the main argument still seems hinged on two fundamental questions: What impact will the ABM deployment have on the Russians? How much deterrence is enough?

Packard again argued that the Safeguard ABM—by leaving American cities unprotected against a heavy Soviet attack—also leaves the Soviet deterrence intact. Consequently, he said, the Safeguard should not provoke the

Soviets into a new round of arms building.

Looking at the American deterrent, Packard said he was worried about the ability of Minuteman ICBMs to survive an attack by the Soviet SS-9 Scrap missile. He said the Soviets continue to build and deploy the big SS-9 nuclear blockbuster. "We must, provide further hedges" to protect the U.S. deterrent, Packard said.

Laird had credited the SS-9 with a 25-megaton warhead. Packard used the figure 20 megatons. He said the missile could also carry three five-megaton warhead in its nose.

With "achievable" improvement in accuracy, Packard said one SSM-9 warhead could knock out one Minuteman ICBM despite its protective layers of concrete. Laird has said that Russia has about 200 SS-9s.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) challenged Packard on the size of the SS-9, quoting a newspaper report crediting it with only two megatons.

Packard, without getting precise about the warhead, said it is the SS-9's weight-lifting capability along with expected improvements in accuracy that concern the Pentagon as they took at 1973 and beyond.

Stressing that the Safeguard system could be built a little at a time and tailored to the threat, Packard said the cost of defending two wings of Minuteman ICBMs (about 350 missiles) would be \$2.1 billion. Expanding the ABM—but not to protect cities in depth—could raise the price tag to about \$7 billion.

The Nixon Administration apparently wants to go to arms talks with the Russian with the Congressional approval of Safeguard in hand. Administration sources are meeting this fall.

# Senators Clash at Hearing on Missile Defense as Split In Armed Services Panel Appears to Deepen

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 22—The Senate Armed Services Committee exposed itself today to a public debate on the missile defense issue, and the apparent result was to deepen the division within the committee over the Administration's proposed Safeguard System.

The public hearing was marked by a confused personal wrangle among the Senators, as Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, complained that the Pentagon had attempted "to put the arm on" committee witnesses opposed to the safeguard antiballistic missile system.

For more than five hours, beneath the glare of television lights and with technical jargon that sometimes passed beyond senatorial ken, the committee listened to Paul H. Nitze, former Deputy Defense Secretary; Dr. Herbert F. York, former director of Defense Research and Engineering; Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panovsky of Stanford University, and Dr. William C. McMillan of the University of California, Los Angeles, debate the pros and cons of deploying safeguard.

Dr. York and Dr. Panovsky opposed deployment, arguing that the system was not needed now, would be ineffective and would tend to accelerate the atomic arms race.

Mr. Nitze and Dr. McMillan contended that the system was needed to parry a potential Soviet move toward acquiring a "first strike" capability as well as to strengthen the American diplomatic hand in missile limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Most of the arguments had been expressed earlier before the Senate Foreign Relations disarmament subcommittee.

But what was new and potentially significant was that the arguments were being presented to the normally secretive Pentagon-oriented Armed Services Committee in public debate.

The committee was forced into the public hearings by its admission last year that it had heard only Pentagon witnesses before deciding upon deployment of an ABM system.

## Hears Both Sides

Opponents of the system seized upon this admission to extract the concession that this year the committee would hear both sides of the case, with the critics having the right to select the opposition witnesses.

Whether or not the public debate, which will continue tomorrow, would reverse committee support of the Safeguard system was doubtful. But in the opinion of opponents on the committee, the debate may undermine some of the support within the committee, which was already deeply divided on the issue.

It now appears that at least five, and possibly as many as eight, of the 18 committee members will vote against deployment of the Safeguard system.

For a committee that normally goes to the floor in monolithic unity, such a division is not only surprising but should also weaken the Administration's already dubious chances of winning Senate approval of the \$6.5-billion Safeguard System, which President Nixon declared last week was "absolutely essential" for the national security.

Senator John Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, the chairman, who normally runs the committee with judicial firmness, evidenced some discomfort over being forced to become involved in technical arguments and over the disarray within his ranks.

After hours of listening to the scientists cast about such terms as MIRV, CEP, FOB's and SS-9, Senator Stennis summed up his position this way:

"This is the best horse we have in the stable, and if we are going to move, we had better move with it. I don't see who we can be worse off in 1975 if we move forward."

Mr. Nitze and Dr. McMillan

concurred in this judgment. Dr. York and Dr. Panovsky disagreed.

Dr. York gently suggested that "we could be worse off" if the arms race continued unabated. Dr. Panovsky, an expert on radar, suggested that the proposed Safeguard system was a "bad match" to meet the Soviet missile threat.

It was only with considerable tapping on a glass that Senator Stennis was able to keep his committee under control as a wrangle broke out between

Senators who oppose the Safeguard System and those who favor it.

The squabble erupted after Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, the ranking Republican, said that a few weeks ago Deputy Defense Secretary David R. Packard had refused to brief Dr. York on the ABM issue on the ground that the former defense official was not cleared to receive secret information.

Then Senator Stennis disclosed that yesterday Dr. John S. Foster, the director of de-

fense research and engineering, had briefed Dr. York and the other scheduled witnesses before the committee on the Safeguard system.

This prompted Senator Symington, a leader in the opposition, to complain that the Pentagon was attempting "to put the arm" on opposition witnesses, who just a few weeks ago it did not consider important enough to brief.

When Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, objected that there was

nothing improper about the Pentagon briefing, Senator Symington amended his complaint to say: "Dr. Foster did not put his arm on you. He just put his arm around you."

## Symington Threatens Move

Senator Symington threatened to declassify information on his own initiative if the Pentagon continued to declassify information to support its case and then play "the game with the opposition of saying, 'if you only knew what we know.'"

With his argument that the Safeguard System was "technically questionable" and "would accelerate the arms race," Dr. York ran into criticism from Senator Strom Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina.

"Your statement sounds like a defeatist," Senator Thurmond drawled as he peered across the 10-yard chasm separating the Senators and the scientists.

Dr. York replied that what was involved was a contest between offensive and defensive technologies and that in such a

contest the offensive has such a large advantage that "it will be ahead substantially all the time."

Senator Thurmond, a retired Army major general, observed that since the beginning of warfare there had always been a defense to every offense. He asked Dr. York: "Are you advocating we abandon this proven principle of warfare?"

"History is full of Maginot Lines," Dr. York replied, cutting off the Thurmond line of questioning.

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site to success in employment, housing, education, and health.

Because the existence of hungry Americans represents a strain on the self-respect of the Nation, we must act immediately to end this stigma. Because malnutrition is such a stubborn link in the poverty cycle, we must work hard to break this link. Because of the great return resulting from a small investment in health and nutrition programs, we must help reduce social dropout rates and enable hungry people to make the contributions of productive citizens. Because the real costs of our inaction are a high infant mortality rate, birth diseases, physical disabilities and a shortened life expectancy, our action is long overdue. Because we can expect that an individual who is hungry will be listless, apathetic, distrustful, frustrated, and alienated, we must act before the injustice of hunger in this rich land produces social unrest and chaos.

Michael Harrington asserted in his troubling book, "Another America," that there are two Americas: one made up of the middle and upper classes and "another" America of the poor and the indigent. The middle and upper classes are comfortably sheltered and are rarely aware of the poor and indigent America. They have their modern highways conveniently by-pass the ghetto areas. They have their suburbs which neatly avoid the migrant farm areas. And they have their immaculate high rise apartments and shopping centers which have clearly forced the relocation of shacks. But how long can the existence of 22 million poor be systematically denied?

Mr. President, the solution cannot be found by turning away to a more pleasant question. We can no longer tolerate "another America" if we are to be a strong and healthy country. Freedom depends on free people, but hunger and malnutrition will keep our poor in bondage unless we act now to end the crisis.

#### DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT A. EVERETT, OF TENNESSEE

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the 91st Congress lost an outstanding Member in the passing of Robert A. Everett on January 26, 1969.

The middle South, the area he knew and loved so well, will miss him, for he epitomized public service and the cause of good government in its finest sense.

He visited me in my Senate office on January 4. It was the last time I was to see and talk with him. Even then, his zest for life made a deep impression on me.

His congressional service had its mark of greatness: concern for the disabled veterans, flood control from Minnesota to Louisiana, cotton research—and the tireless, devoted service to the needs of constituents will long be remembered.

I shall remember his smiling face, booming voice, counsel, and good fellowship.

To his wonderful mother I extend my deep and heartfelt sympathy.

It was that which he sought for others, that which he found, and that which he shared as he made his way to God.

#### ABM CAN HELP ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as the Senate is aware, the Committee on Armed Services, under the chairmanship of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), conducted public hearings last week on the antiballistic-missile defense system. These hearings were held in connection with the yearly legislation authorizing funds for fiscal year 1970 for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, ships, and research and development.

On April 22, Hon. Paul H. Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and now chairman of the advisory council at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, expressed to the committee the view that in negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation and control of offensive and defensive weapon systems, the executive branch has the best chance of arriving at an agreement satisfactory to the United States if Congress approves the administration's request for authorization and appropriation for the ABM Safeguard system.

I commend Mr. Nitze's opening statement before the Armed Services Committee to the attention of Senators, and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAUL H. NITZE, BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, APRIL 22, 1969

Mr. Chairman: It is a privilege to appear again before this Committee on a matter of national importance, the ABM issue.

My first involvement with the nuclear question was in 1945. At that time, as Vice Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, I was charged with the supervision of the group of scientists and engineers who conducted a survey of the effects of the nuclear weapons used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In 1949 I participated in the reevaluation of U.S. policy which followed on the first testing of a nuclear device by the Soviet Union.

In 1958 I was one of the co-authors of a study entitled "The Impact of Technology on Foreign Policy," done at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In 1961 and 1962 I participated in the work of the Executive Branch on the Berlin and Cuban missile crises.

In 1963 I was among those involved in the successful effort to arrive at a limited test-ban treaty with the Soviet Union.

In 1967 I participated with Mr. McNamara in the development of the Sentinel Program.

In 1968 I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in favor of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Since January 20th of this year I have been enjoying the freedom of a private citizen.

I wish today to support two propositions: The first is that negotiations be entered into promptly by the Executive Branch with the Soviet Union on the limitation and control of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems. The second is that the Congress support the request of the Executive Branch for Fiscal Year 1970 authorization and appropriation in the amount of \$490 million Total Obligation Authority for investment in the Safeguard system. I believe

these two propositions are not in conflict and, in fact, are mutually supporting.

It is my view that just as the world would be a far better place if nuclear weapons had not been technologically possible, so it would be a better world if neither MIRV's nor ABM's were technologically feasible. Unfortunately they are feasible.

It is also my view that the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship is not symmetrical. The Soviet Union has professed to be on the political offensive in respect to the non-communist world. The West has been, and is on, the political defensive. During the years when the United States was the only nation to possess nuclear weapons, we offered to share them with other nations under the Baruch plan. That plan was rejected by the Soviet government. At no time was our monopoly of nuclear weapons a threat to the integrity of other states. I am not one who believes that the reverse situation, on in which the Soviet Union is assumed to have held a monopoly on nuclear weapons, would have had the same result.

Once the Soviet Union developed a substantial nuclear force it became evident that the relationship between us could develop in a more, or in a less, dangerous manner depending on the course which the United States followed. In the 1958 study on the impact of technology on foreign policy, to which I referred earlier, we emphasized the desirability of striving for a U.S. deployment which contributed to the stability of the nuclear relationship rather than to instability. We believed this could be done by developing mobile, dispersed or hardened systems which would not be excessively vulnerable to a first, or a pre-emptive, strike. This program was subsequently carried out with the deployment of the Polaris system, hardened Minuteman ICBM's and dispersed or air alert bombers.

I find it useful to look at the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship since 1957 in two distinct time periods. The first period was that from 1957, the year in which the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, to 1962, the year of the Cuban missile crisis. The second period is that from the Cuban missile crisis to the present time. During the first period the United States was deeply concerned that Soviet technology had in some important respects over-leaped that of the West. Great efforts were made, with the full support of the scientific community, to develop rapidly the secure second strike nuclear deterrent capabilities to which I earlier referred.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, relied more on claims of technological progress and a wide ranging series of threats of nuclear destruction against other nations. Their actual deployment of ICBM's, as opposed to medium and intermediate range missiles largely directed against Europe, turned out to be slower than had been estimated by the intelligence community. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis the United States had, and the Soviet Union knew the United States had, a clear predominance in land based ICBM's and submarine based missiles, as well as long-range bombers. This fact, coupled with local superiority in the immediate vicinity of Cuba on the part of the United States, enabled President Kennedy to take a firm position in the Cuban missile crisis and caused Chairman Khrushchev to withdraw.

During the period since 1962 the United States has continued to perfect its second strike deterrent capabilities. The U.S.S.R. has, however, changed its declaratory policy; that policy has no longer been characterized by threats and unsubstantiated claims of technological progress. The Soviet Union's action policy, however, has been to increase greatly its efforts in the nuclear field. The result has been to change the situation from

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that existing in 1962 to one approaching overall parity.

A matter of particular concern to the United States has been Soviet developments in the ABM field. They started in 1962 with the deployment of a first generation ABM system around Leningrad and ABM related nuclear tests just prior to the limited nuclear test-ban treaty. The Soviets continued with a second generation system around Moscow and with the Tallinn system, which was considered by U.S. experts to have limited ABM capabilities. They are continuing development work on a more advanced system.

The Leningrad system was abandoned. The Tallinn system is now believed to be primarily directed against bombers but it is not certain that it cannot be upgraded so as to have an ABM capability. The Moscow system by itself does not appear to be a serious threat to our deterrent capabilities; it can be penetrated with high assurance provided a sufficient number of weapons are allocated to this purpose. The major concern is a more advanced Soviet ABM system deployed in large numbers for city protection. The Poseidon and Minuteman III programs are, in my view, of high urgency to protect our deterrent against this possibility. The lead time between first obtaining evidence that a more advanced ABM is being deployed, and a substantial deployment in being, is so short that long lead time systems, such as Poseidon, cannot safely be delayed.

The more difficult issue is whether the United States should now abandon work on any deployment of an ABM system. In Fiscal Year 1968 the Congress authorized and appropriated funds for the deployment of such a system. Further authorizations and appropriations were included in the Fiscal Year 1969 budget. To terminate the program now and restart it again at a later time would involve a delay of one or two years from the date it was decided to resume and an extra expenditure of several billion dollars. In my view a long term relationship in which the Soviet Union proceeded with successive generations of ABMs and we did not could well result in an unstable situation with consequent grave dangers not only to the United States but to the rest of the world.

It is of the utmost importance that a way be found to halt the further evolution of strategic armaments. I see no way in which that can be done other than through reciprocal or parallel action by the Soviet Union as well as ourselves. The assumption that if we refrain from taking an action, the Soviets, in the absence of an agreement to do so, will refrain from taking a similar action is not supported by any experience we have had in the past or any reasonable forecast of Soviet action in the future. I see no alternative to taking all the actions necessary to give us unquestioned assurance of deterrence in the absence of an agreement with the Soviet Union for reciprocal limitations on offensive and defensive nuclear systems.

At the time of the Glassboro Conference in 1967, Mr. Kossygin was not prepared to initiate discussions. Subsequently, after the decision to go forward with the Sentinel system, the Soviet Union indicated it was prepared to initiate talks. The announcement of agreement to talk was to have been made on the day that the Czechoslovakian invasion took place.

Agreement now to initiate talks would not have the effect of appearing to condone the Czechoslovakian invasion. As I understand it, the Executive Branch believes it would be in a much stronger position in any talks on limitation of offensive and defensive systems if it had the backing of the Legislative Branch on its Safeguard program. I believe that position has merit. Negotiations with the Soviet Union are always difficult, long

drawn out, and the subject of the most careful examination of all possibilities for relative advantage. If our negotiators are faced with a situation where the Soviet negotiators believe time is running on the Soviet side, our negotiators may be up against extremely adverse odds.

To arrive at successful and mutually advantageous agreement will, in any case, be extremely difficult. Under our Constitution the President is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs. I strongly urge the Legislative Branch to put him in the position he believes to be best to conduct those negotiations.

In Summary: I believe the Executive Branch should promptly enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation and control of offensive and defensive nuclear weapon systems. I believe that the Executive Branch has the best chance of arriving at an agreement satisfactory to the United States in negotiations which are bound to be of extreme difficulty if the Legislative Branch has approved the request being made for authorization and appropriation for the Safeguard system.

### ARMS CONTROL

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, when the Secretary of State appeared before the Committee on Foreign Relations last month and was questioned about the wisdom of deploying an ABM system at this time, I observed that "our biggest concern is with its effect on the escalation of the arms race itself and bringing us to a higher level of armaments on both sides." The reason for this concern, I said to Mr. Rogers:

We will then be much less able to negotiate effective arms limitations because at a higher and more sophisticated level of armaments on both sides we will be unable to be sure, without the kind of inspection that the Russians will never permit, that they are abiding by their agreements.

We who have opposed ABM deployment at this time are no less concerned by the implications for arms control of another impending development—the deployment of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles, or MIRVs. Deployment of these multiple warheads may well be the "point of no return" in the arms race, at which time we might be unable to trust to national inspection systems to verify compliance with a strategic arms freeze. And when I recently asked the Secretary of Defense how soon we might reach this "point of no return," he replied:

Not in the too distant future.

The urgency of this matter was underscored last week by the junior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Brooke) in a most lucid and forceful address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association. I commend his analysis to the attention of all Senators. I very much hope that his suggestion for a negotiated freeze now on further MIRV air tests will be given the full and quick consideration by the administration that it deserves. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the address be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

### A CHOICE OF RISKS: THE DILEMMAS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

(Statement of Senator EDWARD W. BROOKE, American Society of Newspaper Publishers, New York, April 24, 1969)

I am pleased and honored to be with you today. This is a welcome and appropriate forum to discuss a question of supreme importance to the future well-being of the American people and the prospective tranquility of the world at large. That question concerns the likely course of the global arms race, and that course depends heavily on the actions which the United States and the Soviet Union, as the principal nuclear powers, elect to follow in the next few months.

These issues are esoteric and controversial. They evoke passionate comment more often than reasoned analysis. But if the United States is to exert the enlightened leadership which these issues require, we in government, you in journalism, and the citizens of this country are going to have to do a better job of understanding precisely what is at stake and what the options are in this complex area. It can never be said too often that, in matters of high policy, emotion is no substitute for insight, and commitment to an ideal is no guarantee of competence in reaching it.

Decisions on strategic weapons are inherently complicated. The relevant information is often classified or too voluminous for most of us to digest, even if it is not beyond our comprehension.

Still more important, these decisions are never static. They depend on what other countries have done and will do, and the decisions themselves will influence the behavior of those other countries. Largely because of this interdependence, strategic decisions are marked by extreme uncertainty, uncertainty about what effects they will have, about what actions potential adversaries may be able to take, about whether they will take steps of which they are known to be capable, and about a host of other factors which bear directly on the wisdom or unwisdom of the particular decision.

For these reasons decisions on strategic policies pose an extraordinary challenge to a democracy. How can a nation be said to govern itself if its people are unable to make a meaningful judgment on such paramount issues? The only answer I can conceive of is that the people's representatives, especially those in Congress, must devote the utmost energy and intelligence to probing strategic problems. Without critical and diligent evaluation by both the Executive and Legislative branches, the tendency of technology may well be to sustain that "mad momentum" of the arms race which Robert McNamara so vividly described.

Too often in the past it seems that military technology has been allowed to proceed without adequate political guidance. Vast programs have been undertaken too hastily and with too little scrutiny. Dangerous and unreliable innovations have been begun without sufficient appreciation of their likely consequences.

These concerns, together with the conviction that imperative investments at home will be delayed or curtailed until we get better control of the defense budget, prompted me to seek assignment to the Senate Armed Services Committee. In my first weeks on the Committee, I have become increasingly aware of the decisive significance of the strategic decisions which we and the Soviets are now making. It is no exaggeration to assert that these decisions, even more than the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam, will shape this country's vital interests for years to come. As horrendous as the costs of the war in Southeast Asia have been, in both human and material terms, they will



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seem paltry indeed if mis-steps in the Soviet-American strategic relationship should lead to a breakdown in stable nuclear deterrence.

I say this not to dramatize my remarks but to stress the necessity for a proper perspective on relations between Moscow and Washington. Our preoccupation with Vietnam, however justifiable, must not lead us to neglect the impending issues between the United States and Russia. We must overcome the familiar tendency for the urgent to displace the important.

We have reached a unique juncture in the arms race between ourselves and the Soviets. We face a crisis in the dual sense conveyed by the Chinese symbol for the that term, a symbol suggesting a condition of both danger and opportunity.

A combination of political and technological developments has brought us to an unprecedented situation. It is now clear that the great powers will either devise ways of limiting the growth of nuclear arsenals or they will plunge ahead into a costly and dangerous competition in strategic weapons with unforeseeable consequences for the peace and stability of the world.

There have been previous escalations of the arms race, to be sure, but not quite like the one now looming. For the first time both sides have expressed serious interest in seeking to limit additional deployments of strategic forces. The leaders of the Soviet Union have now come to recognize what responsible officials in this country have long declared, that there can be no winner in a nuclear war and that a rampant arms race will leave both countries much poorer but also less secure. Whatever else may be said of Nikita Khrushchev, he brought essential realism to the Soviet Government when he abandoned the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war between Capitalism and Communism.

Furthermore, the prelude to the present dialogue has seen substantial achievements in more limited realms of arms control. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban, the Treaty prohibiting deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the "hot line arrangement", and other measures of restraint have shown that the Soviet Union and the United States can carve out significant areas of agreement in such difficult and delicate areas. These are historic accomplishments. They augur well for further efforts to find mutually acceptable means of insuring both nations' security.

Of equal importance is the fact that the last few years have seen the evolution, through a combination of U.S. restraint and continued growth in Soviet missile forces, of a kind of rough strategic equality between the two sides. The most astute students of Soviet behavior have welcomed this development, because of the evident reluctance of the Soviets to enter wide-ranging arms limitation arrangements so long as they were militarily inferior.

A central factor in the less heated strategic atmosphere which has emerged during the nineteen sixties has been the rapid advance of the technology of surveillance. Both major powers, but especially the United States, have devised unusually effective means for observing and monitoring the strategic inventories of the other side. Rising confidence in these techniques for determining force levels in the Soviet Union has permitted the United States to avoid repeating the massive over-expansion of offensive weapons in which it engaged in the early sixties.

These new technologies have also afforded hope that compliance with certain arms control agreements could be verified without the kind of local inspection to which the Soviet Union has consistently objected. It has seemed possible that we might escape that cycle of suspicion which Roswell Gilpatric once characterized by saying that "the So-

viets are forced to react to what they know we are doing in response to what we think they are doing."

These were some of the trends which began to give a degree of assurance that the balance of terror might become less delicate, and that meaningful arms control was more than merely conceivable. Unfortunately, other trends have been at work to frustrate these hopes.

Contrary to widespread opinion, deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems is by no means the most significant of these trends. In fact, while ABM is hardly a trivial matter, it is clearly a subordinate part of the larger strategic problem. The more sinister elements in the situation, the ones which pose the gravest threats to the stability of the strategic balance and to the possibility of effective arms limitations, are pending innovations in the offensive forces of both sides. Developments now under way on both sides raise the likelihood that the level of offensive weaponry available to the Soviet Union and the United States will rise rapidly in the next few years.

I refer, of course, to the multiple warhead technology on which both the United States and the Soviet Union are working. The so-called MIRV concept, in which a number of independently targetable warheads are mounted on a single launcher, is undoubtedly the most disturbing breakthrough in strategic weapons since the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Not only does it mean that a given rocket force may be modified to throw several times as many warheads, but it creates what could be insurmountable problems for inspection of an arms control agreement.

Together with the possible development of mobile land-based missiles, a technology of special interest to the Soviet Union, the deployment of MIRV systems would open large opportunities for evasion of any arms agreement which did not provide for extensive, on-site inspection. Disagreements over inspection of that kind have always been a major barrier to successful negotiations. But, if MIRV is actually deployed by either side, it will be virtually impossible to rely exclusively on the means of national verification which otherwise might be adequate to monitor a freeze on strategic forces.

What this means is that the present opportunity for strategic arms control is highly perishable. Indeed, it is measured in months. It now appears that, however justified the last Administration may have felt in postponing the arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, however outraged we and our allies may have been over Soviet ruthlessness in Czechoslovakia, the delay in the arms talks has been most adverse to their chances for success.

That sober view is based on the conclusion that, if MIRV is not controlled prior to deployment, it will probably not be controlled at all. And if MIRV is not controlled, other limitations will be even more difficult to achieve than otherwise.

In my judgment the most urgent task is to limit further operational testing of multiple warhead missiles. Once testing of these provocative systems is completed, it will be unlikely that either side will believe the other is not deploying them.

On the other hand, there are several major factors suggesting the desirability and feasibility of controlling test activity of this kind. First of all, without extensive tests it is doubtful that either side would have sufficient confidence in these complex systems to deploy them heavily. Secondly, unlike a ban on deployment, an understanding to forego operational tests of this kind lends itself to verification by the kinds of surveillance capabilities which both sides already possess. In addition, there is much to be said for seeking an exchange of observers at the small number of facilities where such full-scale tests could be conducted. Since

such an exchange would not involve the widespread intrusion required by more elaborate schemes, an agreement might be facilitated. An exchange of this kind could be invaluable in providing experience in mutual observation and could help lay the foundations of trust which will be essential if more extensive inspection arrangements are to be accepted.

Obviously, any suspension of operational tests of MIRV is at best a stop-gap. It can only buy time for more elaborate arrangements to be negotiated. A ban on MIRV tests, as a means of impeding deployment of such dangerous systems, can only stand if both parties respect it and if they promptly move forward on a number of other agreements. For example, such a suspension must be conditional upon mutual limitation of ABM deployment and an understanding on the total number and size of strategic launchers which both sides will have. If ABM defenses for cities were deployed without limitation, or if the number of delivery vehicles continued to grow much beyond the present levels, there would be irresistible pressure to proceed with MIRV either as a penetration device or as a means of multiplying retaliatory capacity in general.

But an initial suspension of MIRV tests could be the critical lever on the arms race. By curbing the immediate need for deployment of both new offensive systems and ABM, it could create an environment for success in the more detailed and elaborate arms control discussions which must follow.

I believe there is a growing appreciation of the perils of further delay in the proposed arms talks and the need for prompt and bold action to initiate them. Secretary Rogers struck a heartening note when he announced that the talks should begin in the next two or three months. If they are not begun quickly, mankind's technological capacity will once more have outstripped its political capacity to build a safer and more rational world.

The President's proposal to deploy a modified ABM system must, of course, be evaluated in this larger context. And in that context I believe it should be seen for what it is, a dependent variable.

I have voted against every appropriation for ABM deployment. I remain skeptical. In the Armed Services Committee I am developing the most intensive interrogation I can concerning the so-called Safeguard system. There are a great many technical, political and strategic questions which would have to be answered satisfactorily before I could consider supporting deployment at this time.

Yet I believe it is vital that the President have a fair hearing for his recommendation before the Congress and the country exercise their responsibility to pass judgment. This is a matter in which we need to muster the most balanced and objective view of which we are capable.

I find it distressing that the President's recommendation was caught up in a flood of opinions and emotions related to the earlier Sentinel proposal. The ABM discussion had already acquired such momentum that it has been difficult to examine the new recommendation strictly on its merits. The result has been as Meg Greenfield so well portrayed it in the Washington Post, "a ragged non-debate on the ABM." If the nation is to make the hard decision which this question deserves, it will have to examine what the President has in fact proposed—not what others say he has proposed, not what his predecessor proposed, not what some wish he had proposed.

In particular it just will not do to have this matter descend into a narrow political contest, in which either partisan or personal advantage becomes a consideration. Whatever others may imply, I do not for a moment believe such factors influenced the

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President's decision. In fact, had they done so, he had every incentive to postpone or reject an ABM deployment. I am utterly confident that Mr. Nixon did not make his proposal on this basis. Those who charge that the President's decision was politically inspired reveal more about their own motives than about his.

Nor will it do merely to ignore the potential vulnerabilities which intense technological competition may create for strategic forces. Some observers have blithely proposed that the simplest and most effective way to deal with a potential threat to Minuteman would be to adopt a "launch on warning" policy. That is, if the radar screens showed what appeared to be an attack, the Minuteman force should be fired in a volley.

Apart from the technical uncertainties of such a scheme, this ill-conceived proposal completely ignores the requirements of stable deterrence. The entire effort of the past decade has been to construct secure second-strike forces which did not have to be launched on warning. It has been recognized by both the United States and the Soviet Union that the creation of such hair-trigger forces is a sure recipe for heightened tensions and fears, and for increasing the propensity to nuclear war at times of extreme crisis. I urge those who have been attracted to such a proposal to consider the implications of what they are suggesting. I, for one, do not propose to replace a strategy of questionable wisdom with one of obvious lunacy.

My plea today is that we get our priorities straight. The over-riding strategic problem of our time is to limit the multiplication of offensive weapons which increase the chance that a nuclear exchange might actually be initiated, not so much through a calculated first strike out of the blue as through a preemptive strike generated by fears that multiple warhead technology and other devices might be used to destroy or defeat a country's retaliatory capability. As I have stressed, the next few months are especially critical and the problem of controlling further development and deployment of multiple warhead technology is especially vital. Only by pressing forward urgently with strategic arms control efforts to deal with these problems will we find a lasting means of preventing or limiting ABM deployment.

The risks of an uncontrolled arms race are frightening to contemplate. They include not only increased danger of a nuclear holocaust, though that is ample reason to seek to curb this deadly competition; but the profound dangers of continued neglect of social needs in this country and elsewhere. Even a small fraction of the nearly 200 billion dollars which the world is spending on armaments could make an inestimable contribution to relieving hunger, rebuilding cities, educating children, and to performing all the other humane missions which are now desperately starved for resources. Unless we can begin to reduce international tensions and to substitute programs of security through negotiation for the elusive quest for security through competition, the prospects for meeting the human needs of this planet are dim indeed.

These, then, are the real stakes in the decisions we and the Soviets face in the coming months. More than at any time in the postwar period, it may be possible for us and the Soviets, acting together, to choose the risks we will bear; to ease the strains on our societies by reducing the burdens and hazards of unending strategic competition. The moment is opportune, and the opportunity is too precious to lose.

#### CONSUMER PROTECTIONS

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, a recent issue of the CWA News, the official national newspaper of the Communica-

tions Workers of America, AFL-CIO, contained a comprehensive roundup of consumer protections that this Congress must face up to. Interest in these issues is widespread—and it should be, for they directly affect every citizen. I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "Let the Buyer Be Protected," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### LET THE BUYER BE PROTECTED

(NOTE.—The beginning of 1969 brought a new President, a new Congress and presumably new attitudes in many corners of the U.S. But the nation's interest in one old thought—consumer protection—was heightening.)

(Almost certainly, the old axiom of Caveat Emptor, "Let the Buyer Beware," will be removed from American usage. Aroused U.S. citizens will not suffer much more abuse.)

(Action may not be swift. But as long as pressure is kept on via public exposure, action will come.)

(The last days of 1968 brought two examples of the kind of commentary that will keep the pressure on:

(Betty Furness, President Johnson's adviser on consumer affairs, wrapped up her work with a parting blast at manufacturers' warranties, which she described as "more garbage than guaranty." She also decried the apparent attitude of President-elect Nixon, who, "in effect said he felt consumer protection should go back to each of the Federal agencies. In theory, that's a marvelous idea, but in practice that isn't the way it works.")

("Nader's Raiders," a group of seven young lawyers assembled by Ralph Nader, a guiding light in exploration of consumer protection, released a study made last summer of the Federal Trade Commission. It amounted to a scathing denunciation of the FTC and its chairman Paul Rand Dixon in such terms as "inept" and "anachronistic." Such charges as "cronyism" have been refuted by Dixon, but even if the truth lies somewhere between, the report still has the effect of focusing attention on consumers' needs.)

(While support of consumer protections is wholly predictable from such sources as Betty Furness and Ralph Nader, support also came from surprising sources, such as George R. Vila, chairman and president of Uniroyal Inc.)

(Implying that industry was getting what it deserved, Vila laid part of the blame on intensive TV and other advertising. As a result, Vila said, "The consumer—already suffering from a sense of alienation—is constantly bombarded by 72 fiercely competing advertising claims. Is it any wonder he winds up with a feeling of hostility and suspicion?" ("We cannot ignore what is happening," Vila concluded. "We care not to merely confront it with blind resistance. Consumerism will not disappear.")

#### TAX REFORM

Perhaps fundamental to the whole question of the U.S. consumers' needs is the right to an equitable tax structure which leaves the U.S. working men and women paying their fair share—but only their fair share—of the costs of operating the Federal, state, and local governments.

The benefits from a redistribution of the tax load are many and obvious. First, a fair redistribution would leave the working man more money. Second, the increased revenue when previous freeloaders assumed their fair share would provide the kind of expanded services the working man has a right to expect, all the way from highways to low-interest housing loans.

But, unfortunately, the U.S. tax system is not equitably distributed. Even the National

Observer, a weekly newspaper published by the Wall Street Journal—credentials that hardly qualify the Observer as a friend of the working man—has gotten on the bandwagon, citing these glaring examples of inequity:

—A wealthy widow with an annual income of \$1.5 million in interest from tax exempt municipal and state bonds pays nothing in federal income tax—in fact, she doesn't even file a return. Yet her gardener, who makes \$5,000 a year, must pay \$350 in income taxes.

—An apartment building owner has earned \$7.5 million in personal income in the past seven years. This should put him in the 70 percent tax bracket, or about \$5 million in income taxes. But by carefully using the "fast depreciation" loophole, he paid only \$800,000 over the seven years. That's the same rate, 11 percent, paid by a man with a \$10,000 a year income and two children.

—A man purchased \$10,000 worth of stock, which he kept until his death, when it was worth \$100,000. It passes to his heir and there will be no income tax—then or ever—on the \$90,000 in capital gains. That case history of a loophole was cited by Rep. Henry Reuss (D-Wis.), who estimates that \$2.5 billion is lost in Federal income taxes each year because of failure to tax inherited gains.

Other examples are legion. Some of the foremost examples of tax loopholes feature depletion allowances on oil and other minerals, exemptions for charitable deductions and tax-free "non-profit" foundations.

The charitable contributions can be expertly employed. For instance, one aspect of the Federal law provides that if in 8 of the previous 10 years a person's charitable contributions plus his federal income tax payments add up to 90 percent of his taxable income, he can deduct an unlimited amount for contributions to charity in the present year.

The tax-free state and local government bonds may be the most galling to the working man of all the tax loopholes. Originally intended to help state and local governments provide schools and other public services, studies by the AFL-CIO reveal that in many instances, "This federal subsidy has been perverted into a tax loophole promoting plant piracy, enticing runaway shops when many communities used tax-free bonds to build plants for private use and private profit."

Obviously, the plugging of just a few of the more glaring loopholes would allow raising of the current \$600 per dependent exemption to \$1,000.

#### AUTO INSURANCE

One of the hottest items in the current consumer cauldron is the issue of inordinate rates paid by U.S. drivers for often inadequate amounts of automobile insurance protection.

For the long run, the issue evolves around the Keeton-O'Connell plan. Strongly endorsed by the CWA Executive Board when it was first introduced, the Keeton-O'Connell plan calls for the elimination of the long and costly process of establishing blame in auto accident cases with losses of under \$10,000. Devised by two young law professors, the plan would revolutionize the whole concept of auto insurance—and drastically reduce costs to the consumer.

Meanwhile, such groups as the Ohio State AFL-CIO have come up with some startling inadequacies in current protections. For instance, the Ohio AFL-CIO study shows that auto insurance rates have risen a startling 25.8 percent in the past three years. That compares with an over-all increase in the state's economy (consumer price index) of barely 11 percent.

And what are auto owners getting for the increased premiums?

Not much, according to the AFL-CIO findings in Ohio.

A December report revealed case after case of policy holders being cancelled without apparent cause, then being re-classified as high

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a greater tax loss than the depletion allowance.

"It's another example of the oil companies finding a crack in the tax laws and widening it until it reaches the proportions of a chasm."

#### TIGHTER TAX LAWS FAVORED

A majority of 300 top corporation executives surveyed by a leading business magazine favor closing of loopholes in the nation's federal income tax laws.

Results of the survey—published this month by "Dun's Review Magazine," showed that most business leaders favor:

Reducing tax shelters such as the 27½ % oil depletion allowance.

A closer look at some of the exemptions currently enjoyed by tax-free foundations.

Eliminating some deductions now used by individuals and a lowering of the over-all tax rate.

Taxing at least half the income of every individual—regardless of the source of the income.

Commenting on the poll, the magazine stated:

"Amid this swelling bipartisan support for an overhaul of the tax laws, perhaps the most surprising aspect of the survey of business leaders is the growing sentiment it discloses for reducing the availability of tax shelters."

#### OIL FIRMS LOST BATTLE, WON WAR

WASHINGTON.—The government tried to plug a petroleum industry income tax loophole back in 1958 and the big loser was the U.S. Treasury.

The reason:

In a successful legal battle to close one loophole, worth a few million dollars to oilmen, the government opened another loophole worth an estimated billion dollars or more to the same oilmen.

Looking back on the legal proceedings, a Capitol Hill tax expert says:

"It is the most expensive victory the government ever won."

The unusual victory came in a decision handed down April 14, 1958, by the U.S. Supreme Court in a case known as the P. G. Lake Case.

For the oil industry, it was a landmark decision that opened the door to a billion dollar tax dodge through the use of carved out production payments.

The issue then before the court was this: Should the proceeds of a production payment be taxed at the low capital gains rate of 25 % or at the ordinary income tax rates that ranged up to 91 %?

Until 1958, lower courts and the U.S. Tax Court had held that the sale of a carved out production payment constituted the transfer of a capital asset.

Using this interpretation of a production payment, the lower courts said the proceeds from the transaction should be taxed as a capital gain.

The Lake case was a consolidation of five separate cases, four involving oil production payments and one dealing with sulphur.

The lower courts had sustained the taxpayer's argument that the production payment represented the sale of a capital asset and thereby the lower tax rate.

In appealing the case to the Supreme Court, the government contended that the payments were merely an assignment of future income subject to taxation as ordinary income and not capital gains.

The Supreme Court upheld the government, moving The New York Times to report the following day:

"The Supreme Court held unanimously that payments for rights to future oil profits are taxable as ordinary income, not as capital gains."

"The ruling was a blow to what has become a widespread practice in the oil industry, so-called 'in-oil payments.'"

"Forty-three cases are pending before the Internal Revenue Service and officials have said 'many millions' in tax revenue are at stake.

"In the government's view, the disputed practice was a way to anticipate future income and avoid paying full income tax on it."

As a result of the court's decision, the production payment device has been used by the oilmen not to "avoid paying full income tax"—but to avoid paying any income tax, as explained.

The decision paved the way for an oil company to create self-induced paper losses that may be used to reduce or eliminate the income tax payments of not only the oil company but its subsidiaries.

In the Lake case, the legal issues considered by the Supreme Court were quite narrow and did not involve the propriety of selling production payments to reduce taxes.

But the Tax Court, other lower courts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) all have issued similar opinions on techniques employed to lower income taxes.

Typical is a decision handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, which states:

"The legal right of the taxpayer to decrease the amount of his taxes, or altogether to avoid them by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.

"If, upon careful scrutiny, the transaction has real substance and is not a sham, it matters not whether the taxpayer's aim was 'to avoid taxes or to regenerate the world' . . ."

In private rulings, the IRS has expressed the same opinion on production payments, saying they are proper as long as there is a bona fide transaction.

There is nothing new about the sale of carved out production payments—only the purpose of the transaction has changed over the years.

The use of production payments in the petroleum industry dates back to the turn of the century—years before the United States had an income tax.

At that time, a wildcat oil operator would grant a production payment to a landowner in exchange for the right to drill on his property.

This concept later was expanded and the wildcaters gave the production payments to drilling companies—instead of cash—for their services.

The final refinement came in the last few years when tax experts found a way to reduce and often eliminate an oil or minerals company's federal income tax liability through the sale of a production payment.

#### ABM NEEDED TO PROTECT U.S. DETERRENT

Mr. JACKSON, Mr. President, as Senators know, the Committee on Armed Services, under the able chairmanship of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), held 2 days of public hearings last week on the proposed anti-ballistic-missile defense system. The hearings were held in connection with the yearly legislation authorizing funds for fiscal year 1970 for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, ships, and research and development.

On April 22 the distinguished scientist, Dr. William G. McMillan, professor of chemistry at the University of California at Los Angeles and noted specialist on such strategic nuclear matters as re-entry vehicle vulnerability, penetration aids, nuclear weapons effects and missile vulnerability, expressed to the committee his views in support of early deployment of the Safeguard ABM system as an essential part of maintaining the viability and credibility of our strategic deterrent.

I wish to commend to the attention of this body Dr. McMillan's opening statement given before the Armed Services Committee and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY DR. WILLIAM G. McMILLAN, BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, APRIL 22, 1969

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, your invitation has provided me a welcome opportunity to offer my views on the issue of ballistic missile defense.

Since this is my first appearance before your committee, I thought I should begin by sketching my technical background and experience.

#### BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE

I received my doctorate at Columbia University during World War II in that hybrid field known as chemical physics. Immediately thereafter I joined the Columbia University branch of the Manhattan Project as a member of the Chemistry Division, where we were deeply involved in the design of the gaseous diffusion plant for the production of U<sup>235</sup>. After the war, I spent a year as a Guggenheim Postdoctoral Fellow in theoretical physics at the University of Chicago. In 1947 I joined the faculty of the Department of Chemistry at UCLA, where latterly I served six years as Department Chairman. I have also taught at Harvard and Columbia Universities.

During the 50's I served as consultant to the Engineering Department of Brookhaven National Laboratory and to the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore. Since 1954 I have been a part-time member of the Physics Department of the Rand Corporation, where my work has been concerned primarily with such strategic nuclear matters as re-entry vehicle vulnerability, penetration aids, underground nuclear testing and test detection, nuclear weapon effects and missile vulnerability.

In mid-1961 in anticipation of the Soviet abrogation of the nuclear test moratorium I was charged with forming the Scientific Advisory Group on Effects to advise the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Defense Atomic Support Agency. This group played a large role in designing the U.S. nuclear test programs aimed at exploring many of the strategic nuclear problems mentioned above.

In 1963 I was asked to chair a study group on missile vulnerability for DDR&E, the Air Force and the Navy. This group, which is still in existence, greatly extended our understanding of missile vulnerability and sponsored far-reaching changes in the design of our strategic missiles.

With the support of DDR&E and the Advanced Research Projects Agency, I founded in 1964 the Defense Science Seminar aimed at getting new young scientific talent in the defense advisory business. This seminar ran for three successive summers, with a total attendance of about 120 individuals. In 1965 I helped establish the Defense Intelligence Agency Scientific Advisory Committee, which I have since served as Vice Chairman. Also in 1965 I chaired a study for the JCS on the technical-military implications of possible extensions of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In 1966 I participated in a related study for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Most recently from October 1966 through December 1968, I served in Viet Nam as Science Advisor to COMUSMACV.

#### THE THREAT

As Mr. Nitze so ably described, the intransigence of the Soviet Union after World War II left us no alternative to the development of a strong nuclear deterrent. The hope that the Soviets would join with us under the Baruch plan for sharing the great potential of the nuclear age was shattered with the



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first Soviet atomic explosion in 1949. Similarly the national debate over the decision to develop thermonuclear devices was punctuated emphatically by the first Soviet thermonuclear explosion in 1953.

Our policy of nuclear deterrence, which came to maturity under President Eisenhower, has I believe served us well. There are, however, two current Soviet developments that threaten the survivability and credibility of our deterrent: their ballistic missile defense systems; and their counterforce efforts.

For some years I have followed closely the growth of the Soviet ABM systems. By my reckoning there have been three systems involved: the first, partially deployed around Leningrad and then apparently abandoned; the second, deployed around Moscow and now approaching operational status; and the third or Tallinn system, very extensively deployed throughout the Soviet Union, and which appears to me likely to have a considerable ABM potential.

I find very unpersuasive the argument that the Soviets are building in the Tallinn development yet another SAM antiaircraft system to the neglect of a defensive system aimed at what they must surely regard as the more current threat of ICBM's and SLBM's.

By the counterforce effort I refer to the current Soviet development of multiple warheads for their SS-9 missile. To me the evidence as I understand it points very strongly, if not unequivocally, towards a MIRV—i.e., a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle-system designed against the U.S. land-based Minuteman system.

To impart some feeling for the strength of my conviction on these two Intelligence issues, I would strongly support spending a substantial fraction of our Defense budget to assure that neither of these Soviet developments be allowed to degrade our strategic deterrent.

Put differently, I am most certainly not willing to gamble the survival of our Minuteman force that such an interpretation is wrong.

In addition to the question of capability, Intelligence must concern itself with the question of intent. Here the writing of such high-level Soviet military planners as Marshal Sokolovsky abound with references to the need for a preemptive strategic first-strike capability. They tell themselves they must develop it, and now we see that development in progress. How much more notification do we need?

In this focussing on the survivability of Minuteman one often encounters the rebuttal—"Well, there is always Polaris." This seems to me a hazardous position. The whole point of the mix of strategic weapons systems—Minuteman, Polaris, Poseidon, B52 Bombers—is to have such diversification that our deterrent could never be totally negated. I am sure that if we are willing to write off Minuteman as a component of our deterrent forces, we would not have any difficulty inducing the Soviets then to focus their full counterforce genius against our submarine and bomber forces. In fact, I fully expect there has already been long established a Soviet group charged with developing specific means of countering such element of our deterrent. To them, Polaris may not look like 600 missiles, or 6,000 warheads if given a ten-fold MIRV multiplication, but rather as only 41 boats to be neutralized. Certainly we know the Soviets are engaged in large-scale ASW developments. And our 600 B-52 bombers may be viewed as a much smaller number of airfields to be attacked—for which they may think their Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) is well suited.

Turning to the Chinese Peoples Republic, it is no secret that their progress in the development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons has been spectacularly rapid. While

their missile program has been less spectacular, there can be little doubt that they are striving to achieve an ICBM capability. Now who will those ICBM's be aimed at? It should be a sobering thought that no Chinese ICBM's would be necessary if only the Soviet Union were their target.

As to intent of the CPR, we have the wonderfully candid statement of Marshall Lin Piao, Minister of Defense, in September of 1965. This document developed the theme that the U.S. nuclear capability is a paper tiger, and "cannot save U.S. imperialism from its doom." It also laid out a blueprint for what Marshall Lin euphemistically termed "peoples wars of national liberation," a blue-print that is being followed by the North Vietnamese in their invasion of South Viet Nam.

Thus, while I had no part even as an advisor in the Sentinel deployment decision, which occurred while I was on overseas assignment, it did seem to me a prudent move to anticipate a CPR ICBM threat.

#### TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY

It has been argued that even if there were a sound military requirement for the Safeguard ABM System it wouldn't work anyway. The technical reasons adduced for this view include:

1. It is too complicated.
2. There is insufficient reaction time for human decision-making.
3. It was designed for another purpose ("thin" defense of cities against a CPR attack) and is thus unsuited for the defense of Minuteman.
4. The radars can be blacked out.
5. Cheap and simple decoys can saturate the defense.

Before commenting on these points I must emphasize that I have no special expertise in the engineering of either missiles or radar—although I have studied Professor Panofsky's excellent book on Electromagnetic Theory. But we have all seen some other fairly complicated systems built by our aerospace industrial complex that work, and work well; for example, the Explorer, Surveyor and Mariner space shots, topped by the magnificent performance of the Christmas round-the-moon Apollo excursion. The use of solid state electronic components, which were invented only a few short years ago, has made possible a vast improvement in reliability. It would, of course, be folly to expect no difficulties, no start-up bugs in any new system. But both the Spartan and Sprint missiles have been successfully flown many times. At Kwajalein there has been constructed a Missile Site Radar (MSR) that will soon be tested in operational launches, and somewhat later in actual ICBM reentry-vehicle intercepts. Already in operation are numerous phased-array radars employing the same basic principles as the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR). The computer required is well within the state of the art. The nuclear warheads are either already developed or can be tested underground. In other words there is a justifiably high confidence that each and every component is completely feasible.

The short time in which an ABM system must react is indeed a severe problem. But it seems to me far better to place that burden upon a defensive system which would not trigger a nuclear exchange, rather than upon our ICBM's which certainly would if they had to be launched on warning.

Since the new Safeguard deployment has brought into question the rationale behind the original Sentinel deployment, I believe it may be useful to quote an important part that seems to have been overlooked in Secretary McNamara's San Francisco address on 18 September 1967. He said,

"Further, the Chinese-oriented ABM deployment would enable us to add—as a concurrent benefit—a further defense of our

Minuteman sites against Soviet attack, which means that at a modest cost we would in fact be adding even greater effectiveness to our offensive missile force and avoiding a much more costly expansion of that force."

This statement is, of course, borne out by the proposed Sentinel deployment, in which 4-face MSR's along with complements of both Spartan and Sprint missiles were to be collocated at both Grand Forks and Malmstrom, the same two Minuteman bases to be given priority protection under the Safeguard proposal. In other words, the difference between the two deployments is more one of emphasis than of kind.

Of course, many other approaches to hard-point defense have been examined, but precious—perhaps even critical—years would be lost in starting over at this point.

A blackout attack, like that of a direct attack upon the radars—the eyes and ears of the ABM system—is of course a possible enemy option, but is neither simple, guaranteed to work nor cheap in ICBM's and nuclear warheads. To be sure, any defensive system can be burned through with enough concentration by the offense, but this absorbs time that would upset a concerted attack, and absorbs warheads that could have caused great casualties elsewhere.

Any nation, like the CPR, who can produce ICBM's and nuclear warheads can of course also develop penetration aids—given time. In my view we can only hope to buy time, time to give our political colleagues and their foreign counterparts an opportunity to realize a workable arms control agreement based upon mutual concern, mutual restraint and mutual dedication.

#### ALTERNATIVE COURSES

In his San Francisco speech, Secretary McNamara made clear that intensive consideration was being given to others means of protecting our land-based deterrent: mobility, super-hardening, etc. It is strange to find some of those individuals who most strongly oppose ABM deployment because of the risk of escalating the arms race now advocating proliferation of our Minuteman system to assure its survivability.

In previous hearings of this Congress some have even suggested launching the Minuteman force on warning as a tenable course, or undertaking a preemptive strike against the CPR if their ICBM threat becomes intolerable.

I want to go on record as unalterably opposed to any intentional action—or intentional lack of action—that would maneuver the United States into such a position that only a strike-first option remained.

#### INTERNATIONAL OVERTONES

One of the most often expressed arguments against ABM is that it will inaugurate a new cycle of escalation in the arms race. Some of this fear may have been allayed by the reorientation of Safeguard to the defense of our deterrent forces. But it is noteworthy that the Soviets first formally announced their interest in arms limitation shortly after the U.S. decision was reached to deploy the Sentinel System. The Safeguard deployment in no way reduces the deterrence inherent in the Soviet retaliatory capability. That the Soviets understand the desirability and innocuousness of such a defense is illustrated by Premier Kosygin's declaration that their ABM system is a threat to no nation and does not contribute to an arms race.

Personally I should be sorry to see even the thin city defense permanently rejected. I believe such a defense might serve to dampen an unwelcome CPR adventurousness, and thus to maintain for us a wider class of options and more room for political maneuver.

Finally, I believe the maintenance of the credibility of our deterrent—to which Safeguard would contribute—is absolutely essential in our relations with NATO and our other allies around the world.



# CONCLUSION

There are two additional reasons, which may even be the strongest of all for an early deployment of the Safeguard system. First, a review of the Soviet ABM programs indicates that they have for a number of years been gaining operational experience from actually deployed systems, whereas we have not. We can ill afford to allow an important gap to develop in the learning process concerning such an important capability. Second, it is only through the actual deployment of the major system elements that we can learn with certainty how to cope with the problems that will surely arise in command, control, communications and the inter-action and internetting of the radars with each other and with the rest of the system.

I believe that the great majority of the American people, with their down-to-earth commonsense, are having as great a difficulty as I am in swallowing the sophisticated arguments that conclude it is somehow bad to defend ourselves. I simply do not understand why it is provocative for the U.S. to deploy an ABM system as we are here considering today, but not provocative of the Soviet Union to have already deployed two ABM systems; nor why it would be provocative of us to defend our Minuteman forces against a developing Soviet preemptive first-strike capability, whereas it is not provocative of the Soviets to develop that destabilizing capability. We are told, in effect, to stop our provocative action of punching the Soviets on their fist with our eye. I sincerely hope that such an inverted Alice-In-Wonderland view of the world will not be allowed to prevail.

In summary, I support the early deployment of the Safeguard system as an essential part of maintaining the viability and credibility of our strategic deterrent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## INDUSTRY MAKING MAJOR EFFORT IN POLLUTION CONTROL

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the pollution of our air and water is accepted as one of the major problems facing the United States today.

The growth of our population and the resulting increasing in the industry and services necessary to sustain it has made the control of pollution more essential than ever before. In recent years, enlightened industry has joined with all levels of government in an effort to return our environment to a state of cleanliness and purity.

In the space of 5 years air pollution control expenditures by the Federal Government have jumped from \$4.1 million to \$91 million. This year the Government plans to spend \$133 million.

A beginning has been made, Mr. President, but we have considerably more to do. Yes; much to do.

American industry recognizes the need to continue antipollution work and has itself made constructive contributions to the campaign in both talent and money.

The very nature of the business makes the American steel industry deeply involved in pollution problems, and there are notable examples of success in reducing the amount of waste material loosed in the atmosphere and streams.

Our steel industry last year spent \$222 million to improve air and water quality, almost evenly divided between the two. This was in addition to expenditures in the preceding 16 years totaling \$600 million.

Steel spokesmen affirm that the job in reducing pollution is going forward. They are dedicated to continue high-level spending on antipollution projects.

There are many outstanding examples of new techniques and revolutionary methods being applied to the problems of combatting pollution of the air and water.

In our State of West Virginia, for example, a new \$100 million plant at Weirton Steel Co. has been called the "mill of the future," combining in a new facility many modern antipollution devices in addition to modern steel-producing equipment.

And a new electric power plant near Moundsville, W. Va., the Mitchell plant owned by American Electric Power Co., has a stack 1,206 feet tall to carry waste gases high into the atmosphere and away from the ground. This is approximately three times as tall as the average.

The electric power industry as a whole spent \$98 million to abate pollution in 1967. During the same year, the chemical industry was spending \$87 million, petroleum \$47 million and coal \$18 million fighting these problems in their own spheres.

So, while we may sometimes think that little is being done to purify our environment, there is ample proof that industry, as well as government, is making a determined effort to create and keep clean air and water in America.

## S. 1717—A BILL TO INCREASE THE INCOME TAX EXEMPTION, SUPPORTED BY JACK BOSTICK, VICE PRESIDENT OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, recently I introduced a bill, S. 1717, to increase the personal income tax exemption from \$600 to \$1,200. As I said at the time I introduced by bill, I feel that we have waited far too long to take such action.

Recently, I received a letter from my good friend Jack Bostick, vice president of the International Association of Fire Fighters. Mr. Bostick is a fellow Texan and lives in Fort Worth, Tex. He enclosed with his letter a resolution which was recently adopted by the IAFF in convention. Because the resolution pertains "to the spirit, if not the letter" of my bill, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### RESOLUTION No. 86

Re increase in exemption for dependents from \$600 to \$1800 for each dependent for income tax purposes.

Whereas in the past number of years the cost of living has risen steadily and in many instances wages have not kept pace with the rapid rise, and

Whereas for the above reason the cost of supporting a family and dependents has increased greatly, and

Whereas the present \$600.00 exemption for a dependent is no longer a realistic figure: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the International Association of Fire Fighters strive for Federal legislation to increase the \$600.00 exemption for

a dependent to an \$1800.00 exemption for each dependent for income tax purposes; and be it further

Resolved, That the International Association of Fire Fighters solicit the aid of all organized labor and pursue this legislation with a united front.

Submitted by: Local Union No. 344, Detroit Fire Fighter Association, Earl L. Sanders, Secretary.

## SENATOR NELSON FIGHTS FOR TIGHTER TRUTH IN PACKAGING STANDARDS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, an editorial published in the May issue of Wisconsin's nationally known the Progressive magazine, edited by Morris Rubin, tells of the frustrations and confusion confronting the housewife in performing her routine but important task of shopping for the family groceries.

In 1966, Congress passed the Truth in Packaging Act, aimed at removing deceptively packaged products from the supermarkets. However, consumer studies conducted before and after enactment of this law have proved that the Truth in Packaging Act has not accomplished all that it set out to do.

Our distinguished colleague and my fellow Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), has long been a vigorous spokesman for the consumer. We are all familiar with his outstanding achievements in investigating the high costs of prescription drugs and in assuring the highest safety standards in automobiles and automobile tires. Now Senator Nelson has introduced an amendment to the 1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act which would require the price per unit to be placed on the label of consumer commodities, including food, household goods, drugs and cosmetics.

The Progressive's editorial is just one of the many voices urging Congress to take action on this important legislation, S. 1424. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### CHEAPER BY THE POUND

Three years ago this spring—before Congress enacted the "truth-in-packaging" bill—we reported in these columns on an Eastern Michigan University survey involving thirty-three college-educated housewives who were turned loose in a supermarket with identical shopping lists. Confronted by a staggering variety of sizes and deceptive labeling of grocery and household goods, these shoppers were misled into spending an average of \$10 for purchases that could have been made for \$8.90.

Food industry lobbyists successfully persuaded Congress to pass only a diluted truth-in-packaging law in 1966. As a result, confusion still reigns in packaging. Senator Gaylord Nelson, Wisconsin Democrat, recently pointed out that "consumers today still must be mathematicians before they can select the best bargain from among the vast variety of odd-sized packages on the market."

He cited two consumer tests conducted in California, one before and one after the Federal law was enacted. In a 1962 test five college-educated housewives were asked to buy a total of seventy items at the lowest unit costs. The women made thirty-four incorrect choices and thirty-six correct ones.

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In an identical test made after the law went into effect, the women made thirty-eight incorrect choices—four more than before the law was operative—and only thirty-two correct ones.

Senator Nelson proposed that the 1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act be amended to require that a per unit price be placed on the labels of commodities, including food, household goods, drugs, and cosmetics. Thus, a package of pancake mix containing forty-two ounces and priced at sixty cents would show not only the sixty cent price but a price of twenty-three cents per pound. This would enable housewives who see on the grocery shelves "thirty-two different choices of pancake mix in thirteen different size packages at twenty-one different prices," as the Senator described it, to judge value by comparing the price per pound.

Products would be priced per ounce or pound for solid commodities, by the pint or quart for fluids, and per unit for packages of napkins and similar items.

The principle is not new, said Nelson, since the practice of printing the price per pound has long been used in supermarkets on packages of meat, fish, and poultry. His proposal would permit housewives to get the best buy for their money without requiring a slide rule or calculating machine.

The lack of unit price information which caused housewives in the 1966 Michigan study to pay twelve per cent more than they should have, is probably even costlier in dollars and cents today because of sharp price rises in the past few years. Inflation has made it more urgent than ever that Senator Nelson's amendment be made part of a strengthened and updated truth-in-packaging law.

#### QUESTIONS CONCERNING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, an editorial published recently in the *Paragould, Ark., Daily Press* asks some sobering and important questions about our continuing involvement in Vietnam. Referring to the more than 33,000 Americans who have been killed there, the editorial points out that these questions become "more urgent with every casualty."

These are urgent questions. I ask unanimous consent to have the editorial entitled "Question" printed in the *Record*.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

##### QUESTION

The Congressional Record of March 25 contains 31,379 names—162 from Arkansas—captioned "List of Casualties Incurred by U.S. Military Personnel in Connection with the Conflict in Vietnam."

Each casualty is listed by name and hometown.

The hometowns: Paragould, Jonesboro, Leachville, Rector, Marked Tree, Walnut Ridge, Trumann, Blytheville, Colt, Hoxie, Corning, Little Rock, Camden, Wynne, Dell, to name a few. Paragould is listed twice, Timothy Eugene Clark and Teddy Gene Whitton.

The names listed are all of those killed by hostile action from the very beginning of the war through the end of January 1969.

Congressman Paul Findley of Illinois caused these names to be printed in the Congressional Record to raise some "sobering questions:

"What advantage to our national interest has been secured by the death of the men listed on the following pages?

"Were sacrifices of this magnitude justified by events and issues in Vietnam?"

"The listing," Findley opined, "is especially appropriate this week because, making adjustment for the Department of Defense's 1-week lag in reporting those killed in action, it is clear that Vietnam deaths have now surpassed Korea. Nearly one-third occurred since the peace offensive began last March 31."

One hundred twenty-one solid pages are taken up with triple rows of names, listed alphabetically by states, and branch of service.

Findley, in his accompanying remarks, made this essential point:

"The men who have died in this mistaken conflict nevertheless deserve every recognition and honor. The fact that misguided national leadership, in which I freely acknowledge my own share of the blame, erred in sending them to war diminished in no way whatever their heroism, made no easier their sacrifice, and lessened not at all the anguish of their relatives."

He went on in this vein:

"Questions that inevitably will be asked are: Would withdrawal dishonor those who have died? Would it be a camouflaged surrender unworthy of our nation? Perhaps the best answer is another question: Will additional casualties alone rectify mistaken war policy?"

"If the premise is accepted—as I believe it must be—that our military policies have been based on false assumptions all along, then the best way to honor the war dead is to take steps to assure that the casualty lists stop growing.

"To waste additional lives simply because of previous deaths is rationalization so warped as to dishonor every noble sentiment attached to the name America."

Findley, who admitted to coming to his view "relatively late" yielded the floor at one point to his "leader," Rep. Tim Lee Carter of Kentucky, who described the list as a "roll of honor, consisting almost entirely of men between 19 and 24 years of age."

Carter also said, "we must recall when this started it was not in 1963 or 1964. This was first escalated in 1961 when 17,000 men were first placed over there. Later, in 1964, about the time of the Tonkin Bay resolution, we were told that our vessels, the destroyers, *Maddox* and the *C. Turner Joy* were under attack by North Vietnamese vessels. Hearings . . . have shown beyond doubt the commanders of those vessels today know not whether they were attacked or not, and will not state whether they were attacked at that time.

" . . . And still we are in this ceaseless, tireless war, where our men are mangled and mutilated, and in which 33,000 have now been killed, over 200,000 have been wounded, and \$100 billion has been blown away."

This is precisely the problem which the Nixon Administration has inherited. One may disagree with the conclusions of Findley and Carter, but can we continue to justify more casualties primarily through appeals to national vanity?

The questions raised by Findley, too, become more urgent with every casualty.

#### FARMWORKER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, currently the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare is conducting hearings on S. 8, which would authorize farmworkers to organize for purposes of collective bargaining. I ask unanimous consent that the testimony of Reed Larson, executive vice president of the National Right To Work Committee, regarding S. 8 be printed in the *Record*.

There being no objection, the state-

ment was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

STATEMENT OF REED LARSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE, BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and to present our views on the important legislative matter under consideration.

My name is Reed Larson. I am the Executive Vice President of the National Right to Work Committee, a single-purpose citizen's organization dedicated solely to the protection, for every worker, of the free choice to join or not to join a union. Our members and supporters represent a cross-section of persons from all walks of life, including professional people, rank-and-file wage-earners—both union and non-union—businessmen, and others. Like most Americans, and certainly like every member of the Committee, we are anxious to see that every working man has the greatest possible opportunity to utilize his talents to the maximum extent of his ability. The concern expressed by members of the Committee for the plight of migrant workers is, indeed, an integral part of a broader fight for freedom and opportunity for all Americans. Our organization is concerned with a particular facet of this struggle for equal opportunity—and we believe one of the most important facets.

Experience has shown repeatedly that, while the right to organize and bargain collectively can be an important tool for the working man in achieving justice the widespread practice of compulsory unionism has increasingly perverted this tool into an instrument of political and economic repression.

We believe that passage of S. 8, as presently drafted, would be a step in the wrong direction—a step toward restricting rather than enhancing the opportunities available to farm workers throughout America.

We neither advocate nor oppose the extension of representation elections and mandatory collective bargaining to farm workers. However, we strongly believe that adoption of the provisions of this bill which provide for compulsory unionism will work against the public interest and the interests of working people everywhere.

I think all of us would agree that one of the factors which has led to the introduction of this legislation and has helped to focus attention on this question is the widely-publicized effort by the AFL-CIO's United Farmworkers Organizing Committee to curtail the sale of California grapes by our nation's food stores. The stated purpose of the boycott promoters is to pressure grape growers into holding employee elections to determine whether or not employees which to be represented by unions. The facts indicate this may not be their real objective. As we have stated publicly many times, the real boycott objective is "to compel employers to compel their employees to join a union in order to work."

However, if we accept at face value the stated objectives of Mr. Chavez, his superiors in the AFL-CIO, and the many concerned citizens who have become involved in this controversy, there is very little room for disagreement. A bill can be drafted to carry out those objectives which would meet almost no opposition. We certainly do not object to giving farm workers an opportunity to vote on union representation. From what I have read, most of the growers are agreeable to such a provision—and surely the overwhelming majority of Members of the Congress will agree. So, there is no problem unless the real objective of the AFL-CIO and their Mr. Chavez is something other than that which they publicly say it is. We say they want compulsory unionism. AFL-CIO officials say they don't. As recently as Febru-

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## MILITARY VALUE AND POLITICAL COST

This, in effect, scathing criticism of McNamara aroused to his defence his fellow-rationalist McGeorge Bundy, who had by then left the White House to become President of the Ford Foundation. He, too, had now become doubtful of the effectiveness of military measures, however well executed, in a limited war. He took the Committee to task: "Nothing is less reliable than the unsupported opinion of men who are urging the value of their own chosen instrument—in this case military force. We must not be surprised, and still less persuaded, when generals and admirals recommend additional military action—what do we expect them to recommend?"

He warned that careful judgment was required between military value and political costs. The ideologists continued to hold fast, but the rationalists had had second thoughts. As McGeorge Bundy now confessed, "Grey is the colour of truth."

On September 29, the President revealed in San Antonio his new negotiating formula, which by then was already in the hands of Hanoi.

Just before Christmas General Westmoreland, the U.S. Commander in Vietnam, and Ellsworth Bunker, the Ambassador in Saigon, returned to the U.S. to sprinkle some optimism into everybody's ears. They both talked about "light at the end of the tunnel," but many suspected that Johnson was using them to set the right mood and tone for the Presidential election year of 1968.

And, in fact, it had been clear for some time that the war had become a stalemate. The word was resented in the Johnson Administration, but until the Tet offensive began in February, 1968, its use was accurate. The Tet offensive caught the U.S. forces off guard and proved how vulnerable they still were; but their counter-offensive, so to say, restored the stalemate. It did not restore, though, the lost confidence in the political and military assessments from Saigon.

## THE ABM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the ABM debate symbolizes and encompasses

more than a weapons system. The development of technology as applied to missile systems and other implements of war affect our chances for disarmament and tend to distort domestic priorities. They have great implications not only in the military field but in the fields of industry, labor, the universities, and politics and all these factors can be, and have been, without any prior determination and without any deliberate intent, developed into a partnership of enormous proportions.

Mr. President, I have nothing but the greatest respect for the military. I think they are doing their job with integrity, dedication, and patriotism. I have great respect for industry in this country. They are seeking business and achieving it. Sometimes I think perhaps they go to undue lengths. I have great respect for labor, too, but labor too often finds desirable the jobs which missile installations and other systems make available, the work pays well and often carries a good deal of overtime.

The universities have also been benefiting for some time. The latest figure I have indicates that last year, educational and nonprofit institutions earned \$772 million in research contracts—\$16 million more than in 1967.

For example, with no intention of impugnng any university, but rather to note their excellence, I note from published news sources that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is in 10th place in this field, with \$119 million in Defense research contracts, and that the Johns Hopkins University, for example, is in 22d place with \$57,600,000.

As far as the politics is concerned there are many of us in this Chamber, myself included, who must share a part

of the responsibility, and a part of any blame, because when it comes to getting defense installations, missile or otherwise, for our States and into our areas, none of us have been shrinking violets. I think that ought to be made clear.

So what has developed along with the technological developments over the past two decades, is a military-industrial-labor-academic-political combination, and that development simply cannot be gainsaid.

To come back to the main theme of my remarks, I would note that the Pentagon's allegation, in defense of the ABM—Safeguard—system, is, in my opinion, predicated on its belief that the Soviet Union is developing a first strike capacity and that almost all our land-based missiles or at least a sizable portion of them would be destroyed on that basis.

It is well to reiterate and to emphasize that the second strike capacity is only in part predicated on the reaction of our land-based missiles and that we have, in addition, 41 Polaris submarines with 656 nuclear missiles and 646 nuclear armed strategic Air Force bombers.

At this point, I ask to have printed in the RECORD a table showing the increase from 1963 through 1968 on the part of the United States and the U.S.S.R. of ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile—SLBM—sea-launched ballistic missile—and total missiles from these two systems. In addition, I would like on the same basis to include the number of intercontinental bombers. All this is public information.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

	1963		1964		1965		1966		1967		1968	
	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.
ICBM launchers.....	514	100	834	200	854	270	934	340	1,054	720	1,054	905
SLBM launchers.....	160	90	416	120	496	120	512	130	656	30	656	45
Total missiles.....	674	190	1,250	320	1,350	390	1,446	470	1,710	750	1,710	945
Intercontinental bombers.....	1,300	155	1,100	155	935	155	680	155	697	155	646	150

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, with regard to this table, I merely wish to say that while the Senator has included, in the table which he has just asked to be inserted, I think, a very complete and very good table of the nuclear weapons, this by no means exhausts the capacity of this country to destroy any enemy or any antagonist, because we have enormous capacity in the field of chemical and bacteriological warfare agents, sufficient at least to duplicate the destructive capacity represented by the figures in the table the Senator has inserted.

I wish only to make the point that this table, with all of its impressive figures, by no means tells the whole story. The Russians, as do we, have, in addition, the further capacity to decimate populations.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), is correct. And may I say that I have not even given all the information at my disposal relative to the number of warheads and the like, but I shall do so now.

It is my understanding, subject to verification, that in 1963 the approximate number of nuclear warheads was 7,844 for the United States and 755 for the Soviet Union and that by 1968 the figure was 8,556 for the United States and 3,295 for the Soviet Union.

I say that subject to verification; but I have a pretty good idea that what I have just stated is fact, and can well be proved.

Another aspect of the development, or in some instances, lack of development, of missiles is indicated by the fact that

approximately \$23 billion has been expended on missile systems planned, produced, deployed, and abandoned. Of that figure about \$4.1 billion was spent on missiles which were abandoned in the research and development stage. I shall ask to have printed in the RECORD a list of major missile projects terminated during the past 16 years and not deployed; but before doing so, I wish to give full credit to the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), who placed these figures in the RECORD on March 7, and thereby made them available to the rest of us.

I now ask unanimous consent that the list of terminated projects be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:



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Project	Year started	Year canceled	Funds invested (millions)
<b>Army:</b>			
Hermes.....	1944	1954	\$36.4
Dart.....	1952	1958	44.0
Loki.....	1948	1956	21.9
Terrier, land based.....	1951	1956	18.6
Plato.....	1951	1958	18.5
Mauler.....	1960	1965	260.0
Total Army.....			399.4
<b>Navy:</b>			
Sparrow I.....	1945	1958	195.6
Regulus II.....	1955	1958	144.4
Petrel.....	1945	1957	87.2
Corvus.....	1954	1960	80.0
Eagle.....	1959	1961	53.0
Meteor.....	1945	1954	52.6
Sparrow II.....	1945	1957	52.0
Rigel.....	1943	1953	38.0
Dove.....	1949	1955	33.7
Triton.....	1948	1957	19.4
Orion.....	1947	1953	12.5
Typhon.....	1958	1964	225.0
Total Navy.....			993.4
<b>Air Force:</b>			
Navaho.....	1954	1957	679.8
Snark.....	1947	1962	677.4
GAM-63 Rascal.....	1946	1958	448.0
GAM-87 Skybolt.....	1960	1963	440.0
Talos, land based.....	1954	1957	118.1
Mobile Minuteman.....	1959	1962	108.4
Q-4 Drone.....	1954	1959	84.4
SM-72 Goose.....	1955	1958	78.5
GAM-67 Crossbow.....	1957	1958	74.6
MMRBM.....	1962	1964	65.4
Total Air Force.....			2,774.6
Grand total.....			4,167.4

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the following table shows the total investment for missile systems which have been deployed but are no longer deployed. These two sets of figures add up to a total of \$23,053 billion:

(Cost in millions)

<b>Army:</b>		
Nike-Ajax.....		\$2,256
Entac (Antitank missile).....		50
Redstone.....		586
Lacrosse.....		347
Corporal.....		534
Jupiter.....		327
Total Army.....		4,100
<b>Navy:</b>		
Polaris A1.....		1,132
Regulus.....		413
Total Navy.....		1,545
<b>Air Force:</b>		
Hounddog A.....		255
Atlas D, E, F.....		5,208
Titan I.....		3,415
Bomarc A.....		1,405
Mace A.....		328
Jupiter.....		498
Thor.....		1,415
Total Air Force.....		13,241
Grand total.....		18,886
Plus missile systems terminated before deployment.....		4,167
Total.....		23,053

In view of the fact that the estimated cost of the Safeguard system will increase considerably above the present approximate \$8 billion—\$6 billion plus for acquisition, construction, and deployment and \$2 billion plus for research and development—that there are grave questions about the reliability of the system; that, inherent in the Safeguard proposal, is the start of a new phase of the arms

race which could cost tens of billions of dollars; and in view of the fact that there are alternatives both of diplomacy and weapons technology which have yet to be considered, it seems to me that it is high time to put first things first.

First, I would suggest that on the basis of a number of Soviet diplomatic probes over the past several months suggesting a readiness to go forward on an arms limitation or freeze, a diplomatic reaction should be tried on our part which might lead to the setting of a time certain in the first part of June for negotiations to begin in earnest between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Second, in the meantime, research and development should be continued on the ABM system to determine more clearly the prospects of resolving the technical problems which have raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of this system.

Third, A year from now, we should know as a result of diplomatic initiatives as well as further research on the ABM whether there is a sound basis for going ahead with the building of an ABM system or for setting it aside entirely. In my judgment the Defense Department and the State Department have not yet provided the Senate with persuasive grounds for going ahead with the deployment of the ABM at this time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I associate myself with the conclusions of the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana. In presenting these facts to the Senate and to the public, he has rendered a great service. I hope that his suggestions will be taken most seriously.

I congratulate the Senator on his fine statement.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have noted with deep interest the views of the Senator from Montana. They are most authoritative and have been well borne out under the auspices of the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Tennessee both in the principal committee and in the subcommittee.

I appreciate the feeling of the President of the United States upon this matter. But I think one thing needs to be made very clear—and I know the Senator from Montana will agree—that there is not one whit less feeling about the security and future of our country in the heart of the Senator from Montana, the Senator from Arkansas, and myself than there is in the heart of the most ardent advocate of the Safeguard or antiballistic-missile system.

There is no partisanship in this matter. I took this position before. The Senator from Arkansas, the Senator from Montana, and the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) also took this position before President Nixon was even considered for the nomination of the Presidency of the United States.

I hope that these two factors may be

made crystal clear by so authoritative a voice as that of the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the distinguished senior Senator from New York. But I think he gives the Senator from Montana too much credit.

I not only appreciate what the Senator had to say, but I also agree with him. There are two sides to this question, maybe the proponents are right.

It is a matter of judgment. It is a matter of searching our consciences to try to find the truth on the basis of the best evidence available, and arriving at a judgment.

I honor the President for being responsible for a review of this system. I appreciate that he made a decided change in the system which he inherited—the Sentinel.

He faced up to his responsibility of exercising his best judgment on the basis of the facts. And what he has done, we in our individual capacities will have to do as well. It is a part of our responsibility as Senators from sovereign States.

I hope that recognition will be given to the fact that probes have been made by the Soviet Union and that the President himself, as well as the Secretary of State, have indicated that there is a very strong possibility that talks will get underway either late this spring or early this summer. We need only refer to Secretary Rogers' latest press conference.

I am somewhat disturbed at the question of priority. I think the key word is "balance"; that we must balance our foreign policy and our defense expenditures, on the one hand, with our domestic problems and needs on the other.

If we can achieve a balance on that basis, we shall all be further ahead than we would be if we were to place too much emphasis on the use of the word "priority" in one field or the other.

If we were to become the strongest nation in the world and were to spend all of the money that has been requested, of what good would it be? If our cities burned and our society were disrupted, our people became discontented and uneasiness were to spread throughout the land, of what good would it be?

That is why we cannot give either of these factors a priority, but, rather, ought to treat them, in effect, as a duality. That is why we must, in accommodation with the President and the executive branch, work to try to obtain a balance. We must face up to these matters which are difficult, but which cannot be avoided.

The matter must be considered, as the distinguished Senator has already said, on a nonpartisan basis.

It will do neither party any good to win a victory in this or in any other area if the country is the loser.

I have been especially pleased with the tone with which the debate on the ABM has developed in the Senate, not only this year but also last year. I have also been pleased with the lack of partisanship and the understanding on the part of the President and the executive branch of our responsibility and our reciprocal understanding.

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Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am grateful to the distinguished majority leader.

## FOUR-STAR SCAPEGOATS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Four-Star Scapegoats," published in the Wall Street Journal of April 24, 1969.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## FOUR-STAR SCAPEGOATS

The "military-industrial complex" has become an increasingly fashionable bogeyman, and indeed the notion is spreading that the generals have created nearly all our national ills by running up defense spending and involving us in Vietnam. These problems are certainly serious, but making the generals scapegoats for them obscures the actual lessons to be learned.

The international climate being what it is, the garrison state remains a real enough long-term danger, though it ought to be plain that at the moment military influence is not burgeoning but plummeting. This long-run danger surely will not be solved by turning military officers into a pariah class, as much as that would please those intolerant whose personality clashes with the military one. The danger requires a far more sober diagnosis, and this would find that many of the present complaints should be directed not at the generals but at their civilian superiors.

We tend to agree, for example, with the complaints that the Pentagon budget is swollen. But it tells us nothing to observe that the officers press for more funds for their department; in this they are no different from any bureaucrat anywhere. Indeed, the same people who think the generals malicious for requesting large funds would find it quite remiss if, say, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare failed to make similar demands for his concerns.

Choosing among competing budget demands is the responsibility of civilians, in the Pentagon, at the White House and in Congress. Part of the current problem seems to be that in the hazyhoo about "scientific" management of the Pentagon, the old-fashioned unsentimental Budget Bureau review was relaxed. More generally, it needs to be recognized that the problem of fat in the budget is due less to the generals' greed than to a want of competence or will in civilian review.

Much the same thing is true in Vietnam. There is plenty of room to criticize the generals' incoherent answer to the problems of limited war, but many of the most decisive mistakes were made by civilians.

Take the failure to understand the escalation of our commitment implicit in supporting the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. After we had implicated ourselves in overthrowing the established anti-Communist government, we could not with any grace walk away without a real effort to salvage the resulting chaos. Reasons of both honor and international credibility left us vastly more committed than before, and it was almost solely the work of civilians.

Or take the fateful decision to have both guns and butter, made in 1965 when the U.S. part of the ground fighting started in earnest. It was a civilian—and in no small part political—decision to avoid mobilization, to build the armed forces gradually, to expand the bombing of North Vietnam at a measured rate, to commit the ground units piecemeal. All of this is in direct contradiction to

the thrust of military wisdom. And if the generals did favor defeating the Communists, the little public record available also suggests they favored means more commensurate with that goal.

The point is not that the generals necessarily should have been given everything they wanted. The point is that the civilians decided to do the job on the cheap. They would have been wiser to listen when the generals told them what means their goal required, then to face the choice between allocating the necessary means or cutting the goal to fit more modest means. This discord between means and goals is in a phrase the source of our misery in Vietnam, and primary responsibility for it rests not on military shoulders but civilian ones.

Blaming the generals for these problems maligns a dedicated and upstanding group of public servants. More than that, it obscures the actual problem with the military-industrial complex itself. For the real long-term danger is that the garrison state will evolve through precisely the type of falling that led to fat in the budget and trouble in Vietnam.

For the foreseeable future an effective military force will remain absolutely essential to national survival. An effective force depends on generals who think and act like generals. If they worry about funds for defense and Communist advances in Asia, it is because that is what we pay them to worry about.

That the nation needs people to worry about such things certainly does release potentially dangerous forces that need to be controlled. The military's responsibility for controlling them is passive, to avoid political involvement, and our officer corps has a splendid tradition in that regard. The more difficult task of active control is essentially a civilian responsibility, and the modern world makes it a terrible responsibility. But make no mistake, civilian control depends squarely on the will and wisdom of civilian leaders.

This simple but crucial understanding gets lost in the emotional anti-militarism growing increasingly prevalent. What gets lost, that is, is the first truth about this actual menace of a military-industrial complex—the danger is not that the generals will grab but that the civilians will default.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, while I do not agree with some of the observations which are contained in the editorial, I certainly agree that it is a mistake to vent our frustrations on the Nation's military leaders. Like the rest of us, these leaders are trying to do their job for the Nation, with such wisdom and ability and special skills which they possess.

In particular, I am in agreement with the article's basic thesis. It is evident that civilian authority has been remiss in exercising adequate control over the military budget and for initiating foreign policies which result, in the end, in major military commitments. It is the responsibility of the President and his civilian agents and of Congress to exercise judicious management over the military establishment of the Nation. Together, it is our responsibility to decide carefully what to spend for military functions and for what purpose. If, indeed, as the article suggests, we were to wake up one morning and find ourselves living in a garrison state, the fault would lie not so much with the military but with the civilian authorities who had abdicated their responsibilities and permitted thereby the erosion of their constitutional responsibilities.

## ADDRESS BY SENATOR MUSKIE AT BROWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I commend to Senators and the public at large the penetrating remarks by the able junior Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) at Brown University, Providence, R.I., on April 10, 1969.

As we debate the ABM question and indeed the whole philosophy of piling of military might on military might, we would all do well to consider this thoughtful message from our respected colleague.

I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## REMARKS BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE AT BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, R.I., APRIL 10, 1969

For the last several years we have become frustrated by the despair in our cities and the neglect of urban problems. But we have reassured ourselves constantly that new programs would be initiated and more funds would be available as soon as the Vietnam War was over.

Several months ago I first said that I thought this assumption was unjustified. Already, the pressure from the military has mounted, and the President has recommended the deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system.

At the end of the Vietnam War—Defense spending will not decrease automatically.

Our national priorities will not be adjusted automatically.

And the domestic needs that demand a massive commitment of funds and energy will not be met automatically.

The decisions that the Administration, the Congress, and the people make in the next several months are not merely decisions for 1969, they are decisions for the Seventies.

These are not merely decisions about the best kind of weapons for us to have, they are decisions about the kind of society we want to have.

And these are not merely decisions which will determine the strength of our deterrence to nuclear attack. These are decisions which will determine the strength of the world's resistance to nuclear destruction.

These decisions will not wait until the end of the Vietnam War. They are being made now.

And if they are going to reflect any commitment to peace, to a sane defense policy, and to a just life for all Americans, they must be made on the basis of new thinking and new priorities.

Since achieving the role of a major power early in this century, our burdens of leadership have grown. For our own security and the security of the world, this country can never withdraw from its central responsibility for the preservation of peace.

However, this is a responsibility which we derive not from our military strength alone, or from a desire to exert undue influence on the lives of other nations, but from our superior size and our economic and technological strength.

It is not a responsibility we can avoid, but it is one which we can abuse.

Because this responsibility is so easily abused, yet so unavoidable, the ways in which we choose to meet it must be carefully attuned to our national goals.

Our goal is not military domination, but peace for ourselves and the rest of the world.

Our goal is not to equip each nation with the capacity to annihilate its neighbors, but to enable the peoples of all nations to exist in a world free of hunger, poverty, and ignorance.

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

April 25, 1969

Our goal must not be to take risks in pursuit of war, but to take them in pursuit of peace.

We must never forget that our options are limited by our responsibilities. Our every action is examined and re-examined, interpreted and re-interpreted. The more doubtful or less clear our intentions, the more risky our actions.

And we must not fool ourselves. Regardless of our motives, the Vietnam War has not enhanced our reputation as a nation of peace in a world sensitive to the dangers of war. We cannot afford to let our intentions be open to question.

Our resources also limit our options. They are not unlimited. As we face enormous demands on our economic strength in meeting world needs and our global commitments, our domestic society is undergoing the most severe test the nation has known.

We are in the midst of an urban crisis. And the nature of that crisis is that we have not yet decided whether we are at all prepared to make a commitment.

We have not concentrated enough resources in any one place at any one time to demonstrate what can be done to make the system work better for all of us. Our whole approach to the problems of urban and rural poverty has suffered from fiscal and institutional malnutrition. In too many cases we have whetted appetites without providing bread.

Under the circumstances, the decisions we make concerning our national security in the Seventies are more critical than any we have made in the past.

The ABM is only the first of these decisions, but the precedent set by this decision will have a great deal to do with the directions to which we will become committed.

The Administration's ABM proposal represents a major commitment of resources, away from other, vitally important national objectives—with a price tag made suspect by all our experience in weapons-building and by the system's own built-in momentum towards a new arms and cost spiral.

The ABM also represents an immediate commitment to apocalyptic diplomacy—bargaining that raises the ante without calling the bet. It represents another onset of quantum changes in the weaponry on which the precarious balance of mutual deterrence rests. It makes the balance of terror that much more terrible.

With one bold stroke, and the explicit threat it represents, the Administration has put the Soviet Union on the spot, forcing us both to continue to play the game which no one can win.

And no one seems very sure where the rules of this game will take us. We do not know what is proposed to be done within the so-called Safeguard program. The intimations to date have been confusing, contradictory, and ambiguous. The President has stressed his options to restrict the system, but the Undersecretary of Defense has justified the program in terms of full deployment and redeployment. This is terribly expensive uncertainty.

But these are only the short-range implications of this decision. What are its meanings in terms of long-range hopes for world peace and domestic justice?

When I cast my vote in the Senate in favor of the ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, I did not do so lightly. It was a prudent treaty which bought us precious time to gain control over our nuclear destiny.

The treaty established a working precedent of international inspection, and the signatories pledged themselves to pursue with urgency arms limitation agreements.

That treaty was the latest step in a long, agonizingly slow movement toward arms control and disarmament—a process that began with the test-ban treaty earlier in this decade.

We have reached a critical point in these efforts. We have recognized some of the limits and we have put up some stop signs. But stop signs are not enough; you only pause before you proceed to the next. We need some U-turns.

We have reached a point where we must decide whether we shall institutionalize the arms race and preserve it for our children, or whether we shall honestly try to turn back.

For the first time we are considering deployment of weapons whose dependability is questionable. We cannot know whether they will work.

And since the results of initiating serious arms control discussions are also in doubt, we are at the middle of an unusually balanced equation. On one side, risks in the direction of war; on the other, risks in the direction of peace.

Finally, the deterrent capacity of the ABM is so questionable and so slim, that we must wonder whether our view of national security has become so distorted that it is limited to weapons systems and overkill.

The illusion of national security offered by the ABM offers no sanctuary against hunger, poverty, and ignorance.

National defense is not an end in itself. An arms system or a deterrent force may protect us against armed attack, but they are useless against human neglect.

A broader definition of our national security is in order. Armed defense is no more the whole answer to problems of national security, than law and order is the whole answer to crime.

The American people make an investment in their national goals, and they rightfully expect that decisions concerning that investment will not be made from a narrow range of choices.

But as long as the military is responsible for all the choices in the field of national security, the range will continue to be narrow. Consider how many future Vietnams could be avoided by spending half as much money on aid to underdeveloped countries as we may spend on an ABM system.

Food and education are alternatives to weapons systems. They are more meaningful to a struggling nation than a missile, but our national security has never been defined that way.

As our concern over world poverty has grown, so has our military budget. But not our economic assistance. We will always have a military budget, but we must not allow it a life of its own.

We must control its objectives. But in 1969 we can see a pattern of defense spending developing which is similar to our experience after Korea. Within a few years of the end of that fighting, the Defense budgets were larger than they had been during the war.

Around the world, the credibility of our initiatives toward peace holds more promise than the size of our military budget.

Effective diplomacy is a more constructive force than sophisticated weapons systems.

But as long as decisions concerning our defense budget are made in the vacuum of the Defense Department, are accepted at face value by the Administration, and are ratified without pause by the Congress, we will continue to run the risk that alternatives to military spending in the interests of national security will never be considered adequately. And we will forever be forced to modify our foreign and domestic policies to fit our military commitments.

The choices we face for the Seventies are emerging. We cannot have both guns and butter in the manner which we have always thought possible. We simply cannot afford both.

This is not a new situation. We have not been able to afford the mixture for several years, but we have tried to manage both—without success at either.

And because of the budget pressure of Vietnam, many people have had to tighten

their belts—belts that were too tight to begin with.

As long as these belts are tight—as long as we tolerate hunger and poverty in an affluent world, peace is threatened. And as long as peace is threatened, military spending will remain high.

Somehow we must find ways to break out of this vicious circle. As I see it, there is only one way to start, one option to exercise.

We must examine every request for military spending with a new skepticism, asking not whether there is a less expensive military substitute, but whether there is a more effective, non-military substitute.

We should not look to those who are skilled in war for the decisions which lead to peace. It is naive to expect the military to design the new directions we seek.

It is irresponsible for the public and the Congress to abandon its prerogatives of control. Yet these traditions are clearly threatened.

The ABM, chemical-biological weapons, and nuclear weapons are not the keys to peace.

Professor George Wald, a Nobel Laureate at Harvard, stated this very bluntly last month when he said: "There is nothing worth having that can be obtained by nuclear war; nothing material or ideological, no tradition that it can defend. It is utterly self-defeating. Atom bombs represent unuseable weapons. The only use for an atom bomb is to keep somebody else from using it. It can give us no protection, but only the doubtful satisfaction of retaliation."

We cannot eliminate risk from this world, but we can control its directions. We can make up our minds that the time has come when risks in the pursuit of peace hold more promise than risks in the pursuit of war.

But changing the direction of our efforts and the reactions of other nations will not be easy.

Congress is beginning to question the basis of our military posture and our foreign priorities. Our leaders are beginning to realize that our options are limited only by our willingness to broaden our perspectives. We think—

That trying to communicate with China will be more fruitful than isolating her;

That arms control is a more direct route to peace than arms development; and,

That hunger and poverty are more dangerous than Communism.

This progress and this skepticism will continue—if it is maintained by the support of an interested and concerned public.

Public pressure has made halting the deployment of the ABM possible, and public pressure can make it possible to rearrange our priorities and to pursue peace more vigorously and resolutely.

But this pressure will be no more automatic than reductions in military spending.

And its success is far from assured.

The employment of 10 percent of our work-force depends on the defense budget.

Almost 1000 cities and towns and millions of American citizens are caught in the military-industrial combine.

This is the other side of the nuclear deterrent. We have become intimidated by the economic strength of our military as we have intimidated others by the might of its weapons.

We are afraid—

That we can no longer say "no" to the budget requests of \$80 billion and more;

That our economy might not produce housing as profitably as it manufactures weapons;

That we cannot find political solutions to political problems; and

That we are not even going to have the chance to try.

This tyranny of fear has no place in America. Instead of being one of the many nations maintaining the arms race, let us be



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Gurney	McGee	Smith
Hansen	McGovern	Sparkman
Harris	Miller	Spong
Hartke	Mondale	Stennis
Hatfield	Montoya	Stevens
Holland	Mundt	Symington
Hruska	Muskie	Talmadge
Jackson	Packwood	Thurmond
Jordan, N.C.	Pearson	Tower
Jordan, Idaho	Proxmire	Tydings
Kennedy	Randolph	Williams, N.J.
Long	Russell	Williams, Del.
Magnuson	Saxbe	Yarborough
Mathias	Schweiker	Young, N. Dak.
McClellan	Scott	

**NAYS—3**

McCarthy Nelson Young, Ohio

**ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1**

Fulbright

**NOT VOTING—22**

Church	Hollings	Murphy
Cook	Hughes	Pastore
Cranston	Inouye	Pell
Fong	Javits	Percy
Goldwater	Mansfield	Prouty
Gore	McIntyre	Ribicoff
Gravel	Metcalfe	
Hart	Moss	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two-thirds of the Senators present and voting having voted in the affirmative, the nomination is confirmed.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of this nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**LEGISLATION SESSION**

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to the consideration of legislative business.

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

**ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1969 AT 11 A.M.**

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 11 a.m. on Thursday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR DODD**

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Thursday, after the completion of the period for the transaction of routine morning business, the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd) be recognized for not more than 1 hour.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**AUTHORIZATION FOR SECRETARY OF THE SENATE TO RECEIVE MESSAGES DURING ADJOURNMENT**

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the adjournment of the Senate from the close of business today until 11 a.m. on Thursday next, the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to receive messages from the President of the United States

and the House of Representatives, and that they may be appropriately referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEES TO FILE REPORTS DURING ADJOURNMENT**

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the same period all committees be authorized to file reports, together with individual, minority, or supplemental views.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**AUTHORIZATION FOR PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE TO SIGN DULY ENROLLED BILLS**

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President of the Senate be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills until June 12, 1969.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM**

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I wish to ask the distinguished acting majority leader whether or not there will be some business on Thursday.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on Thursday, after disposition of routine morning business, and after the address by the Senator from Connecticut, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of S. 1708, the bill to amend title I of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965. We expect to have at least one rollcall vote on that legislation. Thereafter the Senate will go over until Monday next.

**NOMINATION OF CARL J. GILBERT TO BE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS—REFERRAL OF NOMINATION**

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, there is a matter on the calendar about which I have just had a discussion with the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Finance. I wish to propound a unanimous-consent request with regard to one of the nominations on the Executive Calendar.

After consulting with the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, I ask unanimous consent that the nomination of Hon. Carl J. Gilbert, of Massachusetts, to be a Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, be referred to the Committee on Finance with instructions to report back the nomination within 30 days.

After consultation with the Parliamentarian this referral, or unanimous-consent request, will not affect the original jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations to appointments of this nature but does constitute a special case which will give the Committee on Finance an opportunity to hear this nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Arkansas? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

**THE PROPOSED SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM**

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, on the subject of the recommended anti-ballistic-missile system, I wish to make two additional points.

First, with respect to the remarks of the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) today I think it is clear under the circumstances that there is a substantial controversy over the deployment of the Safeguard system or any anti-ballistic-missile system in the defense of the United States.

I think it is unfortunate that in some quarters it has become a highly emotional matter. That has not been the case with the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri. I think he might join with me in stating that is so on some occasions.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BAKER. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I do join with the Senator in that regard.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, the only two points I would like to make at this late hour as follows: One, the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri pointed out in a previous interview, as I said earlier today, that if a certain chart were released by the Defense Department it is possible that the argument over the deployment of the ABM system might be over. Clearly, he has seen that chart, as I have. I think it is clear the argument is not over. I think it is clear that there continues to be a substantial controversy, and it is clear that there is a substantial controversy in philosophy over what is best and proper for the defense of the United States.

I respect those who oppose the system. I personally support deployment of the system.

I make this last point. One of the arguments advanced in opposition to deployment of the ABM system is that the response of the Soviet Union might be to deploy a greater number of offensive missiles so that it might overwhelm the new ABM. As far as I know, no one claims that Safeguard or any ABM system is infallible or that it can entirely protect the United States against attack by an aggressor. On the other hand, I think we are all trying to do the best we can in the defense of this country. It is important to this debate that it now appears, and I have been informed, that the time has come when it is cheaper to build and deploy ABM Sprints than to deploy additional Minutemen. The time is at hand when it will be cheaper for us to build a component of a defensive system, an ABM Sprint, and its proportionate share of the radar cost, than it is for the Russians to build an offensive weapon to try to counter it. We are all concerned with the cost of defense. We are all concerned most with defense as an abstract quality of necessity for this country. I believe those two points, however, are significant in this colloquy.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BAKER. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I appreciate the position of the distinguished Senator from Tennessee. It is not with respect to

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I wrote a devastating answer that responded to what he said and proved him to be wrong—except that he turned out to be 100 percent right.

He wrote me a letter 2 or 3 weeks ago and said:

Are you man enough now to admit that you were wrong?

I wrote him a letter in which I said:

I am prepared to admit I was wrong. I have been in politics a long time. I have eaten lots of crow. I have never developed a taste for it. I do not want to eat any more. I was mistaken.

I think I could have voted "yea" without any problem. However, as a matter of principle on any appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States or any elevation of a Supreme Court Justice to the office of Chief Justice of the United States, I am not going to vote "yea" until I have read the hearing record.

I have listened time after time to distinguished senior Senators delay the consideration of an issue by saying, "I just got the hearing record this morning."

I have never heard anyone argue with any senior Senator on that. They would say, "Well, would the Senator like to have it delayed until tomorrow or the day after?" Every time I have heard that point raised, there would be a delay.

It strikes me as mighty funny, after all the trouble we have had that in respect to something that raises a very serious question in the minds of the American public, we should not be able to say, "We read the record. We read the facts. We support the nominee."

I am satisfied that 999 out of 1,000 times I would vote for the nominee. Everything I have heard on the floor and elsewhere would make me favor it.

I would not vote against him because I disagreed with him philosophically, whether he was to the right or left of me. I would not want a Supreme Court composed of every one of my philosophical viewpoints anyway. I do not trust my viewpoint that much.

I think it is sound practice to have some people representing various viewpoints. I never would oppose anyone on that ground. I point out that after all of this fuss, Members of the Senate will be voting on this nomination without having read a page of the hearing record.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, all of this has a pretty hollow sound.

The congressional summary for June 2 will show that in this session of Congress 2,416 nominations for civilian positions, other than postmasters, have been submitted to this Congress; 1,721 have been confirmed. There were reports on only three. Where were these voices all this time?

It is time to vote.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I do not think the Senator was present when I addressed myself to that exact point.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I was present.

Mr. NELSON. I said the Senate acts on hundreds and hundreds of appointments. There is no conceivable way in which every Senator can make an investigation and judgment on each one of the appointments. However, at least as to the half dozen top positions in the Government, it is feasible for a Senator

to make an independent check and to read the record and then to cast his vote.

That applies to only a handful of positions. It would be impossible to do it for all.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cook) is necessarily absent today and has asked that I express for him his high regard for Chief Justice-designate Warren E. Burger and his hope that the nomination will be overwhelmingly confirmed by the Senate. Since the Senator from Kentucky is unable to be present to vote for Judge Burger's nomination, he has asked that I place in the Record for him the remarks he would have made had he been able to be here. I ask unanimous consent that his remarks be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR COOK

Mr. President, it is with a sense of sincere pride that I support the President's nomination of Judge Warren E. Burger to be Chief Justice of the United States. I had the privilege, as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, to be present and to participate in the hearing at which Judge Burger was questioned by our committee. Never have I been in the presence of a more articulate and intelligent witness.

Certainly recent events indicate that this is not one of the high points in the history of the Supreme Court. The Nation needs a man of impeccable character, and the Court needs a man with proven judicial experience. Warren Burger certainly possesses these attributes as no other man available for selection. I congratulate the President on his choice and wish for the new Chief Justice many happy and productive years on our highest Court.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, it is with real pleasure that I will cast my vote for the confirmation of Warren E. Burger as this country's next Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.

He is a distinguished judge and will serve, I am sure, with credit to our country.

Judge Burger brings to the Court a significant background of experience, integrity, and competence.

It is my hope that his service will do much to restore to the U.S. Supreme Court the prestige and respect it so justly deserves. His appointment will, I believe, add strength to the law-abiding forces of American society. It will give encouragement to all people of good will who recognize the first responsibility of society to make it possible for people to live together in peace—without fear.

I am convinced Judge Burger believes in the separation of powers; that he regards it as his duty to rule on cases within the framework of a rather strict interpretation of what the Constitution says. He is willing to let the legislative branch of Government write the law.

Mr. President, I welcome Judge Burger to the Court and wish him Godspeed in his duties.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of Judge Warren E. Burger to be Chief Justice of the United States? On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered. Those

voting in favor of the confirmation of the nomination will vote "yea"; those opposed will vote "nay."

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT (when his name was called). Mr. President, in view of the circumstances, I ask leave to answer "present."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator will be so recorded.

The assistant legislative clerk resumed and concluded the call of the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), and the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) is absent because of a death in the family.

I further announce that the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senators from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE and Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senators from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE and Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cook), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY), and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. PROUTY) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) are absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cook), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. PROUTY) would each vote "yea."

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 74, nays 3, as follows:

[No. 35 Ex.]

YEAS—74

Aiken	Brooke	Dodd
Allen	Burdick	Dole
Allott	Byrd, Va.	Domink
Anderson	Byrd, W. Va.	Eagleton
Baker	Cannon	Eastland
Bayh	Case	Ellender
Belmont	Cooper	Ervin
Bennett	Cotton	Fannin
Bible	Curtis	Goodell
Boggs	Dirksen	Griffin

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people like him, however, that I am anxious for the chart to be declassified. The able Senator from Tennessee has been on record as being in favor of the deployment of this Sentinel/Safeguard system for some time. The Senator from Missouri is against deployment, although I am for further research and development; therefore, the release of the chart, in my opinion, would not affect his opinion any more than mine. But the people who should decide are the people of the United States, and I am convinced in my own mind that, if this chart were released, it would show those people that such a very small addition of Soviet SS-9's would be necessary to nullify this planned deployment of Safeguard, that the people would be unwilling to pay this high price for this deployment.

If we would have more information released in favor of those opposed to the system as against what is being released by those for the system, I believe it would be more in the democratic process. I say this without the slightest criticism of the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, for whom I have respect and admiration.

Previously I have protested information being declassified in apparent effort to support those who favor deployment of this system.

This morning, we have another illustration of this problem—an article printed on the front page of the New York Times, written by William Beecher, who says:

The analysis, by intelligence experts in the Pentagon primarily, suggests that multiple warheads now being tested by the Russians may be capable of being guided to three scattered targets and powerful enough to destroy hardened missile silos.

That statement, Mr. President, declares that the Soviets today are testing MIRVS—not MRVS but MIRVS. Mr. Beecher is a responsible newspaper man, therefore, must have been given this information by someone in the Department of Defense. I would add that additional information was declassified in the story by Mr. Beecher.

I do not believe that the thrust of Mr. Beecher's story is correct.

If it is not true, then it should be denied, else the American people will be asked again to agree to further taxes for national security without first being given all the facts.

I thank my colleague for yielding.

Mr. BAKER. I thank my colleague from Missouri for his important and relevant remarks.

I would point out, however, Mr. President, that, as he points out, cost is an important aspect of defense, and in this particular situation, we actually have approached, probably for the first time in history, a situation where it is cheaper to build a defensive system and all of the attendant paraphernalia that goes with it, than it is to build its counterpart in the offensive weapons arsenal, specifically cheaper than to build a Minuteman and put it in its silo, and cheaper than it is for the Russians to build an offensive weapon in an effort to overcome our defensive system.

We are talking about great sums of money, Mr. President, but at the same

time we always must think of the cost exchange ratio; that is, the cost to the Russians to build a weapon to overcome our defenses, and the cost of defensive weapons as distinguished from the cost of an offensive deterrent.

I believe that in the case of the chart which the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri and I have both examined, by now virtually every aspect of it is known in this Record with one exception, that one exception being the appraisal by the U.S. Military Establishment, by the Department of Defense, of the number of warheads that would have to be delivered by the Russians in order to overwhelm our Minuteman as protected by the Safeguard system.

I believe that that information should not be declassified. It has nothing to do with the argument except in this sense: Is the investment in Safeguard so great and our advantage so slight that we should not undertake it?

My reply to that is: My information is that now Safeguard is cheaper to build than the offensive deterrent, and that Safeguard is cheaper to build than the Russian offensive deployment that would be required to overcome it.

If that is the case, I believe there is abundant demonstration of the desirability of turning this Nation to a defensive strategy instead of exclusively an offensive one.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Well, Mr. President, the one sure way to resolve this discussion is to release the chart. Let the chart speak for itself.

I did not mean to get into a colloquy with respect to the ABM system this afternoon, and am only doing so because my position on this matter was referred to earlier in the day.

But I would leave an additional thought with my colleagues this afternoon: Having spent many years in the defense part of our Government, and many years before that in the electronics industry, in private business, there are three basic aspects I know are pertinent to this ABM system:

First is the missile itself. I put in the Record some time back a list of the \$23 billion and \$50 million in missiles which has been spent on missiles later abandoned for one reason or another. We all know, as was so well illustrated in North Dakota last summer, that even missiles we have been working on for years, end up in test failure.

Next the radar. The radar incident to the Sentinel, Safeguard system is a great deal more complicated than the missile; in fact, the vulnerability of the radar itself could well be the core of the weakness of this entire system.

We have had open testimony that the "psi" of the radar was less than 10 percent of the "psi" of the Minuteman base.

My colleague from Louisiana (Mr. Long) asked me what "psi" means. That is a "per square inch" measurement—comparable to B.t.u.'s—British thermal unit—for heat. In effect, it refers to the amount of concrete around a base or site. This is a summary.

We have had open testimony before the Armed Services Committee that the "p.s.i." of the radar is less than 10 per-

cent of the "p.s.i." of a Minuteman base. The Spartan missile would never have been designed to defend a missile base site, rather was designed as a thin-area defense against the Chinese attack. Therefore the Sprint is the basic missile incident to the functioning of defense of the Minuteman base by the Safeguard system.

The Sprint is not a rifle. It has to be guided, and the way it is guided is by means of the MSR radar—not the long-range—PAR—radar, but the short-range—MSR—radar. Actually, the Spartan also has to be guided by the MSR.

Therefore, it is fair to say that if a radar with a p.s.i. of less than 10 percent of the Minuteman site is knocked out by, say, the SS-11's, of which the Soviets have hundreds, then any SS-9 extrapolation would not make any difference, because the Sprints themselves would be worthless.

That is the second component part of the Safeguard system.

By all odds, the most complicated aspect of the Safeguard system is the third component, the computer; in fact, two of the world's foremost authorities on computation say this required computer has problems that have not even been worked out in theory. We all know the computer itself has not yet been completed. When you consider the number of hours and months and years expended on a launch to the moon, where each operation is carefully watched by some of our foremost engineers and scientists, as against GI's handling a system all around the United States, if completely deployed by phase 2, a system which would have to operate instantaneously and automatically, in a matter of seconds, you can realize why some of us have grave apprehension about the wisdom of deploying this system at this time.

Mr. President, someone recently said to me, "We thought you were one of us." I thereupon looked up what I have worked for and voted for, in the interest of the security of the United States, this since I came into Government. The total of the defense budgets is \$953 billion; and because, for the first time, I oppose a weapons system I consider unadvisable, I am not "one of us." What is the logic in that; especially as I want to do whatever is necessary for the security of my country.

There are varying opinions about whether this cold war is becoming warmer; but I am confident every American would agree that, when Mr. Stalin was alive, the cold war aspect of our foreign relations was far more serious than today. Then there was a monolithic structure behind the Iron Curtain, and a man running things whom we all know was interested in taking over the world. That is far from true today.

In 1950 the total budget for the Military Establishment of the United States—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—was \$13.8 billion.

I remember meeting the late great President Eisenhower, in the Pentagon building. He was here to testify before the Appropriations Committee, whose chairman at that time was Senator Mc-



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Kellar. Then he was president of Columbia University. I met him in his office in the Pentagon, where all five-star generals have offices. I pleaded with him to see what he could do to add \$500 million to that \$13.8 billion figure. But we did not get the extra \$500 million.

Although the cold war is far less dangerous to the security of the United States today—and I have reported the \$13.8 billion figure which was up 3 years before the death of Marshal Stalin—that figure, year by year, has now risen from \$13.8 billion a year to \$80 billion a year.

Recently I read that the originally requested amount this year for ammunition in Vietnam alone, is more than double the total Federal appropriation for primary and secondary education—\$5.2 billion for ammunition in this sad war, \$2.3 billion for primary and secondary education.

The current total annual cost of the Defense Department to the American taxpayer is over \$17 billion more than the total Federal individual income tax take of the United States.

It is for reasons such as these that I welcome such discussions as to what we need to do and what we do not need, for our national security.

I opposed this system when it was presented to the Congress by the previous administration although I must say I thought, its design a more logical design for defending cities than for defending missile sites. In any case, all this discussion is constructive.

We have grave problems in this country today, troubles also with our allies and the neutrals, in all parts of the world in addition to the Far East. They appear as important as the strife being waged in South Vietnam. There are troubles here at home, not only in our cities, but also in our suburban and rural areas. An increasing number are worried about the future integrity of the U.S. dollar. Consider the fact that today in America we have over \$1 trillion in life insurance. In addition, all people in Government as well as private industry are interested in retirement plans. Most working people are interested in pension plans. Then we have social security and medicare and medicaid. So I believe we must be careful, as Senators to do our best to preserve the integrity of the dollar.

A week ago yesterday there was an article published called "Money, Money, Money—Where?" This article pointed out, as the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Long), chairman of the Finance Committee knows so well, that prime rates today in this country are 7½ percent—today that rate went up to 8½ percent—and that short-term commercial loans in the New York market today are running between 9 and 10 percent; and I have heard of loans at considerably higher rates.

At the same time we are also having basic disagreement with our allies with respect to proposed additional credit by means of special drawing rights in the International Monetary Fund. As a result, said this article, we may have the crunch of a double crisis from a fiscal and monetary standpoint; a credit crisis in the United States at the same time

there develops a currency crisis in Europe.

Only this morning, Mr. President, I read that the leading countries of Europe, countries wherein today, from the standpoint of their current position, are more prosperous than any others in world history, are in basic disagreement with the United States over the nature and degree of the annual amount of additional greenbacks wherein can be obtained through the SDI programs, designed for additional borrowing on the part of the United States.

It is the development in recent years of this new type and character of problem, Mr. President, that I would hope we all give full consideration to as we vote this on this military budget. We know that militarily, politically, and economically, the policies of the United States in recent years have now given us problems which, if not surmounted, could find us in serious trouble indeed.

Mr. BAKER. I was happy to yield to my distinguished colleague from Missouri.

I have a high and abiding respect for the breadth of his views and his consideration of the balance of equities in terms of the financial realities of the situation as we find it today, as well as in terms of the more pointed question as to whether we should deploy an ABM system, or whether we should resort to some other method for the defense of this country.

All these problems are interrelated, and I appreciate the remarks the Senator has made in this connection.

I would reiterate one single point: The valid question is how we can most cheaply and most effectively accomplish the defense of the United States. I suggest once again, Mr. President, that on the basis of the figures that are supplied to me, it is cheaper to build a defensive system—the Sprint and its associated radar—than it is to put a single Minuteman in its silo, and cheaper than it is for the Russians to build an additional missile to try to overcome that defensive step by the United States.

If that be the case, and I am so advised, then it seems to me that the merits of economy are on the side of missile defense, to say nothing of the moral and the humanitarian considerations. It gives me great pause and concern when I find the alternative proposition urged, that the United States should not build a defensive system, but rather build more and more, and bigger and bigger, offensive weapons, and point them at Moscow. If I lived in Moscow, I would be considerably upset. I have heard no such reactions from the Russians to the proposals by the United States to build a defensive system, which, by the nature of its engineering design, is incapable of rendering any injury to any nation beyond the continental limits of North America.

Mr. President, on the point that the defensive system is vulnerable, of course it is, as is an offensive system, which is just as radar-dependent, let us not fall into the temptation to believe there is a single, massive, whirling radar upon which our

defenses are dependent. I believe my colleague from Missouri would agree, with his great background in the electronics industry, that what we are speaking of is a very advanced system of phased-array radar, interspersed at different and distant intervals, which is not nearly as vulnerable as a single point system of microwave transmission.

I believe that the economics, the humanitarian considerations, and the urgency of the world situation today support the deployment of a defensive system.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, we are now skirting fairly close to classified information. All I can say is that one of my colleagues whom I respect almost as much as I do the able Senator from Tennessee pointed out to me recently that a scientist, whom he quoted by name, told him these radars in Sentinel/Safeguard could be "interlocked."

That scientist is a good friend of mine, so I asked, "How could you say you can interlock these radars, when you know there is only one radar per site?"

He said, "You could redesign it with more than one radar."

I said, "If you have to redesign it, why not wait a little while before deployment?"

To that, he had no answer.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I have listened with great interest to the debate between my distinguished friends, the Senator from Tennessee and the Senator from Missouri, on this issue, on which we shall be required to vote.

The Senator from Louisiana is not going to give anyone any secret information on this subject, because he has none, and therefore he can speak freely and say anything he wishes to say.

I recall that when the Senator from Missouri first came to this body, I was one of the economizers and he was one of the big spenders. The Senator from Missouri was cautioning us that the cutback in military spending being made by the Eisenhower administration was altogether too great. I had been working on trying to find ways to save on the military construction budget. I was contending that the reduction was not nearly enough, that we ought to be saving a lot more than that.

The Senator from Missouri, at that time, was pointing out that much of the Eisenhower defense thinking was based on the theory that if we had a war, it would be a great atomic war, and that we had better position ourselves so that we could also fight a war with less than atomic weapons, because that might be the kind of war we would be forced to fight.

I believe history has proved that that is correct, and that we should have had a Defense Establishment with which we could fight either way, hoping our enemy would not put us in a position where we had to use nuclear weapons, but that if that happened we should be in a position to use them.

Thinking along that line has progressed to the further extent that if we

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had to use nuclear weapons, we would hope we did not have to use strategic weapons to destroy the enemy's cities, but that we could achieve our purpose by using tactical nuclear weapons on the field of battle, to keep his army, with huge amounts of manpower, from overwhelming ours.

We can find a lot of ways to save money in the military budget. There are things we can do without. I have always been convinced that we did not need all those troops over there in Europe, that we could get by with one division as well as five. I believe the Senator from Missouri shares that view. If we brought them back, I would favor putting them back in civilian life, or putting them on a reserve status, so as to save the large amounts of money they are costing us, and eliminate that tremendous drain on our balance of payments.

But here we have a fundamental question of whether this Nation should ever be in a position that we are confronted with another nuclear power which is building a nuclear defense against our nuclear weapons, and have no defense against their weapons.

Mr. President, I am not familiar with all the technical problems involved in building a nuclear defense. I do recall that when I was debating the space satellite bill some years ago, I was making the point that we ought to realize the magnitude of the grant we were giving this space satellite company, because it would be within the capability of someone, within a few years, to broadcast from those satellites out there programs that could be seen all the way around the world.

The Senator from Missouri at that time made a speech explaining how difficult and complicated it would be, and how there was no way to be sure that at any time in the foreseeable future that would be practicable.

Well, we are seeing the programs from the satellites now. Of course, they are not being beamed independently from up there, but it is demonstrated that we can put the signal up there and relay it back, put power behind what we receive back here, and televise it from coast to coast, thus achieving the same result.

Some companies are working on what they think will be a breakthrough to give an 80-to-1 yield on atomic energy, for the purposes of providing commercial power. If we do that, we will be having batteries, in a few years, that would make it possible to broadcast directly from a satellite a signal strong enough to be seen by half the world at one time.

Things that seemed impossible or unthinkable a few years ago are becoming old hat nowadays. I recently bought the latest version of color television, the one recommended by the salesman in the store.

There are devices in that instrument that cause it to correct itself against various atmospheric and needed adjustments to change from one situation or another. They are built into the set. The picture changes automatically without one knowing why it happens. It just happens.

A person turns on the set and waits a moment and it will adjust itself. How they did it I have no idea. However, if one puts enough good minds to work on it, those things can be done.

We ought to hope that all of the money we spend on the missile defense will be wasted. We ought to hope that it will never be necessary to employ the missile defense to shoot down enemy missiles aimed at our country. However, we should not sit here and say, "It can't be done."

In the past, it has been the other way around. If we were to sit here and say, "Why, it can't succeed. Don't try it," we would find that while we were saying this, the Soviet Union might very well go ahead to develop a missile defense which would put us at their mercy.

It would be a tragedy to sit here while Red China went ahead at a tremendous sacrifice to their people to find the resources with which to develop missiles and a missile defense to confront us with an attack against which we had no defense, while Red China could defend itself.

We cannot risk that. To borrow a phrase that the Senator from Missouri used when he came here in about 1953, "It does not do you much good to be the richest man in the graveyard."

We should have a defense with which to protect ourselves. We should have a defense second to none.

I am not too worried about our ability to afford things. If we take the national debt and the national income and make one single calculation to put them in terms of constant dollars, we find that all of our fears about the national debt and how much the Nation is spending tend to diminish.

We would find in terms of constant dollars, whether in terms of 1968 or 1948 dollars, that if we put it on the basis of what a dollar will buy and project it either forward or backward to see what the comparative situation is, we are as well able to afford a missile defense now as we have been at any time in the past.

It has been pointed out to me that our national debt in relation to our gross national product—and particularly if one looks at it in terms of the part held not by the Federal Government itself, but by the people and companies outside of the Federal Government—it is less than when we entered World War II. And we are much bigger and stronger now. However, we need to make that kind of a correction to understand the relative strength of our Nation and its ability to afford something today compared to its ability to afford something many years ago.

Something has been said about our gold outflow. Our main difficulty with that, in my judgment, has been the fact that we too long continued to follow policies we followed at a time when we wanted the other fellow to build up his gold reserve at our expense. We continued to follow it long after the situation no longer justifies it.

We continue to follow trade and aid policies which were founded on the basic assumption that we need to help the other

fellow improve his position whether he cooperates with us or not. Many of those policies are still in effect today although the circumstances have long since changed.

We consider the possibility of building a successful missile defense, we should also keep in mind that many things have been done in the past such as the building of the first atomic bomb and the first hydrogen bomb which others said could not be done. Many things have been done in space which others said could not be done.

Unfortunately, in the space area, because of our failure to pursue our objectives relentlessly, we let the Soviet Union get there first. We are now beginning to overcome the lead of the Soviet Union that existed at one time. Perhaps we will be the first nation to land a man on the moon.

However, if we permit ourselves to be pessimists and say that it cannot be done and that we cannot deploy a successful missile defense system, to the point that we never even try to build one, then assuredly our enemy will have it first.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 29) to correct the enrollment of Senate Joint Resolution 35.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the resolution (H. Con. Res. 192) to reprint a brochure entitled "How Our Laws Are Made."

The message further announced that the House had agreed to the amendments of the Senate to the resolution (H. Con. Res. 162) authorizing the printing of the book, "Our American Government," as a House document.

## ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (H.R. 3480) for the relief of the New Bedford Storage Warehouse Co.

## CAMPUS UNREST—SURFACE IMPRESSIONS AND ROOT CAUSES

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, as the Nation breathes a sigh of relief to mark the close of an academic year marked by disorders and violence—a sigh once reserved for the passing of summer from our tormented and strife-torn cities—it is well to reflect on the events of the last year.

Many questions were raised in our academic communities which will not soon be answered. Why do the students raise such profound hell? How did they get that way? Who are they? What do they represent? What do they want? When will it all end?

I do not have all the answers. I doubt that anyone does. However, the questions cannot be ignored, for while only a few

students participate in the burnings, a great many are deeply concerned and highly critical of the American society, its government, its purposes, its goals, and its values. Many of these concerns deserve our attention. All too many people feel that if the campus leaders were rounded up, expelled, and jailed, the trouble would end.

This is a dangerous oversimplification. As Carl Schorske, University of California historian notes:

In history when you confuse revolution with a few malefactors, you're in trouble.

For, in fact, the activists, idealists, radicals, and the moderates all gather fuel for their indignation in the same place—in the ills of our society, the trauma of the times, the disparity between promised ideals and actual deliveries, between stated goals and shoddy performance, and, always, in the contradictions of the generation gap.

I fully expect, during this session of the Congress, that we will be debating various proposals to restrain campus disorders. I would hope, during this debate, that we would also discuss some of the underlying causes of these disorders as well.

In this regard, Saul Pett, an Associated Press special correspondent, wrote a very penetrating article which was carried yesterday in some of our Nation's leading newspapers, including the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

One excerpt from this article which I found to be particularly pertinent reads as follows:

A boy of 20 sees the big bomb on the horizon, a cold war that does not end, a hot war that does not end, a draft that does not end, poisonous race conflict that does not end, while the air around him grows dirtier, the streams get more polluted, the countryside gets more cement, traffic grows more congested, bigness gets bigger and less responsive to individual need, government, universities, corporations and unions all grow larger and in the great shapeless flood, a single human being sinks deeper in numbers, a cipher in somebody's computer.

A boy of 20 today sees technology as a runaway ravenous monster providing more and more machines and less and less space and serenity for the individual human. In his lifetime, a boy of 20 finds it difficult to see that his country has solved any major human problems.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article by Saul Pett be entered into the Record at this time as well as a speech I recently delivered in Kansas City, Mo., on this same subject.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 8, 1969]

#### WHY IS YOUTH IN TURMOIL?

(By Saul Pett)

(NOTE.—For America's colleges, this has been a far from silent spring. Campus after campus stirred with an uneasy life of dissent, demonstration, and violence. Are there voices beyond these that give some meaning and coherence to the year's chaos? An Associated Press reporter who has searched diligently and listened attentively seeks to illuminate the pattern behind the pattern.)

New York, June 7.—"You brought us up to care about our brothers," the boy said to his elders. "You brought us up not to run

away from injustice but to recognize it and fight it and destroy it.

"And now you castigate us. You castigate us because we think and we care. You demean our consciences, the consciences for which you are largely responsible. And you insult us by describing protest as our social fun.

"Now I want to get this much clear. To think is to make oneself very uncomfortable. To care is to sacrifice something and to act on that is to risk something. To enjoy that is sick and we don't enjoy it.

"We'd rather live. We'd rather be together and play our music and be in the mountains. This world remains somewhat consumed by insanity. We acknowledge, we do acknowledge with gratitude, you know, the great gifts that you've brought to this earth. But some of these gifts trouble us very deeply, and what troubles us even more deeply is that fact that you would have us ignore that which remains to be done. . . .

"The world seems ready to destroy itself and I ask you not to contribute to that destruction."

The boy's name is Pat Stimer and he is student body president at the University of Colorado, a relatively quiet campus at Boulder. Stimer is a student activist who believes in fighting for change within the system and in this appeal was talking to the Board of Regents of his university.

How do you react? Does he bore you, impress you or irritate you? Do you think he was eloquent and his words illuminating? Or do you find your stomach muscles tightening, your back stiffening and the thought mounting: Just who in the hell does he think he is, this kid who never fought a war or a depression or met a payroll, who is he to lecture his elders—did you almost say, betters?—on the meaning of words and the nature of hypocrisy?

Your answers may tell you much about a subject most people are bored with and a few yet understand—the great student uprising of 1969, the shattering spring of wild discontent now pausing for graduation and summer. It leaves behind more questions than it answered. Why? How? Why do they raise such profound hell? How did they get that way? Who are they? What do they represent? Is it contagion or conspiracy? And, praise God, when will it end?

It will not end soon, according to many experts, even if the Vietnam war ends tomorrow. The war has been the greatest single cause of student unrest or, as one man puts it, "the well in which all the agitators let their buckets down." But it was the war which let students to examine the system and now, to them, Vietnam is but a symptom of society's other sins. Now there are other wells and other buckets.

"We are in for a long haul," says Roger W. Heyns, chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley. "New recruits to protest are coming up all the time along a transmission belt of attitudes which runs stronger between the young and the younger than between children and parents.

"And if you think I'm radical or farout," many college activists have told Kenneth Keniston, the Yale psychologist, "wait until you see my younger brother or sister."

Student activists are a mixed bag of bright, articulate, likable and obnoxious kids who, the experts tell us, most frequently come from affluent, middle-class liberal homes. They include idealists seeking reforms within the system, on their campus and in Washington. They include radicals vaguely seeking a revolution to replace the system with a vaguely-conceived Marxism, which is unlike Russia's—they are equally critical of Russia and the United States—and is, in fact, unlike any now existing.

Finally, they include outrageous nihilists who come to the barricades loaded with their own psychological baggage, who get their

kicks out of breaking windows, goading a cop, tossing a dean out, or saying, as one did recently to Morris Abram, distinguished liberal, former diplomat at the United Nations and now president of Brandeis University:

"Substance? I'm not interested in substance. I'm here probing your moral blubber to see if you have any vertebrae left."

The nihilists, we are told, are a small minority within the activists, who have been attracted to the movement by the increasing publicity. They are, we're told, the "alienated," the ones who hit the hard drugs or sex as if it were a club with which to beat their elders. They are, according to Dr. Seymour Halleck, University of Wisconsin psychiatrist, the "casualties of devastating combination of affluence, permissiveness and neglect."

All activists together make up a tiny minority within the whole American student body. You may find it reassuring that most collegians are still typically collegiate and unpolitical. They are mightily "concerned" about their dates, their fraternities, whether Yale decapitates Harvard at football. One night during the student revolt at the University of Connecticut, a night of a crucial rally before the barricades, there were at least 700 other students solemnly engaged elsewhere on the campus in an annual rite, a beer-chugging contest in which one demigod drank 19 bottles in 60 minutes.

Surely a generation which can do that can't be all bad.

But in addition to the activists and the casual collegians there is a large group, in fact, a majority on some campuses, of moderates who are deeply concerned and highly critical of the American society, its government and its values. They may disagree with the activists on tactics but are usually sympathetic with their goals. They do not themselves seize buildings but when the cops bust heads it is the moderates who come a running, join the majority and make possible, for example, the closing of a university. It is the moderates at the better universities. Keniston says, who usually supply American society with its leaders.

Without them the college revolt would be deadlier than the Edsel and, according to Carl Schorske, University of California historian, their elders make a big mistake in thinking the campus uproar would end if the ringleaders were just rounded up.

"In history," Schorske says "when you confuse revolution with a few male-factors, you're in trouble. The British made that mistake about the Boston Tea Party."

Together, the activists, the idealists, the radicals and the moderates all gather fuel for their indignation in the same place—in the ills of modern society, the trauma of the times, the disparity between promised ideals and actual deliveries, and, always, in the contradictions of the generation gap.

"If you wonder," Mayor John V. Lindsay of New York said recently, "why so many students seem to take the radicals seriously, why they seem to listen to clearly unacceptable proposals and tactics, ask yourself what other source in the past has won the confidence of young people.

"Is it the Government telling us that victory in Vietnam was around the corner, or that we fight for a democratic ally that shuts down newspapers and jails the opposition? Is it the military, explaining at Bentre that 'it became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it'?

"Is it the moralizer, warning of the illegality of marijuana smoking as he remembers fondly the good old days of illegal speak-easies and illegal bathtub gin? Is it the television commercial promising an afternoon of erotic bliss in Eden if you only smoke a cigarette which is a known killer? Is it the university, which calls itself a special institution, divorced from worldly pursuits, while



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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 12, 1969

## LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements in relation to the transaction of routine morning business be limited to 3 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY, JUNE 16, 1969

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of business today, the Senate stand in adjournment until Monday, June 16, 1969, at 12 o'clock noon.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider the nominations on the Executive Calendar, commencing with "New Reports."

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The nominations on the Executive Calendar will be stated, as requested by the Senator from Massachusetts.

## AMBASSADORS

The assistant legislative clerk read the nominations of Ambassadors, as follows:

Robert H. McBride, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Mexico.

Richard Funkhouser, of New Jersey, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Gabon Republic.

G. McMurtrie Godley, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Kingdom of Laos.

J. William Middendorf II, of Connecticut, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection the nominations are confirmed.

## AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Lane Dwinell, of New Hampshire, to be an Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

## PEACE CORPS

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Thomas J. Houser, of Illinois, to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on behalf of my colleague from Illinois (Mr. Percy), I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a statement

by him relative to the nomination of Thomas J. Houser to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

## STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY

The nomination of Mr. Thomas J. Houser to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps is now before the Senate. I enthusiastically recommend that the Senate confirm the nomination.

It has been my privilege to know Tom Houser for many years, and I deeply believe that he is just the kind of man we so urgently need in public service today.

Mr. Houser received his degree of Bachelor of Arts in political science from Hanover College, Hanover, Indiana. Subsequently, he earned a law degree at Northwestern University Law School and attended John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. As Commerce Counsel for the Burlington Railroad, in Chicago, he gained widespread respect from the business community and the legal profession alike. He has been active in Illinois political life, bringing to his work a deep commitment to progressive and enlightened government. Following my election to the Senate, he served as my chief counsel in Chicago for a year. Now he is prepared to relinquish an outstanding law practice in Chicago to serve the Peace Corps and the Nation.

The country is most fortunate in having Joseph Blatchford as Director of the Peace Corps. He needs—and wants—a deputy who is a competent administrator and a practical idealist—a man who works well with people as well as with ideas, a man who believes in the program and in the Director to whom he reports. Thomas Houser is just such a man. He has won the confidence of the Administration; and I know that in time, he will earn the confidence of Congress and of the country.

So it is without reservation or qualification that I endorse the nomination of Thomas J. Houser to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of these nominations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

## PROTECTION OF DISABILITY EVALUATION IN EFFECT FOR 20 OR MORE YEARS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 203, H.R. 4622.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be stated by title.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 4622) to amend section 110 of title 38, United States Code, to insure preservation of all disability compensation evaluations in effect for 20 or more years.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the bill was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from the report (No. 91-219), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

## EXPLANATION OF BILL

By law, compensation is paid to veterans who suffer disabling conditions as a result of military service. As the name implies, the purpose of the payments is to compensate the veteran for the average economic loss resulting from the disease or injury sustained during his military service. Thus compensation payments are based not on need, but on the degree of disability of the veteran. On the basis of a medical evaluation, the veteran's disability is rated between 10 percent and 100 percent (total disability). Under present law, monthly compensation rates for disabilities incurred in time of war range from \$23 for veterans with a 10-percent disabling condition to \$400 for totally disabled veterans. Higher compensation payments are authorized for certain very serious disabilities; for example, a blind veteran requiring regular aid and attendance receives \$550 in monthly compensation.

The law also provides for additional compensation payments for the loss or loss of use of certain specified limbs or organs. For example, a veteran who lost an arm in wartime military service would receive \$47 monthly in addition to his basic disability compensation.

In 1954, the Congress enacted a law (Public Law 311, 83d Congress) which guaranteed that a veteran rated as totally disabled for 20 or more years could not have this rating reduced thereafter unless fraud could be shown.

Ten years later, another law was enacted (Public Law 88-445) which prevented the reduction of any disability rating of 10 to 90 percent which had been in effect for 20 or more years.

Because the law speaks of preserving the "percentage" of disability, however, the higher payments to totally disabled veterans and the additional compensation payments for a specific anatomical loss or loss of use are not presently included with the guarantee provision. Thus, for example, the Veterans' Administration could decide that a \$47 award for loss of use of a foot, even though received for more than 20 years, was no longer payable because the foot was now usable.

This bill, which the Committee on Finance approves, without amendment, would preserve higher or additional compensation payments received for 20 or more years in the same way as disability ratings are preserved under present law.

The cost of the bill is nominal.

## COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## THE CASE OF THE SECRET CHART

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, earlier this week the distinguished junior Senator from Tennessee and the dis-



United States  
of America

# Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 91<sup>ST</sup> CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 115

WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1969

No. 97

## Senate

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a.m., and was called to order by the Vice President.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O Thou whom no man hath seen, the invisible cause of all that is visible, break through the things which do appear that we may know Thy nearness in this place. Subdue our jaded and vexed natures. Discipline our wandering spirits and strengthen our feeble faith. O Thou who givest freely of Thyself, order what is disordered in our lives, bring our minds to Thy truth, our conscience to Thy law, our hearts to Thy love, and our souls to fellowship with all mankind. Enable us to hear Thy voice, and hearing it make answer with humble trust and willing obedience. Brood over our troubled world that Thy grace may penetrate all men's hearts until the old refrain, "Peace on earth among men of good will" is the song and the desire of all nations.

In the Great Redeemer's name. Amen.

### THE JOURNAL

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, June 9, 1969, be dispensed with.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT (H. DOC. NO. 91-126)

Under authority of the order of the Senate of June 9, 1969, the Secretary of the Senate on June 11, 1969, received a message from the President of the United States.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair lays before the Senate a message from the President of the United States transmitting the Second Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity. Without objection the message will be printed in the Record, without being read, and appropriately referred.

The message was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, as follows:

To the Congress of the United States: I transmit herewith the Second Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 11, 1969.

### MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Under authority of the order of the Senate of June 9, 1969, the Secretary of the Senate, on June 11, 1969, received messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to appropriate committees.

(For nominations received on June 11, 1969, see the end of the proceedings of today, June 12, 1969.)

### EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE SUBMITTED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Under authority of the order of the Senate of June 9, 1969, the following favorable executive reports of nominations were submitted:

On June 10, 1969:

By Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Robert H. McBride, of the District of Columbia, a Foreign Service officer of the class of career minister, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Mexico;

Richard Funkhouser, of New Jersey, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Gabon Republic;

G. McMurtrie Godley, of the District of Columbia, a Foreign Service officer of the class of career minister, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Kingdom of Laos;

J. William Middendorf II, of Connecticut, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Lane Dwinell, of New Hampshire, to be an Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development; and

Thomas J. Houser, of Illinois, to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps.

### REPORT OF A COMMITTEE SUBMITTED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Under authority of the Senate of February 7, 1969, the following report of a committee was received on June 11, 1969:

By Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, from the Committee on Appropriations, with amendments:

H.R. 11400. An act making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 91-228).

### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT—ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

Under authority of the order of the Senate of June 9, 1969, the Secretary of the Senate received a message from the House of Representatives which announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 35) to provide for the appointment of Thomas J. Watson, Jr., as Citizen Regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, and it was signed by the Vice President.

### ENROLLED BILL SIGNED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Under authority of the order of the Senate of June 9, 1969, the Vice President announced that on Wednesday, June 11, 1969, he had signed the bill (H.R. 3480) for the relief of the New Bedford Storage Warehouse Co., which had previously been signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

### ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on June 11, 1969, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled joint resolution (S.J. Res. 35) to provide for the appointment of Thomas J. Watson, Jr., as Citizen Regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

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tinguished junior Senator from Colorado expressed disagreement with my belief that the publication of a certain classified chart presented by the Defense Department to the Senate Armed Services Committee would go a long way toward letting the public make up its own mind about this costly new venture into national defense weaponry.

Because there is this difference, and because much of the information contained on the chart is already a matter of public record, I would again urge that this chart be made public.

I ask unanimous consent that an editorial on this subject, published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of last Sunday, June 8, entitled, "Case of the Secret Chart," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### CASE OF THE SECRET CHART

Senator Symington carries exceptional weight in the ABM debate because he knows the thickets of the Pentagon bureaucracy, and the behavior of its bureaucrats, so well. Drawing upon that intimate acquaintance, he has hurled another deadly harpoon at the case for deploying Safeguard by challenging the Pentagon to publish a "classified" chart which it has been using to bolster its argument. If the charts exposed to public view, he says, the argument will be over, for everyone can then see that Safeguard will not accomplish its alleged mission of "protecting our Minuteman deterrent."

As could have been predicted, the Senator's initiative soon brought out from others enough unofficial information about the classified chart to permit deductions about it. Evidently its purpose is to show that if the Soviets continue building their SS-9 missiles at the present rate, and if we now immediately deploy Safeguard, then at a certain point in 1975, assuming a Soviet attack on our Minuteman, the antimissile system will protect enough Minutemen to permit a retaliatory blow. Ergo, the deterrent will be protected.

But reportedly the chart also shows something else. It shows that if the Soviets withhold their attack in mid-1975, but go on building SS-9s instead, then within a few months they will have the capacity to saturate Safeguard defenses so thoroughly that our Minuteman deterrent will not be protected. In other words, even if the intricate electronics of Safeguard work to perfection, which many qualified scientists doubt, the system would afford only a few months' "protection" from a nuclear attack.

Of course everybody knows what the script calls for. Long before mid-1975, the Pentagon would undoubtedly go to Congress with the alarming news of a forthcoming Safeguard gap, and the public would be told that national security imperatively demanded an enormous expansion of the antimissile system. This is, quite obviously, the true mission of Safeguard—to serve as the first stage of an unlimited escalation of the nuclear arms race, guaranteeing juicy contracts and military proliferation and cold war psychosis far into the future.

The Pentagon has long been accustomed to scaring Congress and the public into providing unlimited weaponry funds by darkly referring to horrendous military secrets which cannot be told. Senator Symington deserves the public's thanks for putting a neat, round hole in these tactics as applied to the ABM. If Safeguard cannot be justified on the basis of public information and common sense, it cannot be justified at all.

#### NATIONAL COMMITMENTS— SENATE RESOLUTION 85

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I would like to speak briefly in support of Senate Resolution 85.

After studying the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am convinced that the Senate should reassert its constitutional duties in regard to the "national commitments" of this country.

It has only been in this century that the role of the Senate in making commitments involving our Armed Forces has become obscure.

During the period from 1789 to 1900 there was no question that article I of the Constitution vested the war making power with Congress. The President was simply the director of our Armed Forces with the power and authority to commit our forces in defense of the United States in the event of a sudden attack.

There was equally no question that, although the President was given the power in article II of the Constitution to make treaties, his action required the consent of the Senate. Since then, considerable confusion has arisen in regard to the respective roles of Congress and the President in making commitments with foreign countries.

While Senate Resolution 85 will not have the force and effect of law, it will serve very useful purposes. First, it will make it clear to the President that the Senate will expect to exercise the authority given to it under article I. Second, it will place all foreign countries on notice that any commitment not passed upon by the Senate, may well have no binding force.

The resolution is nonpartisan—having been approved by the Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 11 to 1—and is not aimed at any particular administration, past or present.

When an executive commitment seeks to obligate this Nation, such a commitment should be submitted regularly for Senate or congressional approval, as the case may be, before it becomes binding and effective. Otherwise, our system of checks and balances, written into the Constitution is not being allowed to function as intended.

#### OHIO COLLEGE LEADS THE WAY

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, college students demonstrating peacefully or violently, complaining against archaic policies, denouncing the establishment governed by trustees, who were graduates 20, 30, and 40 years ago, and demanding that college courses which have not been changed in more than 20 years be brought up to date, have a point. In fact, it is becoming crystal clear to any thoughtful person searching for answers that university trustees and students have become further apart in the past 20 years. There is real reason for demonstrations by college students. The old order, or establishment, must accept change voluntarily else it may be changed violently.

Very definitely, I do not condone violence. I favor immediate expulsion and

arrest of all campus demonstrators who resort to violence. Those belligerent gun-toting Cornell "students" should have been expelled forthwith. Also, they should have been arrested for disorderly conduct and threatening violence. I agree with Father Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University. He said:

Any group that substitutes force for rational persuasion, be it violent or non-violent, will be given fifteen minutes of meditation to cease and desist . . . if there is not then within five minutes a movement to cease and desist, students will be notified of expulsion from this community and the law will deal with them as non-students.

We must, however, have complete sympathy with the views of the majority of students who know that the colleges and universities of this country have not kept pace with the times in this fast-moving space age of change and challenge. The establishment should realize that as Washington Irving wrote:

Change is inevitable and brings with it a surprising amount of relief.

Unfortunately, three of five trustees in the Nation believe that speakers invited to address their students should be screened before being allowed on the campus. A majority even believe that all faculty members should be required to swear to a loyalty oath as a condition for employment as instructor or professor. This, despite the fact that no Member of the U.S. Congress is required to swear to such an oath.

Peculiarly also, nearly a majority of present college trustees state that college students demonstrating against any professor or against university policy should be disciplined or expelled even though such demonstration is entirely nonviolent. Such trustees would do well to reread the Bill of Rights to the Constitution of our country.

The facts are that only a very few, possibly 2 percent, of the trustees of American universities have read any books or journals on higher education. It has been the rule of the establishment in the past that there has been no mutual discussion and determination between students, trustees and faculty members on goals and purposes.

I propose that in every college in our country some junior and senior students and faculty members should be selected to membership of boards of trustees to help govern their own universities.

I have made that proposal in my State of Ohio and I have made speeches in the Senate for more than 6 weeks in that connection. I am very pleased to note that Princeton University has followed the suggestion and has elected two students to serve on its board of trustees.

Now a small college in Ohio leads the way. Most universities in our country have not basically changed their policies and their courses of study at any time in the last generation. Unfortunately, this is the result of colleges and universities being run by trustees who are highly respected, but most of whom are millionaires selected because they and their wealthy friends can contribute financially to the universities of which they are trustees. They suffer no pain

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from these tax deductions. Historic Hiram College will introduce in September a major yearlong course, "Twentieth Century and Its Roots," as a requirement for all freshmen. We have reason to be proud that this Ohio college is the first in the Nation to produce an answer to student demands for more meaningful modern education. Hiram College officials have already arranged for nationally known experts to meet with students and discuss current topics such as student alienation, poverty, civil liberties, pollution, and prevalent confusion over moral values. In this course, filmed interviews with Malcolm X, James Baldwin, and the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., will be shown and discussed. Were President Garfield, a famed Hiram alumnus, alive today, he would no doubt rejoice that other university presidents, including Stanford of California, have written Hiram authorities expressing interest in this program. Also, Hiram faculty members are giving serious consideration to offering an additional important major study course—"History of Blacks in America—Their Achievements and Influence from Colonial Times to Today." Hiram's program will surely be copied in colleges throughout the country.

I extend my congratulations and thanks to the administrators, faculty members, and students of Hiram College. Paraphrasing the famed words of Daniel Webster:

It is, Sir, as I have said, a small college and yet there are those who love it.

#### SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, as a long advocate of a political settlement in South Vietnam, acceptable to the widest possible range of South Vietnamese opinion, I was dismayed by the statements of President Thieu on his arrival in Saigon. Even before the afterglow of the Midway Conference had died away, Thieu has threatened his non-Communist opposition, specifically including political leaders, legislators, and intellectuals, with "severe punishment" if they so much as discuss broader alternatives to his own leadership.

This approach is reprehensible. Thieu should understand, Congress should advise him and the President should insist he recognize, that the American people deplore his attempts to muzzle political opposition on the crucial question of a "coalition," "reconciliatory," or "transitional" government in his divided country.

Mr. President, let me say, parenthetically, that those adjectives are the adjectives of President Thieu and not my own.

I am well aware that people who hold an official position in one government ordinarily must exercise the greatest tact and caution in criticizing officials in another government. But these circumstances are not normal. The hostile forces, military and paramilitary, which confront our arms in Vietnam are predominantly South Vietnamese and their numbers are increasing. When

President Thieu asks us to continue military participation in a struggle against forces predominantly his own countrymen, I think he must grant us some latitude to consider the impact of our military intervention on political prospects in his country. President Thieu cannot be allowed to regard U.S. soldiers as exterminators called in to eradicate his political opposition.

For American goals in Vietnam are radically inconsistent with such an approach. We are fighting at enormous human and monetary expense to buy time precisely in order to achieve a political settlement acceptable to the followers of these non-Communist leaders who together received a majority in the elections and are now either imprisoned or intimidated by the present regime.

It is up to Thieu to take every possible step to make such a settlement feasible and we expect him to do that as the price for our continued support of his government. Many of these non-Communist political leaders in fact might make important contributions to political unity if given an opportunity to exercise their leadership and even their minimum constitutional rights. We are fast approaching the time when a democratic assembly of non-Communist South Vietnamese leaders could only take place in jail.

Of course it is possible that President Thieu is correct in his view of the prerequisites of his continued rule. But since his conception is inconsistent with a democratic political settlement, it must not be allowed to prevail even if an end to widespread repression also means an end to the Thieu regime.

A democratic political process by definition is to some extent unpredictable and thus to some extent hazardous. The risks of continued war, however, far exceed the risks of the free political activity among non-Communist South Vietnamese that is indispensable to a broadly based political settlement.

#### RAILROAD PASSENGER SERVICE

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, recently, there was published in the New Yorker magazine an article dealing with railroading. It was entitled "Mr. Frimbo on the Metroliner."

The article was written in a rather light manner but I feel that there is a great deal of substance in it and some very good suggestions. I, for one, regret very much the deterioration in railroad passenger service. I wish that we could develop a program whereby good, adequate railway passenger transportation would return for the benefit of towns and cities throughout the country and, I may add, for the benefit of the traveling public who would like so much to have good passenger service on the railroads.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### MR. FRIMBO ON THE METROLINER

We spent a delightful day last week traveling to and from Washington, D.C., on the Penn Central's new non-stop, high-speed

train in the company of our old friend Ernest M. Frimbo, the world's leading railroad buff. We met Mr. Frimbo, by prearrangement, at Penn Station at a quarter to seven in the morning, and he greeted us with his usual booming "Hello," adding "My, it's good to see you. Haven't caught sight of you since—Let's see, must have been my two-millionth mile. Well, it's up to two million eighty-two thousand three hundred and ninety-five miles now, and we'll add four hundred and fifty today. You are going to enjoy today's jaunt. The Metroliner, which is what the Penn Central calls this new high-speed train, is the first forward step taken by any form of transportation in this country in donkey's years," Mr. Frimbo was wearing a tweed suit from Bernard Weatherill in two hues of gray, a pink button-down shirt, and a striped tie. On his head was his familiar black homburg, and he was carrying, out of pure devilment, a maroon Qantas Airways bag. He looked fit. We said hello as soon as we were able, and he told us that it time to get going. "The train leaves at seven-ten, but I wanted you here a few minutes early, so you could get a good look at her," he said.

We followed Mr. Frimbo down a flight of stairs and gazed, with him, at a sleek and slightly convex six-car stainless-steel train that was humming quietly on Track 12. "Four coaches and two parlor cars," Mr. Frimbo said proudly. "Built in two-car units, and there's no locomotive. Each unit is really its own locomotive. For a faster getaway. The rounded shape is called 'tumble home' by designers. Each of the coaches has a snack bar in the middle, and the seats, as in every ordinary coach, are four abreast, with an aisle down the middle. On an airplane, they call four abreast First Class. Huh! The parlor cars on the Metroliner have one seat on each side of the aisle. That's what I call First Class. Each of the parlor cars also has a small kitchen at one end, and for that reason the train crews call them galley cars. The Penn Central people don't call them parlor cars, either, by the way. They call them club cars—or, to be precise, in the present instance, Metroclub cars.

"That's an idea they borrowed from the Canadian National Railways. The people up there decided that 'club' sounds more modern and more tony. You know—I belong to an exclusive club. They thought 'parlor' sounded Victorian and fussy. Of course, I myself have spent many an enjoyable hour in parlors. And many an enjoyable hour in clubs, too, for that matter."

Mr. Frimbo went aboard one of the parlor cars, and we followed him. He called out a good morning to a porter, and the porter said, "Good morning to you, Mr. Frimbo. Glad to have you aboard, sir. We'll be serving breakfast soon."

"Good," Mr. Frimbo said.

We found our seats—Nos. 24 and 26. They were salmon wing chairs, with the wings slightly raked, and they had pea-green paper antimacassars on them. We sat down, and agreed that our chairs were very comfortable. "This is the first high-speed train to be built by someone who knows how to build railroad cars," Mr. Frimbo remarked. "They had some models run up by people who built buses, and they put in—What do you think? Plastic seats. It was awful. The Penn Central people, be it said, have gone about this in the right way."

It was now seven-ten, and, right on the dot, and very smoothly, the Metroliner began to move out of the station. A voice said "Good morning, ladies and gentlemen" over a loudspeaker, and wished us a pleasant trip. The voice was replaced by soft music, which wobbled slightly as the train picked up speed. Mr. Frimbo caught our glance. "I know, I know," he said. "Just like the airlines. Oh, well, people probably wouldn't feel comfortable without it these days. You'll find it isn't obtrusive. This is my sixth trip on a



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section 201, to which the gentleman refers, will be blunted or wholly obliterated.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Of course, that will depend on what is agreed on in conference. I trust the conferees on the part of the House will recognize the inconsistencies that may have developed and that this will be eliminated from our system.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). The time of the gentleman from Colorado has expired.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I move to strike out the last word.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, let me ask the distinguished chairman of the committee what happens under the proposed resolution to the Members' pay increase, since the housekeeping committee has not acted on this question?

What happens to this salary grab of February of this year, so far as the Members are concerned? Will Members be paid at the old rate or will they be paid at the new rate?

Mr. MAHON. I believe that when the photograph, so to speak, of the status quo is taken on the night of June 30 at 12 o'clock, it will disclose that Members are now drawing pay at the new rate and that this would obtain during the fiscal year 1970 until action to the contrary is taken. I believe that is a fair interpretation.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BOW. It would seem to me that the House took care of that situation for fiscal 1969 last week, last Tuesday, under the resolution we passed taking care of the pay for the post office and others. And I think that Members will be paid at the increased pay rate under this resolution.

Mr. GROSS. If I may ask the chairman, what is so magical about the date of October 31, 1969, the termination date of this resolution?

Mr. MAHON. Someone just facetiously said that that is the day after Halloween.

Mr. GROSS. I would say to the gentleman that it would be more appropriate to relate it to April Fools Day.

Mr. MAHON. I would call the gentleman's attention to page 1 of the report in regard to the matter. The report states:

The time period covered by the accompanying resolution is limited to the four-month period, July 1-October 31, 1969. Anything shorter than that is judged to be unrealistic, especially since the membership is proceeding under the announced plan of a mid-August recess extending beyond Labor Day, and the further fact that large segments of the budget have not been authorized by the Congress.

Another continuing resolution will have to be sought just prior to October 31 if we do not complete the appropriation bills by that date. But I hope sincerely, and I choose the word "hope" with care, that we may not need another continuing resolution.

Mr. GROSS. The gentleman says he hopes sincerely, and I sincerely hope that he is right. But would the gentleman be amenable to an amendment to the reso-

lution making the termination date December 31, 1969—just to be on the safe side? I think that comes nearer to being right than October 31. You will note that we paid no attention whatever to the Reorganization Act and its date of July 31 each year for the termination of Congress.

Would the gentleman agree with me that Congress ought to take action toward abolishing that July 31 date, for it is utterly meaningless?

Mr. MAHON. It needs to be studied very carefully. But I would not think we ought to extend the expiration of the pending resolution beyond October 31.

This gives us an objective. I am sure Congress will industriously work toward passing the legislation and doing its job because, when we go home, we want to be able to point with pride to our achievements, on both sides of the aisle, and I hope we will be able to do that. I think we have done a fair job so far as this session is concerned, and we can do a better job as we move along.

Mr. GROSS. From the lack of progress made so far in this session of Congress, would we have any right to point with pride to the enormous amount of work done here? I doubt that anyone can go out with a straight face and point with pride to the work done by this session of Congress thus far, and half of this year is already gone.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman would probably agree with the gentleman from Texas that virtue does not always reside in passing legislation. Often there is virtue in not passing legislation.

Mr. GROSS. But in the end do we not wind up by passing it, to our sorrow most of the time, even if we long delay action? We wind up passing it anyway.

Mr. MAHON. Some of it, including this measure, is necessary for the ongoing operations of the Government, as the gentleman knows.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert pertinent extractions in regard to the continuing resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

#### GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND ON SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 17

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all

Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on Senate Concurrent Resolution 17.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado?

There was no objection.

#### TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR THE MAKING OF A FINAL REPORT BY THE COMMISSION TO STUDY MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 123) to extend the time for the making of a final report by the Commission To Study Mortgage Interest Rates.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate joint resolution, as follows:

S.J. RES. 123

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 4(g) of the Act of May 7, 1968 (Public Law 90-301) is amended by striking out "The Commission may make an interim report not later than April 1, 1969, and shall make a final report of its study and recommendations not later than July 1, 1969," and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The Commission shall make an interim report not later than July 1, 1969, and shall make a final report of its study and recommendations not later than August 1, 1969,".*

The Senate joint resolution was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

#### AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 448 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 448

*Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12167) to authorize appropriations to the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.*

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The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 448 provides an open rule with 2 hours of general debate for consideration of H.R. 12167 to authorize appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission for fiscal year 1970.

The bill authorizes an appropriation in the total amount of \$2,454,284,000—\$1,973,282,000 for operating expenses and \$481,002,000 for plant and capital equipment.

The authorization request submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission included \$1,963,800,000 for operating expenses and \$484,252,000 for plant and capital equipment, a total request of \$2,448,052,000. The request was a 6.5-percent reduction from the authorization for fiscal year 1969.

Generally, the Commission's authorization request reflects estimated costs in two broad categories of effort; namely, military and civilian applications. Military applications primarily include the nuclear weapons and naval propulsion reactors programs, and portions of several other programs such as special nuclear materials and security investigations. Approximately 53 percent of the authorization request is attributable to the military applications. The civilian applications of atomic energy comprise about 47 percent of the total request.

The authorization requests are exclusive of certain adjustments such as revenues received and cost of work for others which must be considered in calculating the net authorization.

The Joint Committee recommended both increases and decreases in the authorizations for many of the AEC programs. This was done to provide for a higher level of effort on several of the high-priority programs. The recommended authorization for fiscal year 1970 is about two-tenths of 1 percent more than the amount requested.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of House Resolution 448 in order that H.R. 12167 may be considered.

(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this rule, if adopted, would provide 2 hours of general debate on the bill authorizing funds for the Atomic Energy Commission. I shall not repeat the figures which have just been read by the distinguished gentleman from California, but I would point out this is only two-tenths of 1 percent more than the amount requested by President Nixon, and it is \$164 million less than the amount authorized to the Atomic Energy Commission last year.

When the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD), the chairman of the committee, appeared the other day before the Rules Committee and asked for a rule on this bill, he

described the authorization as one of the most austere that has been reported by the committee in recent years. Since it has been my privilege to serve on that Committee, as well as on the Rules Committee, I can add to what the gentleman has said: The conviction that because of the very searching scrutiny that was given the budget estimates by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, reductions have been made where they should have been made and in a very few places—as will be indicated I am sure under time authorized by the rule—the committee has recommended some increases. They are increases that are not really very significant in total amount, and yet I think it will be shown they are very significant as far as the impact they will have on such programs as those dealing with the civilian atomic energy power and those programs dealing with flow-share, or the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Mr. Speaker, I concur in what the gentleman from California has said and recommend adoption of the rule.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered. The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12167) to authorize appropriations to the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD).

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). The Chair designates as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BURKE), and the Chair requests that the gentleman from California (Mr. SISK) temporarily assume the chair.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12167) with the Chairman pro tempore (Mr. SISK) in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD) will be recognized for 1 hour, and the gentleman from California (Mr. HOSMER) will be recognized for 1 hour.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD).

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, before I start explaining the bill, I would like to say that our purpose today is not to take the 2 hours unless it is called for by the action of the Members of the House. We are present-

ing to the Committee today a bill which has had several months of intense scrutiny. We have resolved all differences between the members and have come to a point of unanimity in presenting this bill to the House. So we are not in controversy on any item in the bill.

Members are aware we were delayed in the consideration of this bill about 2½ or 3 months because the Johnson budget which came up to the Hill on January 16 was recalled by the new administration, and we received the revised budget on April 15. So outside of our staff studies and our study of the whole subject matter we started our hearings right after April 15, and we continued them until we had all of our witnesses testify. Therefore, the authorization bill was delayed for a month or so because of the late receipt of the final approved bill by the Bureau of the Budget.

This bill would authorize appropriations to the AEC totaling \$2,454,284,000 for both operating expenses and plant and capital equipment funds for the fiscal year 1970. For comparative purposes I might note that the recommended amount is \$64 million less than the amount requested in the budget submitted by President Johnson on January 15. It is \$6.2 million, or two-tenths of 1 percent, more than the amount requested in the budget submitted by President Nixon on April 15. But, most significantly, it is about \$164 million less than the amount authorized to the AEC in the fiscal year 1969, and this in spite of the fact that we have had an increase in the need for military expenditures. We have absorbed those military expenditures in the bill and we have of course had to reduce some civilian applications in order to do that.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. The gentleman stated what was authorized for last year?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes.

Mr. GROSS. Would the gentleman give us the figure for the actual appropriations for last year for the purposes of this agency?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will supply that figure. I do not have it at hand at the moment.

Mr. GROSS. What was the figure the gentleman gave with respect to the Nixon budget?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The figure I gave was \$6.2 million more than the Nixon budget.

Mr. GROSS. It was \$6.2 million.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Out of a \$2.5 billion appropriation. It is less than two-tenths of 1 percent, I might say to the gentleman, but it is still \$164 million less than last year's authorization. I will give the appropriation figure. The staff will provide that in just a moment.

(Mr. HOSMER furnished the appropriation figure in debate.)

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. As to the balance between military and civilian applications of atomic energy, approximately 53 percent of the recommended authorization is for military uses, and the remaining 47 percent for civilian uses. I might

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say that just a few years ago it was predominantly military, but during the past few years we have been able to bring into existence many new uses for atomic energy in the civilian application field, and we are pushing ahead on this because there is great promise and in fact great realization from civilian uses of atomic energy at this time.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KOCH. Are any of these moneys to be used for MIRV or the ABM?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. These moneys are not to be used for the deployment of the ABM. They are for research and development in weapon requirements furnished to the committee by the President through the Department of Defense, so there is no money in here for the deployment of the ABM. This has nothing to do with the subject matter of whether the Congress will or will not approve the so-called Safeguard system.

Mr. KOCH. How about MIRV?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. On the MIRV, we have research and development for missile warheads, Missile warheads for all of our missiles; the missile warheads that are on Minuteman, the missile warheads that are on Poseidon, the missile warheads that would be on Sprint, Spartan, and SRAM. The research and development in that field is applicable to all of the missile development of the United States.

Mr. KOCH. I thank the gentleman. Included in the civilian category is \$121 million for the operational costs and \$234 million for plant and capital equipment for the high energy physics program, for which the AEC has been designated by the President as executive agent on behalf of the entire Federal Establishment.

Turning to the provisions of the bill itself, section 101(a) of H.R. 12167 would authorize appropriations of \$1,973,282,000 for "Operating expenses" of the AEC. On page 3 of the Joint Committee's report, you will find a summary of the committee's recommended authorization for the AEC's major programs and subprograms. A more detailed discussion of each of these areas will be found in the report section entitled "Committee Comments," beginning on page 6. As you will note from the referenced table, the committee has recommended decreasing the funding for some programs while increasing others in an effort to provide the necessary funds to maintain AEC's higher priority programs at a viable level. If any Members have any questions, I will be happy to respond to them.

Let me point out the major areas which have been affected by the Joint Committee's actions. The more significant increases recommended by the committee were for the civilian power reactor program, \$7.3 million; the naval nuclear propulsion program, \$4 million; and the AEC's Plowshare program, \$10.5 million.

The AEC's civilian power reactor program is primarily directed toward the development of the breeder reactor

which will generate more nuclear fuel than it consumes during operation, thus providing this Nation with a virtually limitless supply of energy. I cannot overemphasize the benefits which this Nation will derive from the successful development of this technology, which, I might add, looks extremely promising.

In two other areas, neither of which involves large sums of money but both of which hold great importance to humanity, the committee has voted to restore funds to the budget. One of these programs involves development of an implantable radioisotope heat source power converter for powering a heart pump. If a radioisotope-powered heart device can be developed it will be of inestimable value to heart surgeons and the thousands upon thousands who suffer from heart disease. The committee has recommended an increase of \$800,000 to the AEC budget to initiate development of this device.

The committee has also recommended a minimum increase of \$750,000 to permit continuation of the modest, but nevertheless important, food irradiation program, through which it is believed that the feasibility and safety of preserving food by low dose radiation will be established. In a world which knows hunger the potential humanitarian returns of this program more than justify this investment.

If we could produce refrigeration in many parts of the world to take care of the foods and if we could develop a substitute for the expensive refrigeration equipment which is needed in tropical countries and substitute radiation, which kills bacteria in the food itself and thereby prevents decay, this would be a tremendous accomplishment. It will enable fish that are caught in the ocean, for instance, to be transported for thousands of miles without refrigeration. You can see what this would mean in bringing protein into the interior of these nations, from the seacoast. It would also be a great boon to the fish industry of our own country and other countries.

The recommended increase of \$4 million for the naval nuclear propulsion program would bring the total authorization for that important program to \$125,855,000. I need hardly point out to this body that it has been primarily through the efforts of Congress that this Nation has developed its superior nuclear submarine capability. The Joint Committee believes that particular vigilance must be exercised if we are to maintain that superiority. As indicated in a special committee print issued yesterday, copies of which are available in the Chamber, there is considerable cause for concern over the significant progress the Soviets are making in submarine development and construction.

For example, according to unclassified information, the Soviets now have a force of 375 submarines, all of which were built following World War II, including at least 65 nuclear submarines.

In comparison, the United States has 143 submarines, of which 82 are nuclear and 61 are diesel. Most of the diesel-powered submarines, I might mention, are of World War II vintage. Thus the

Soviets have now an advantage of about 230 submarines.

However, the most startling information relates to the Soviets' vigorous building program. They have a capability of turning out one submarine a month and have already completed seven of their latest Polaris-type submarines. For reasons that escape me our Navy has no Polaris submarines under construction or planned. Thus, all available evidence indicates that by the year 1973 or 1974 the Soviets will have a ballistic missile submarine fleet equal in size to that of the United States. Moreover, it is also believed that the Soviets will add about 70 nuclear-powered submarines to their fleet by 1974, whereas the United States will add but 26. I believe the seriousness of this situation will be further underscored by speakers who will follow me.

I should like to go back through the halls of memory for a moment to call the attention of the Members to the fact that beginning in World War II Hitler had 56 submarines and he sunk millions and millions and hundreds of millions of tons of shipping right off our coast with those 56 submarines.

Now, today the Soviets have 375 submarines to our 143, almost three times as much as we have. And if we would get into any kind of trouble in which we needed submarine warfare, we would be at a disadvantage of about 3 to 1 at this time, with the Soviets.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

In looking through the committee's report to try and find out for my own information what is involved with respect to the ABM and MIRV, I find that there is a listing of \$135 million with respect to the ABM covering research, development, and testing.

I would like to know whether we could ascertain what the amounts are with respect to the testing of the MIRV, and also suggest to the gentleman this: that those of us who are opposed to the MIRV are not talking about deployment, but are talking about testing, and therefore would we not, by supporting this bill and supporting funds for the testing of MIRV, have already then made a commitment which we are not willing at this time to do?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman of course can make up his own mind as to what he is willing to do, but I will answer the first question by saying that I find it impossible to say precisely how much research and development would go toward MIRV, toward those warheads that go on the Minuteman, the Poseidon and the Scram, and for Safeguard, which the Congress has authorized, because in the research and development and testing of warheads you are crossing the technological border from one missile to another.

Therefore I would say it will be very difficult to take out of this whole research and development on nuclear warheads and bombs that part you would use in a MIRV warhead.

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Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield further?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield further to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding with respect to MIRV that the crucial question to be determined is whether or not there will be testing. It is not the same as the ABM, where the testing has occurred, and it is a question of deployment. With MIRV the key question is, Does it work? And that is ascertained after you have tested it. Therefore the major decision to be made by Congress is do we or do we not test in advance of having asked the Soviets whether they will agree with us that there should be no testing on both sides. Therefore my question to the gentleman is have we not crossed that bridge once we authorize funds which will permit the testing of the MIRV under this authorization?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I might say to the gentleman that Congress crossed that bridge a long time ago. We passed legislation for research and development. We have already tested in-flight facsimiles of MIRV. The Soviets are testing them. We have had uncontradicted intelligence of the fact that they are testing multiple reentry vehicles, and we also have tested multiple reentry vehicles.

Now let me be very clear on this matter. These were not nuclear warheads, these were facsimile components of the warhead that will be of the same size and shape and weight as a nuclear component. The nuclear components themselves are tested in underground holes deep in Nevada, as a rule. Some of those holes are 6,000 or 7,000 feet deep, some not so deep. The warheads themselves are tested there. However, the flight of the missile is tested usually from Vandenberg down range into the Pacific Ocean using facsimiles.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 additional minutes.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I know the gentleman from New York has a high regard for the New York Times and its news columns, and the New York Times for June 24 contains a report on Secretary Laird's news conference on the subject of the Soviets and testing to the point that they are testing multiple warheads for their SS-9 missile which is capable of knocking out three Minuteman missiles simultaneously.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is right. That is unclassified information which has been revealed by the President and also by the Secretary of Defense. They have testified in public on that matter and they testified at great length in executive session giving the details of this.

We do know that these tests have been conducted. This is not something that we have been talking about that might happen. It is something that has already happened in the Soviet Union. We know

they are trying to learn how to put a cluster of warheads inside a missile nose-cone and they have had some test flights as we have had.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I also want to concur wholeheartedly with what has been said here about the need for our going ahead with research and development testing for each of the potential applications of the various weapons systems that are under consideration at this time.

The development work on a nuclear component is potentially applicable to the number of weapons systems which may or may not use the MIRV concept.

I think this is part of the reason why it is impossible to nail down a specific amount, aside from the question of classification, why it is impossible to nail down a specific amount and say that this is an amount allocated to MIRV.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. These are the problems. The gentleman is exactly right. These problems are being worked on by a number of different laboratories, problems of physics, and engineering and design of the nuclear weapon. They are applicable to other weapons, the same as they would be to the Minuteman or the Poseidon.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. KOCH. Is it the gentleman's position that a vote for this bill is a vote for the testing of MIRV in addition to other aspects of the bill?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will again explain. My evaluation of a vote for this bill would be a vote to continue research and development of missile warheads.

But if the gentleman is against any kind of warhead and if he believes that we should stop our research and engineering and we ought to stop our development of missile warheads while letting the Soviet Union go ahead and develop theirs, then I say if he takes that position, he should vote against the bill.

Mr. KOCH. I want to make clear that I do not take that position. But I believe there is a strong body of opinion in this House and in the other body and in this country which takes the position that until there has been a discussion with the Soviet Union to the effect that neither one of us ought to continue with MIRV or a comparable weapon, we ought not to do any testing because it is the testing itself in effect which if successful says, Yes, it does work, which is the crucial factor in this decision to test. Successful testing of the MIRV by us as the Soviet Union may make it impossible to arrive at an agreement to bar the MIRV and the consequent escalation that would follow.

It is my position and I submit the position of others, that before we take that crucial step, we ought to say to the Soviet Union, "We want to have one last chance with you to see whether both of us will stop at this point and before we go to that brink." That is my position.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let me say to the gentleman that I am a supporter of disarmament and I helped pass that legislation in this House and took a very strong stand on it. If any man in this world knows the horrors of nuclear war-

fare, I think I know about it because I have seen the tremendous explosions of megaton nuclear weapons in the South Pacific.

I know that if we have any massive nuclear weapon exchanges by one of these nations with any nation in the world, it will be a catastrophe for humanity.

I yield to no man in this House or in this Nation in his desire for peace in this world. But, I am not so naive and innocent to think that we can unilaterally stop our research and development and the production of weapons, and the maintenance of our military strength and at the same time have no control over the Soviet Union's purposes or programs.

We have been going after this goal of disarmament for several years. We have made numerous advances and propositions to the Soviet Union. Up to this date we have not had very much success, I might say. It took us many, many years to get the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

I am not for unilateral stopping at this time of MIRV, Minuteman, Poseidon, nuclear submarines, planes, or any other element of military power which at this time keeps a balance of power in the world and prevents the Soviet Union from dominating the world, as its ideology calls for it to do. I am against giving them this opportunity of elevating them up to one position and keeping us at another. I am for keeping it even, at least, and the way to keep it even, I will say to my friend, is for us to continue research and development, to continue production, to continue to keep our power equal or superior to theirs, because we do not intend to use it aggressively. But their ideology calls upon them to use their military power aggressively.

Therefore, I say it is naive, in the strongest sense of the word, for the gentleman to advocate our stopping unilaterally the development of military power and the enhancement of the military power of the United States, while the Soviet Union continues their programs of military improvement.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes; I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KOCH. Will not the gentleman agree that there is a difference between research and development and the other category of testing? In addition to that, does the gentleman agree that there is a difference between unilateral disarmament, which the gentleman discussed a moment ago, and an offer made to the Soviet Union to say in effect that, "Before we go on, we say to you that this is the last chance. Will you agree with us not to test, not to pursue this weapon?" Then if they say, no; if they do not pick up that offer, then we could proceed.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is the same argument that has been made before to stop every weapon program in the United States. It was presented in relation to the hydrogen bomb. The gentleman was not in the House at the time. I happened to be in the House and I was chairman of the subcommittee



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within the joint committee that studied it. A tremendous number of scientists were involved. Among them were J. Robert Oppenheimer, chairman, Center for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J.; James B. Conant, president of Harvard University; Lee DuBridge, president of the California Institute of Technology; Enrico Fermi, of the University of Chicago; I. I. Rabi, of Columbia University; Hartley Rowe, vice president of the United Fruit Co.; Cyril Smith, director of the Institute for the Study of Materials, University of Chicago; Oliver E. Buckley, president, Bell Telephone Co., and others. They said, "Do not make the hydrogen bomb. Do not do it. If we do not do it, the Russians will not do it."

I was chairman of the subcommittee that studied the subject, with the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Price) and other Members of the House at that time, and a Member of the Senate.

We came back from a study in the fall of 1949 with the deep conviction that we had to find out if the hydrogen weapon could be made. We had very little evidence at that time that the Russians were working on it, but we made this recommendation against the advice of all these famous people, including three people—a majority—on the Atomic Energy Commission, who said, "Do not do this. Do not make the hydrogen bomb. If we do not do it, the Russians will not." The AEC's prestigious General Advisory Committee was saying the same thing.

As a result of our recommendation, in January 1950, President Truman initiated the hydrogen bomb project on a crash basis. Nineteen months later we proved its feasibility and successfully exploded a hydrogen device.

Ten months later—I want to emphasize that—10 months later the Soviets exploded a hydrogen weapon. That was in August 1953.

Now, who was right and who was wrong? This Congress said that we had to protect the United States. We could not wait for the Russians to give us some kind of mythical agreement, which they might or might not fulfill. We in this Congress decided that we had to protect the United States, and we took the step against the advice of some of the greatest scientists in the United States at that time. We were right and these great scientists, who were all right in their own disciplines, who were experts in their certain fields—they may be great physicists or great in some other field—but when they get into the field of judgment on these things which we have to deal with in this Congress, they are about as naive as some other people I could mention.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the chairman for yielding, and I thank him for refreshing the memories of a lot of us in this House about the history of the hydrogen bomb development. The chairman has, I think, made the point very, very clear that a continuation of the testing and research and development program is absolutely essential if we are

going to be in a position to make any kind of agreement or a deal with the Soviet Union regarding deployment.

It takes two to make a deal and ordinarily we have to have something to give on both sides. We know the Soviet Union is going ahead now with testing of a MIRV capability, and for us to stand still and not develop that capability is going to put us in a position where we have nothing to offer the Soviet Union that is of really demonstrable value to them if we reach the point, which is still in the realm of speculation, of sitting down and negotiating an agreement. It is easier to negotiate from strength than from weakness—and the Soviet will never negotiate an agreement or keep an agreement with a nation that is not dealing from strength. That is their history and that is the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD) has expired.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD) an additional minute.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD) yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. HOSMER).

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, the figures that were requested by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Gross) are the following: Fiscal year 1969 appropriations to the Atomic Energy Commission were \$2,570,874,000. The authorization sought by legislation before us today is \$116,590,000 less than that; namely the sum of \$2,454,284,000.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for furnishing those figures. The bill then, is substantially less than the appropriation of last year.

Mr. HOSMER. It certainly is.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. HOSMER).

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to rise with the distinguished chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and to join him in urging passage of H.R. 12167.

I believe that Mr. HOLIFIELD has effectively conveyed to you the spirit in which the Joint Committee reviewed the Atomic Energy Commission's authorization request for fiscal year 1970. Every effort has been made to wring the maximum out of each dollar which the Joint Committee has recommended for authorization. As a result, the Joint Committee was able to report out a bill which is approximately \$164 million less than the authorization for fiscal year 1969 notwithstanding the inclusion in this bill of an additional authorization of \$217 million for the 200-billion-electron-volt accelerator as requested by both the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The total authorization recommended for fiscal 1970 represents a 6.2 percent overall reduction from fiscal year 1969 despite the

obvious increase in the cost of doing business.

Approximately 37 percent of the AEC budget is for the nuclear weapons program, which entails production and surveillance of, research and development on, and the testing of nuclear weapons. The administration requested \$828,300,000 in operating expenses for this program in fiscal 1970 and the committee has recommended approval of the entire amount. As noted in the committee report at page 10, the AEC weapons program for fiscal 1970 reflects a sizable increase in combined production requirements for numerous complicated weapons systems, such as the Poseidon, Minuteman, and short range attack missile—SRAM. This workload is the most formidable ever undertaken by the AEC production complex.

As the committee report notes, the recommended authorization for the weapons program includes \$135 million associated with the AEC's responsibilities in connection with the ABM program. This \$135 million is devoted entirely to research and development and testing of nuclear warheads to be employed in the ABM system. Accordingly, this amount of money will be required regardless of the decision made in this fiscal year on deployment of the Safeguard system.

With respect to another AEC program associated with the military uses of atomic energy—the naval propulsion program—the committee has recommended approval of \$125,855,000 for fiscal 1970 operating costs. This represents a recommended increase of \$4 million over the funds included in the President's budget request. This increase partially restores a reduction of funds for development work on improved nuclear submarine propulsion plants made during the administration's budget review process. These additional funds will enable the Commission to proceed with its advanced development program for nuclear propulsion reactors.

The other program which I should like to specifically mention is the Plowshare—civilian applications of nuclear explosives—program. You will note that the Joint Committee has increased the requested authorization by \$10.5 million to a total operating fund authorization of \$25 million. The committee feels very strongly that the \$25 million level is the minimum necessary to meet our domestic commitments and to fulfill the obligations we will be assuming internationally. The commitments of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Inter-oceanic Canal Study Commission call for four more cratering projects before the Canal Commission submits its report in December 1970. Funds for only one of these were included in the administration's budget. The Joint Committee is recommending authorization of sufficient funds to complete one more of these experiments in fiscal 1970.

The credibility of our international commitments as embodied in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, particularly article V, demands that we proceed to develop the technology to enable us to make available to the nonnuclear signatories

of that treaty the benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. If the intent of that treaty is to be realized, those nations must be assured that they will suffer no economic detriment by relinquishing the right to develop or acquire nuclear capabilities and such assurances will only result from a demonstrative endeavor by the nuclear powers to fulfill their obligations.

If there are any questions about the bill or the accompanying report thereon, I shall be very happy to respond.

As noted by the gentleman from California, Chairman HOLIFIELD, H.R. 12167 has been reported by the Joint Committee without dissent. I am confident that the bill which the Joint Committee has recommended to the Congress is sound and I believe that it warrants your favorable consideration.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON) such time as he may consume.

(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I support this bill and believe it is essential to the security of our country and continued development of our naval defense forces.

The bill before you provides the following amounts to be applied in developing nuclear propulsion plants for submarines and surface warships: \$125,855,000 in operating expenses for research and development; \$9,550,000 for capital equipment; and \$4,400,000 for modifications to the expended core facility in Idaho, for a total of \$139,805,000.

The amount recommended for fiscal 1970 operating expenses includes restoration of \$4,000,000 in operating funds which had been deleted from the AEC request during the administration's review of the budget. Such restoration will permit the most important of the desired work on advanced development of naval propulsion reactors to move ahead. This effort involves a wide range of reactors from the high-powered, long fuel life plants for the two-reactor aircraft carrier to the advanced, high-performance submarine propulsion plants.

There are two distinct facets of this development program. One involves an advanced test core to ascertain the long-range effects of irradiation on materials. The other is development of a completely unique core concept applicable to both submarine and surface vessels. These activities of course involve classified data. The available declassified information is published in the Joint Committee print, "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, 1969," at pages 18 and 19 and 28 to 31.

#### STATUS OF U.S. NAVAL NUCLEAR REACTORS

The committee conducted its annual, in-depth review of the naval nuclear power program in April. As indicated in the record of these hearings and in the committee's report, there is reason for considerable concern over the U.S. nuclear submarine program relative to the Soviets both as to technology and production. The committee has summarized the situation in both of these respects on pages 12 and 13 of its report, and Chair-

man HOLIFIELD reviewed the figures in his remarks.

While this country seems to be applying the brakes to our nuclear submarine program the Soviets are rapidly accelerating theirs. Not only do the Soviets have a much larger total submarine force—375 versus 143 for the United States—but the current emphasis being placed on nuclear submarines by the Soviets is estimated to place them ahead of us in about 18 months. The same situation exists relative to advanced technology. The addition of the \$4,000,000 to the budget recommended by the committee is intended to reverse the trend at least in the field of advanced technology.

#### POLARIS SUBMARINES

The committee report, on page 12, also covers the phenomenal advances the Soviets are making in building ballistic missile submarines—a present capacity to produce one a month. It is estimated that, since we are not building any more Polaris submarines, the Soviets will take the lead in this area also in the early 1970's.

The Polaris fleet is, of course, our most invulnerable strategic weapons force. A number of Members of Congress have been asking how long we can depend on keeping this force safe from a massive attack. The question is, can we depend indefinitely on the invulnerability of the Polaris submarines?

In response to that question, I should like to quote Admiral Rickover's comment of this question as it appears on page 132 of the hearing print I mentioned a few moments ago:

Let me first say that based on the best evidence available, I believe that today our Polaris submarines are safe from a massive, neutralizing blow. Further, I am not aware of any valid information indicating that the Soviets possess a means to track and destroy our Polaris submarines which they are on station. However, there is no assurance that this situation will prevail for long.

There is, in fact, evidence that the Soviets are actively engaged in a determined effort to acquire the capability to neutralize or destroy our Polaris force. They have developed and they continue to develop faster and quieter submarines. They are experimenting in all phases of submarine and antisubmarine warfare—we are not. In fact, during the past year alone they have developed several new types of nuclear submarines; we have developed only one new type in 10 years. It is clear that a major objective of their naval programs is to invalidate our own Polaris system.

Any doubt that exists on this point serves to emphasize the importance of increasing our efforts in the advanced submarine program to preserve that invulnerability of our Polaris type submarines.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I call attention to the fact that under the authorization provided for in this bill, the Atomic Energy Commission is of course the executive agent for the whole Federal Establishment with respect to our high energy nuclear physics pro-

gram. I am pleased to note that by this legislation we have completed the authorization of approximate \$217 million as the necessary funds to complete the funding for the 200-billion-electron-volt accelerator project which is going to be located in western Illinois.

I should point out, I believe, that the State of Illinois has gone ahead with its commitment to do some things in connection with that project. They committed themselves to provide, first of all the site of 6,800 acres of farm lands lying just beyond metropolitan Chicago, necessary to locate this new facility.

I am proud to say that Illinois has now virtually fulfilled its commitment to the project. At a cost of some \$26 million the State has acquired this site and has deeded the land to the Federal Government.

There have been other areas where they have made important progress as well. Some 14 communities in the vicinity of the project, with a total population of almost 400,000, have enacted open-housing ordinances. In addition, the city of Chicago, which is of course only about 25 miles from the site, has passed the ordinance.

These were commitments made by the State and by authorities of the State of Illinois at the time the decision was made to locate the project in our State, and I am proud those commitments have been kept.

I want to say in conclusion that I support this legislation. I concur with what the chairman said earlier on the floor, as one who has suggested openly and continues to suggest the desirability of our President taking the initiative of proposing a moratorium on MIRV testing. I see nothing inconsistent between that position and the position we take in this bill, that until such time as the executive branch has made that decision we have to continue to provide the research and development capability to maintain the defenses of our country.

My mind goes back to the time when we adopted the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which I believe most of us on this committee, if not all of us, supported at that time. A very important element in the decision to support that treaty was the decision that at the same time certain basic safeguards would be maintained, and among them the ability to maintain a readiness to resume testing if there were a breach or a violation of the treaty. We have maintained our national laboratories and we have maintained our research and development capability in that regard.

Even so, when we get to talking about this particular weapons system, I believe we have to draw a distinction between the research and development capability and the political system which has to be made at the level of the President himself as to whether or not a mutual moratorium should be called for with respect to the flight testing of this weapons system.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I am happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from California.

June 24, 1969

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 5095

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is it not true in respect to research and development on any kind of device that one has to test it in order to know whether the theories are working out or not? In other words, testing is a part of the development of the device.

In the case of the multiple warhead for reentry, we cannot test a nuclear weapon coming into the atmosphere because of our treaty which precludes us from exploding anything like that in the atmosphere, but we can, under the treaty, test those warheads underground, where they do not vent any radiation beyond our national boundaries, and we can test dummies of the same size, shape, and weight inside the nose cone of a missile and determine how they act.

This is what we are talking about when we talk about testing. We are testing, actually, dummies in this instance, but of the same size, shape, and weight as the nuclear components of the multiple warhead, what they would be if we were really using them in warfare.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Yes, I quite agree with the gentleman from California. I believe this is compatible with and is a part of the whole research and development function of Government. Certainly we cannot just try to carve out or divorce that particular feature from the research and development capability we have sought to give the Commission by the funding in this bill.

I just want to repeat that urging, as I do, the President to pursue what he himself referred to as constructive proposal on the part of those Members of the Senate who recently filed a resolution urging a mutual moratorium, I think it would be the height of folly for us to consider any unilateral suspension and unilateral cessation by stripping ourselves of the capability to continue the research and development and testing function. So, in support of what I spoke of earlier, I do not want to confuse that with the notion that I think this bill is one that ought to have the support of the Members of this body.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. DUNCAN) as much time as he may consume.

(Mr. DUNCAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

[Mr. DUNCAN addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois [at the request of Mr. HOLIFIELD] was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Joint Subcommittee on Research, Development, and Radiation, I have a special interest in that section of the bill before you dealing with the 200 billion-electron-volt accelerator.

More than 4 years ago the Subcommittee on Research, Development, and Radiation held a week-long series of hearings covering the entire field of high energy physics. Those hearings stressed the relationship and importance of high energy physics to the scientific leader-

ship of this nation. Central to those hearings was a full-scale review of a high energy physics national policy report from the executive branch requested by the Joint Committee. It had become increasingly clear to the committee during the 1960's that an overall national policy in high energy physics was imperative for the guidance of the Congress and the taxpayers. The requested report was transmitted to the Congress by the President in January 1965. The single most important recommendation in that policy report, and one on which the subcommittee spent a considerable amount of time during those hearings more than 4 years ago, concerned the extension of proton energy. The specific recommendation called for—construction of a high-energy proton accelerator of approximately 200 billion electron volts in accordance with technical specifications developed by LRL, to be operated as a national facility. This machine should be authorized for design in fiscal year 1967, and for construction in fiscal year 1968.

It should be pointed out that an earlier panel report—Ramsey panel, 1963—made to the President's Science Advisory Committee and to the AEC's General Advisory Committee had a similar recommendation as the next most important step to be taken in the field of high-energy physics. It should also be pointed out that an extensive design study on such a machine had been underway at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory during the years 1963 to 1965.

The years 1965 and 1966 were spent on a vigorous nationwide search for the most appropriate location possible in the United States for such an important basic research facility as the 200 billion-electron-volt accelerator laboratory. After some 99 meetings on this matter the Atomic Energy Commission, advised by a special committee of the National Academy of Sciences, selected a site in DuPage and Kane Counties, Ill., some 25 miles west of Chicago.

In the President's fiscal year 1968 budget request for project authorization it developed that the project scope had been curtailed for budgetary reasons. My subcommittee held hearings and reviewed in detail the proposed reduced scope and management of this project. The subcommittee and the full Joint Committee not only concluded that the accelerator should not be reduced in its initial scope but also that consideration should be given to building into the machine the possibility of going to much higher energies at some later date. That year Congress authorized and appropriated \$7,333,000 for design of the project.

During its authorization hearings for fiscal year 1969 the committee was most pleased to hear from the Laboratory Director, Dr. R. R. Wilson, that he and his key staff had not only managed to design the machine to reach its original intensity goal of  $3 \times 10^{18}$  protons per pulse but also had incorporated an option to go to a higher energy than 200 billion electron volts at some later date. And Dr. Wilson and his staff had accomplished all this within the budgetary guidelines laid down by the executive

branch—some \$60 million less than the original cost estimate without the option of higher energy.

In the budget submitted last year extraordinary efforts were made to reduce both project obligations and project costs for that year. A minimum construction program restricted to key starts that bore directly on Dr. Wilson's construction time table was proposed. Such a minimum program required commitments of approximately \$25,000,000. This additional amount was authorized but actual appropriations were only \$12,074,000. At this time all available funds have been committed. The laboratory director and his staff are now awaiting fiscal year 1970 appropriations in order to return to their construction schedule, which calls for an initial beam to be available in July 1972.

This is an exceedingly complex and technical national research facility. No machine in this energy range, nor with the novel and innovative features designed by Dr. Wilson and staff, has ever been built. More than 2 years ago the U.S.S.R. succeeded in bringing into operation the Serpukhov accelerator. This proton accelerator quickly reached an energy of 84 billion electron volts. The highest energy machine in the United States is the alternating gradient synchrotron at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, on Long Island, with an energy of 33 billion electron volts. The U.S.S.R. will continue to have the highest energy machine in the world until the 200-billion-electron-volt machine becomes operational. It is therefore very significant to note that any substantial reduction in the appropriations for fiscal year 1970 will serve to extend the duration of the U.S.S.R.'s advantage in the frontier science of high energy physics—the field of science concerning itself with the most fundamental laws governing the constitution of matter and the elementary particles of which all matter is constituted.

Also most important are the adverse effects that continued piecemeal authorization and inadequate appropriations have on the efficient and economically planned construction schedule as well as the morale and cohesiveness of the present laboratory staff. A loss of the skilled team now assembled at the site would inevitably strike a severe blow to the entire project. This staff has already very vividly shown its potential. At present, construction of the laboratory is solely dependent upon the dollars available, as contrasted to a schedule utilizing the most efficient marshalling of the laboratory staff and its contractors. Continued inadequate funding would very probably disrupt the well planned construction schedule and result in a substantial cost overrun.

The key staff—the 75 or so accelerator physicists and engineers that have been assembled under Dr. Wilson's leadership—are critical to the success of this project. They are among the very best in their fields and represent an important national asset. They have been attracted to this project because of the challenge it represents and because the planned schedule is a fast and efficient one that will bring the machine into op-

eration at the earliest possible moment, with the maximum impact in the scientific world. Loss of these people, or a loss of morale due to a considerably lengthened schedule, will have a serious impact on the quality of the accelerator and the quality of research that will come from it. As Dr. Wilson has stated:

Second rate scientists and engineers build second rate facilities, and do it very expensively.

As indicated earlier the 200-billion-electron-volt machine is a highly complex scientific instrument actually comprised of four accelerators that successively bring the accelerated particles up to the desired energy. The design and construction schedules are closely interlocked with one another. Therefore the initiation and completion of many phases of the project are completely dependent on earlier phases. A continuous balance must be struck among the three major phases of the project—design, construction and procurement of long-lead time components.

The Joint Committee is impressed with the significant progress that has been made on this project despite a history of budgetary stringency and reductions. The committee feels that further budgetary restraints will affect the schedule and our international position vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. in this important basic research field.

The committee is also of the opinion that further budgetary reductions will serve to increase the total cost, result in the loss of key personnel and ultimately reduce the quality of the important research that should be possible with this machine. The committee held its hearings on the national policy for high-energy physics in March 1965—more than 4 years ago. This project—the most important recommendation contained in that policy—is to be a national facility and requires a national commitment. The Joint Committee believes strongly that full authorization this year is essential and that appropriations in the order of the amount requested in the President's fiscal year 1970 budget should be made if the success of this project is to be assured.

There are fundamental questions in physics today that can only be answered by the very high energy and the high intensity that will become available from this machine. For example, a question that has plagued physicists in recent years is the host of new subnuclear particles that have been discovered, at times seemingly without order in a field where order is generally an underlying principle. With the capabilities of this machine it will be possible to search for an elementary set of building blocks that may form the basis for all matter and life.

Some tremendous advancements that have been made in this country are directly attributable to or associated with accelerators. In the late 1930's, for example, work on accelerator research resulted in large advances in the development of high-powered transmitting tubes which were basic to the development of radar and continue to be an integral part of radar systems. In this time

period, the basis of all modern computer circuits had its origin in the circuits developed for particle detection devices. At the present time the techniques being developed for pattern recognition in connection with the analyses of high-energy-physics research data are finding application in biomedical work, and in air and space surveillance activities. Moreover, certain accelerators are currently being used for medical treatment and for the irradiation of food to increase its shelflife.

Mr. Chairman, high-energy physics is important to education, it produces a quantity of highly talented scientists, and it contributes profoundly to modern technology. For these reasons I heartily endorse the fiscal year 1970 high-energy-physics program recommended to you by the Joint Committee and, in particular, the full authorization of the 200 Bev national accelerator which the committee has recommended.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12167 and in doing so wish to speak on a portion of the AEC authorization bill in which I have a particular interest.

I refer to that segment of the physical research program known as controlled thermonuclear research. There is little doubt in my mind that this research program holds as much promise for the future as did splitting the atom under controlled conditions in that first atomic pile under the west stands of Stagg Field in Chicago on December 2, 1942.

If the controlled fusion process can be harnessed for the production of electric energy—and qualified scientists believe it can be so harnessed—this Nation and the world will have a virtually limitless source of power. Moreover, if thermonuclear energy is put to this beneficial use, we shall have not only the most abundant source of power ever known to man, extractable from ordinary water, but the least environmentally offensive source.

Significant scientific advances have already been made, especially very recently, in the area of plasma density and confinement time by scientists both in this country and in the Soviet Union. This involves plasma, completely ionized gas, at millions of degrees centigrade. However, much remains to be accomplished before our Nation's vast capacity to consume electrical energy will have this source of power upon which to rely.

In 1965 the Joint Committee asked the AEC to commission a comprehensive study of this entire program in order to establish goals and ascertain the probabilities of practical accomplishments. An AEC select review committee, comprised of eminent scientists from within and without Government, made a searching inquiry into the entire program. In its comprehensive technical report the select committee recommended that the manpower resources, particularly scientists and engineers, be doubled within 5 years in order to assure the influx of vigorous and imaginative thought.

Shortly thereafter, the AEC issued a policy and action paper on the controlled fusion program which thoroughly

discussed the state of the art, the options for progress and the need for application of greater resources. That paper noted that the accomplishment of the ascertainable goals would require a net annual increase in operating funds of approximately 15 percent over a 5-year period plus an annual requirement for major device fabrication of \$3 to \$4 million. Under that formula the funding for this program in fiscal 1970 should be at a level of over \$40 million. The bill before you recommends authorization of \$27,800,000—more than \$12 million below that level.

This is an area of endeavor in which the Nation can ill afford the luxury of less than a sustained effort. The Joint Committee has exercised restraint in recognition of the total budgetary situation. The recommended authorization of \$27.8 million is the amount considered to be an absolute minimum necessary to maintain this program at the proper level of effort to sustain the momentum generated by recent successes. I wish I could be supporting an even greater authorization for this program, but, mindful of the limitations of the national budget, I can only heartily endorse this portion of the authorization as reported.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, today I cast my vote against the bill authorizing an appropriation of \$2.5 billion for the Atomic Energy Commission. I vote with knowledge that the programs to be funded by this appropriation may well have merit and may well be justified. The merit of these programs, whatever they are, are far outshadowed, however, by the urgent need for the Federal Government to apply its resources to the problems of our cities and the problems of the poor.

I believe we have failed to establish rational national priorities. Therefore, I cannot place my stamp of approval on an authorization of \$2.5 billion, \$828 million of which is to be devoted to the production of nuclear weaponry, while the urgent need for funds for our cities is being ignored.

As a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the mayor of the city of New York, I have for 6 months observed with painful intensity the problems of New York City, problems most of which are national in cause and origin, and not of our city's design or creation, but problems which nevertheless typify the dilemma of all our major cities.

Mr. Chairman, I must report to you that New York City is strangling; that well-conceived programs to revive our cities are being starved for funds; that unless we in Congress carefully examine our current pattern of allocating available national resources, we can expect only an increase in the mounting hatreds and bitterness now building, escalation in the frightful polarization now taking place between groups of people within the city.

Congress must recognize its responsibility for this frightening situation. Through gross mistakes in the distribution of our resources, we have contributed mightily to the disintegration of our cities.



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I know that New York City does have the talent, the knowledge, and the programs to solve the problems with which it is struggling.

What our city does not have are the resources.

The time has come for us to examine all of our programs—marginal, desirable, and indispensable—programs for national defense, atomic energy, space, public works, transportation and programs for our cities—for the purpose of establishing a sound and sane system of national priorities.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, the bill before us (H.R. 12167) would authorize the appropriation of \$2,454,284,000 to the Atomic Energy Commission for the fiscal year 1970. This amount, which is recommended by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, is \$64,318,000 less than the authorization requested by AEC in its original budget request, but \$6,232,000 more than its revised request of \$2,448,052,000.

Certain areas of this bill are of special concern. Let me discuss each of these areas separately.

First, under the category of weapons, \$135 million has been recommended by the committee for "research, development, and testing of ABM components"—committee report, page 10. The report notes:

What the AEC will have purchased with the construction and equipment funds provided through fiscal year 1970 are capability and capacity.

In addition to the clear intent of the report, the debate and legislative history on the floor should clearly indicate that approval of this authorization does not in any way infer approval by the House of deployment of the Sentinel ABM system.

A decision on whether or not to approve the administration's recommendation that the Sentinel anti-ballistic-missile system be deployed will come before the House at a later date, at which time I would hope it will be possible to obtain a separate vote on that issue.

A second area of concern is \$26,900,000 which the committee has recommended for the final phases of the development of the NERVA I engine.

I have on several occasions pointed out to this body the ill-advisability of proceeding with the NERVA program, for which NASA—despite its determination to proceed with research and development—has yet to define a mission, let alone ask the House to approve a mission.

During the debate on the NASA authorization bill June 10, I cautioned the House:

Before authorizing more money for this program, at least we should be aware of what NASA intends for the future.

The report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on H.R. 12167 reinforces my belief that a mission must be defined and submitted to Congress. On page 15 of the report, the committee noted that it continued "to be concerned that no mission has yet been planned for the nuclear rocket." While the committee suggested possible missions for the nuclear rocket, including manned and unmanned lunar missions, unmanned deep space missions, and manned or un-

manned earth orbital missions, the fact remains that no mission has as yet been approved by Congress.

As I said on June 10, the testimony from the past several years in the House Committee on Science and Astronautics makes it perfectly clear that the NERVA program is, at least as far as NASA is concerned related to the promotion of glamorous and costly manned space flight, specifically a manned mission to Mars. Its purpose is interplanetary travel.

While such a mission may not have been approved by Congress as yet, we should recognize that further investments in the NERVA program will increase the pressure to approve whatever purpose NASA ultimately determines for the program. For as investments in the program mount, NASA will argue that, if the investments are not to be wasted, we must proceed with whatever mission NASA advocates.

Such a mission may, however, entail spending billions of additional dollars on a program of dubious national priority. The NERVA program, which is expected to ultimately cost some \$2 billion, is the forerunner of a manned Mars mission which I estimated last year would cost perhaps as much as \$200 billion into the 1980's.

Given the potential of the NERVA program for increased cost over the next few years, it is doubly important that Congress establish a rational allocation of our resources between our domestic social needs and the space program. Beyond that, we must set priorities within the space program itself. This means objectives must be stated and a balance established between manned and unmanned space flights.

When the costs of a manned Mars mission may be as much as \$200 billion—\$200 billion which will be vitally needed in such domestic areas as housing, education, and the abatement of pollution in our air and water—should Congress quietly allow the pressure to build for the adoption of such a goal? I think not. And yet, as we pour more and more money into a program for which no mission has been approved, that is precisely what will happen.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. HOSMER. I have no further requests for time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

Sec. 101. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with the provisions of section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended:

(a) For "Operating expenses", \$1,973,282,000, not to exceed \$121,000,000 in operating costs for the High Energy Physics program category.

(b) For "Plant and capital equipment", including construction, acquisition, or modification of facilities, including land acquisition; and acquisition and fabrication of capital equipment not related to construction, a sum of dollars equal to the total of the following:

(1) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS.—

Project 70-1-a, waste storage tanks and tank farm waste handling systems, Richland, Washington, \$10,000,000.

Project 70-1-b, bedrock waste storage (AE and site selection drilling only), Savannah River, South Carolina, \$1,300,000.

Project 70-1-c, waste encapsulation and storage facilities (AE only), Richland, Washington, \$1,200,000.

Project 70-1-d, contaminated water control facilities, Savannah River, South Carolina, \$1,500,000.

Project 70-1-e, equipment test facility, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, \$5,700,000.

(2) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS.—

Project 70-2-a, rebuilding of gaseous diffusion plant cooling tower, Portsmouth, Ohio, \$1,000,000.

Project 70-2-b, improvement of gaseous diffusion plant electrical distribution systems, Paducah, Kentucky, \$1,700,000.

(3) ATOMIC WEAPONS.—Project 70-3-a, weapons production, development and test installations, \$10,000,000.

(4) REACTOR DEVELOPMENT.—

Project 70-4-a, high temperature sodium facility, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington, \$6,300,000.

Project 70-4-b, research and development test plans, Project Rover, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, New Mexico, and Nevada Test Site, Nevada, \$1,000,000.

Project 70-4-c, modifications and alterations to expended core facility, National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho, \$4,400,000.

Project 70-4-d, modifications to reactors, \$1,000,000.

(5) REACTOR DEVELOPMENT.—Project 70-5-a, conversion of heating plant to natural gas, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois, \$560,000.

(6) PHYSICAL RESEARCH.—

Project 70-6-a, accelerator improvements, zero gradient synchrotron, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois, \$650,000.

Project 70-6-b, accelerator and reactor additions and modifications, Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York, \$700,000.

Project 70-6-c, accelerator improvements, Cambridge and Princeton accelerators, \$200,000.

Project 70-6-d, accelerator improvements, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley, California, \$680,000.

Project 70-6-e, accelerator improvements, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, California, \$640,000.

Project 70-6-f, accelerator improvements, medium and low energy physics, \$130,000.

Project 70-6-g, modification to Heavy Ion Linear Accelerator, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley, California, \$2,650,000.

(7) ADMINISTRATIVE.—Project 70-7-a, computer building, AEC Headquarters, Germantown, Maryland, \$1,850,000.

(8) GENERAL PLANT PROJECTS.—\$37,650,000.

(9) CAPITAL EQUIPMENT.—Acquisition and fabrication to capital equipment not related to construction, \$172,525,000.

SEC. 102. LIMITATIONS.—(a) The Commission is authorized to start any project set forth in subsections 101(b) (1), (3), (4), and (6) only if the currently estimated cost of that project does not exceed by more than 25 per centum the estimated cost set forth for that project.

(b) The Commission is authorized to start any project set forth in subsection 101(b) (2), (5), and (7) only if the currently estimated cost of that project does not exceed by more than 10 per centum the estimated cost set forth for that project.

(c) The Commission is authorized to start a project under subsection 101(b) (8) only if it is in accordance with the following:

(1) The maximum currently estimated cost of any project shall be \$500,000 and the maximum currently estimated cost of any building included in such project shall be \$100,000 provided that the building cost limitation may be exceeded if the Commission determines that it is necessary in the interest of efficiency and economy.

(2) The total cost of all projects undertaken under subsection 101(b) (8) shall not

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exceed the estimated cost set forth in that subsection by more than 10 per centum.

SEC. 103. The Commission is authorized to perform construction design services for any Commission construction project whenever (1) such construction project has been included in a proposed authorization bill transmitted to the Congress by the Commission and (2) the Commission determines that the project is of such urgency that construction of the project should be initiated promptly upon enactment of legislation appropriating funds for its construction.

SEC. 104. When so specified in an appropriation Act, transfers of amounts between "Operating expenses" and "Plant and capital equipment" may be made as provided in such appropriation Act.

SEC. 105. AMENDMENT OF PRIOR YEAR ACT.—Section 101(b) of Public Law 90-56, as amended, is further amended by striking from subsection (4) thereof the figure "\$32,833,000" for project 68-4-f, 200-Mev accelerator, Du Page and Kane Counties near Chicago, Illinois, and substituting therefor the figure "\$250,000,000."

SEC. 106. LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER REACTOR DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM.—PROJECT DEFINITION PHASE.—(a) The Commission is hereby authorized to conduct the Project Definition Phase of a Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Demonstration Program, under cooperative arrangements with reactor manufacturers and others, in accordance with the criteria heretofore submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, without regard to the provisions of section 169 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and authorization of appropriations therefor in the amount of \$7,000,000 is included in section 101 of this Act.

SEC. 107. The Commission is authorized to appoint persons as employees to positions in the Atomic Energy Commission without regard to the provisions of section 201 of Public Law 90-364, and such positions shall not be taken into consideration in determining numbers of employees under subsection (a) of that section or numbers of vacancies under subsection (b) of that section.

Mr. HOLIFIELD (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered as read, printed in the Record, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that I shall not take the full 5 minutes. I know the need for expediting the business of the House today, but I have two general sets of concern about which I believe more general information is needed and I know I would like to have, in addition to that which is in the committee report.

First of all I would like to know the status of or what happened to the experimental gas-cooled reactor which we built at Oak Ridge.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HALL. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOSMER. Which reactor is the gentleman talking about?

Mr. HALL. The EGCR.

Mr. HOSMER. The experimental gas cooling program?

Mr. HALL. That is right.

Mr. HOSMER. As I recollect it, that experiment served its purpose. It demonstrated the feasibility of further activity

in the gas-cooling area. Indeed today industry has taken up the gas-cooling approach at Peach Bottom, in Pennsylvania, where there is a producing gas-cooled reactor, I think with a 50,000-kilowatt capacity, on a commercial utility line which was built as a part of the demonstration program in which the AEC participated. As a follow-on to Peach Bottom, at Fort St. Vrain, in Colorado, the Public Service Co. of Colorado, in cooperation with the General Atomics Corp., and with the AEC, is building a large production powerline station on this principle.

Mr. HALL. I thank the gentleman for that part of the information which he volunteered. I think he anticipated my second question, about the Fort St. Vrain projector, indeed, all of the power reactor demonstration program projects. The Fort St. Vrain project, according to the committee's own report, encountered considerable problems, and the committee has been asked by the joint commission to keep it advised on a timely basis of the status of these efforts toward a reconfiguration of that project. Is that not true?

Mr. HOSMER. That is true.

Mr. HALL. But my original question, Mr. Chairman, goes back to the status of the experimental gas-cooled reactor that was a part of the TVA authorization and built on contract by Union Carbide and TVA at Oak Ridge. I believe, if you will search the records, you will find that it was never completed.

I would like to know how much money we put into that out of the taxpayers' pockets before it was thrown overboard, as so many of these cooperative projects and power reactor demonstrations are being thrown overboard.

I want it understood that I am in favor of this bill. I believe in atomic energy. I think it is here to stay. I believe the committee has brought in a good report. Certainly it is forthright and honest, but I believe that the Members and the taxpayers need an answer to some of these questions.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I do not personally recall that the TVA was a partner in any cooperative gas-cooled reactor. The AEC has had some experiments on its own, and at the present time the TVA is actually buying a 2,000-megawatt nuclear reactor for its system, but these are neither gas-cooled or in cooperation with the AEC. Perhaps the chairman of the committee will recollect something that I have not in connection with this.

Mr. HALL. The gentleman may be right on the details, technically; as to whether it was to furnish power to the TVA under contract or was being built experimentally and TVA was to benefit from the power therefrom. I am not knowledgeable enough to speak authoritatively and from memory in this area, but I think I do know that toward the end of the completion for this type reactor that it was stopped.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, there was a reactor, I might say, at Oak Ridge, but this was an experimental reactor. We spent quite a bit of money on that. I am going to be

frank. We have spent on research and development several hundred million dollars over the period of the atomic energy program. In some cases the committee itself has stopped projects when we thought we had all the scientific information that we could get out of the project. We did not let the project run on; when we got to the end of what we thought was the end of advanced technology in that project then we stopped the project. In many instances the technological information and development of the reactor in such a case which we had stopped was then used in another reactor which eventually brought out a successful reactor.

Mr. HALL. The gentleman in the well fully understands the advantages of research and development, testing and evaluation; as well as advantages from so-called fallout. However, would this same explanation that the gentleman has given, apply to the Malibu nuclear plant which the committee has recommended—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HALL was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes).

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, as I started to say, would the same explanation given by the gentleman apply to the cooperative power reactor demonstration programs? At least three out of the five mentioned in the committee report have been modified, discontinued for cause, or were not properly thought out in the first place; or these civilian consultants and benefactors have not been able to bear their portion of the matching funds. I report, is the same general explanation applicable to these power reactor demonstration projects, to the effect that we found acceptable plans not coming to pass?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let me say to the gentleman that in 1962 and 1963 the committee authorized two reactors in California. One was the so-called Malibu plant, and one was for the Southern California Edison Co.

Mr. HALL. Is that the same one as the Bolsa Island project?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That was a later project.

Mr. HALL. But the Bolsa Island project fell through.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The Bolsa Island project did not proceed because of the escalation of prices. But let me get back to the question.

The gentleman will find an explanation on page 34 of the report.

Mr. HALL. I will say to the gentleman that I have read the report thoroughly.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes, I am sure you have.

The Southern California Edison Co. is producing electricity from its nuclear reactor and it is the most advanced plant now on the line in the United States.

The engineers and scientists believe it will be competitive with other types of fossil fuel and other types of electrical generating plants.

In the case of the Malibu plant, they had trouble in getting a site, local authorization for the site.

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So there will never be any money to build on that one.

That was announced in the past, the time when they could avail themselves of that particular cooperative venture because it was to help develop the technology which has now been developed. Therefore, they are not at this time eligible for any help.

As I stated before, the Los Angeles Water and Power Department could not get the siting because of local governmental opposition.

Mr. HALL. I commend the committee on its oversight and review of these projects and continuing to classify and nullify them where there will be no additional civilian or military fallout, where the arrangements cannot be completed.

I will ask the gentleman finally, Has the Commission completed the Sefor reactor satisfactorily, in northwest Arkansas near Fayetteville? Are you happy with it?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. No. This reactor is being completed by partnership between the Federal Government and 17 privately owned utilities, also a German concern is participating in the venture. This is considered to be one of the most advanced reactors for the purpose of improving this breeding factor that I spoke of sometime ago. We are learning a great deal from it at the present time. We are continuing to learn.

I would say that that plant should operate for another two or three years to get the advance technology we need in that field.

Mr. HALL. I will ask the gentleman one final question.

Can he, as chairman of this committee which has oversight and review function of the Atomic Energy Commission, assure me that we are closing these experimental and cooperative civilian demonstration reactor projects down on time, in order to still get the greatest fallout from the technical evaluation and yet not waste the taxpayers' money in order to continue at the insistence of a local concern?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I believe that is true. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. McCulloch) is on our committee and we had a research reactor in his district which much to our regret we decided needed to be shut down, and notwithstanding the fact that it was in the gentleman's district, he finally agreed it should be closed down, and we did close it down.

We will continue to watch carefully all research and development and we will not allow any experimental device to continue beyond the point of what giving us a good scientific return.

Mr. HALL. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a detailed discussion on the MIRV program which I think is of overwhelming concern to all of us. I will not have a chance in the time allocated to get into it all because I have some questions I would like to direct to the chairman.

But I do think it is clear that there is a real problem here—both of escalation and of foreclosing the option of negotiating an enforceable limitation on MIRV deployment.

At the appropriate time I will be circulating among my Democratic colleagues the substance of the Brooke resolution. The reason I am doing this is, I feel that this is the most effective way to dramatize the concern that all of us have about this expensive and very critical weapons development.

Some of us feel that we ought to take the initiative. I personally would hope that we could do that. I think it is essential that we come to grips with the MIRV issue and the separate resolution that has already been introduced by Senator CRANSTON and Senator BROOKE in the other body.

## MIRV MORATORIUM

Mr. Chairman, we are today engaging in the first dialog in the House of Representatives on the critical issue of the development and deployment of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles.

This discussion comes at a crucial time—a time when the President and the National Security Council are preparing the American position for the upcoming strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, and at a moment when time is fast running out on our chances of ever being able to have an enforceable arms control agreement limiting MIRV's.

I would like to state at the outset that it is my firm conviction that the United States should at this time halt all testing of our MIRV system, and that further testing should be deferred at least until the arms limitation talks begin, and longer if the Soviets refrain from testing their multiple warhead systems. And in any event the United States should strongly press for mutual moratorium on MIRV's in these talks.

I recognize that not all Members of this body share this conviction. Moreover, I recognize that not all Members of this body are as familiar with the MIRV issues as they would like to be. Accordingly, I would like to take a few minutes to outline the issues as I see them, and to explain the reasons underlying my conclusions.

## THE STATE OF THE ART

At the outset it is important to understand how very far along in MIRV development we are, and to understand what it is that we know about Soviet developments in this area.

The United States has present plans to use MIRV's on two types of missiles—the Minuteman III land-based ICBM's and the Poseidon submarine-based missiles. These plans call for the deployment of MIRV's on 500 out of 1,054 of our ICBM's and on 496 of the 656 missiles on our nuclear submarines. The Minuteman III is a new last stage which will be fitted on the existing missile launchers for the Minuteman force. The Minuteman III will carry one to three warheads and is assumed to contain sophisticated penetration aids like chaff and decoys. The Poseidon will carry 10 to 15 warheads, and can apparently also carry penetration aids.

Minuteman III missiles are expected to

cost about \$10 million each. The Poseidon missiles are expected to cost between \$7 and \$10 million each. It will also cost about \$80 million to overhaul and convert each of the 31 Polaris nuclear submarines to carry the large Poseidon missiles. Thus total MIRV costs may be on the order of \$10 to \$15 billion, without including research and development costs.

In the current fiscal year 1970 budget there is \$2,074,000,000 for the Minuteman III and Poseidon programs. This is more than twice the amounts in the budget for the Safeguard ABM.

The Poseidon and Minuteman III MIRV's both employ a bus concept. This means that one propulsion and guidance mechanism directs all of the individual warheads carried by the missiles. After the main missile boosters have cut off, the propulsion unit on the bus makes minute adjustments in speed and direction, and after each of these adjustments releases another warhead, directing it to a different target.

The Soviet Union is at the present time testing at least two different concepts employing multiple warheads. In one concept, three warheads each in the 5-megaton range can be delivered in a pattern. Intelligence data available in the United States has not conclusively determined whether these warheads are independently targetable or whether they are merely multiple warheads like the ones we have had on our Polaris missiles since 1962 which deliver three warheads in a fixed shotgun-like pattern. President Nixon indicated last week, however, that even if the Soviet warheads are not independently targetable, he regards them as a threat to our ICBM's because the pattern of the Soviet warheads is much like the layout of our Minuteman fields.

The second Soviet concept being tested involves the delivery of a string of up to 10 warheads. Each of these warheads would land in a separate location, but they would not be capable of being independently targeted.

## THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

MIRV's have at least two strategic roles. MIRV's can increase the number of targets which can be struck by a given missile launcher force. And MIRV's can increase the probability that an enemy ABM will be penetrated.

MIRV's will affect the strategic balance only if one side perceives the MIRV warheads of the other to be either so large, or so accurate, or so numerous, as to be able to destroy a significant portion of its land-based ICBM's in a first strike, and thereby threaten the credibility of its deterrent.

Thus the crucial question with regard to the MIRV is whether one side sees its adversary's MIRV as a hard target—ICBM—killer. If so that side may perceive a threat to its deterrent and may have to take steps to maintain its assured destruction capability.

The U.S. Defense Department and the President have seen the possible Soviet deployment of large numbers of SS-9 ICBM's with MIRV's as potential hard target killers and not as mere ABM penetrators. Accordingly, the administration has perceived a threat to the

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land-based portion of our deterrent forces, and has recommended the deployment of an ABM to add to the credibility of our deterrent.

It is not clear how the Soviet views our plans to deploy MIRV warheads on our Minuteman III ICBM's and on our Poseidon submarine-launched missiles. There is information in the public domain which might induce the Soviets to fear our MIRV's as first-strike weapons, and there is other evidence which might convince the Soviets our MIRV's did not pose such a threat.

It is clear that U.S. experimentation with MIRV began, not to develop a system to penetrate antimissile defenses, but to develop a system to increase the number of military targets we could strike with our given force of missile launches. In July 1968, Dr. John Foster testified to the Senate:

The MIRV concept was originally generated to increase our targeting capability rather than to penetrate ABM defenses. In 1961-62 planning for targeting the Minuteman force, it was found that the total number of aim points exceeded the number of Minuteman missiles.

Since there are scarcely 200 Soviet cities worth targeting, and there were their plans for 800 Minuteman missiles, it must be assumed that these numerous "aim points" were missile sites and other military targets. However, experimentation in the early 1960's showed that with the guidance systems then available, MIRV's could not be made accurate enough to effectively take out these military targets. Accordingly, the early MIRV concept was dropped. But today both the Pentagon and the Soviets are aware of the hard target kill potential of MIRV's.

As far back as November 1967, Paul Nitze testified to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that with the same accuracies, ten 50-kiloton warheads were 1.2 to 1.7 times more effective in destroying hardened missile silos than was a single 10-megaton warhead. And since 1967, high defense officials have been making public statements indicating that the MIRV's now being developed will have greater accuracies than any of the single warhead missiles now deployed. Public reports have indicated that our MIRV's are designed to accuracies of less than a quarter of a mile. Furthermore, public reports also indicate that we are working on guidance technology which would permit warheads to actually home in on missile silos.

And perhaps most convincingly of all from the Soviet's point of view is the statement made at least three times this year by Secretary Laird in support of the \$12.4 million request for improved guidance for the Poseidon MIRV. Secretary Laird testified:

This is an important program since it promises to improve the accuracy of the Poseidon missile, thus enhancing its effectiveness against hard targets.

Thus, there are a good many reasons for the Soviets to fear that our MIRV is a first-strike weapon—just as we fear their MIRV is a first-strike weapon.

Recently, perhaps in an effort to allay Soviet apprehensions, the Pentagon has

been putting out information on the size of our MIRV warheads—Minuteman III, 200 kilotons; Poseidon, 50 kilotons, and their expected accuracies—one-quarter mile—which indicates that our MIRV's are not particularly good weapons for destroying missile silos. But it is not at all clear that the Soviets either believe the information as to the size of the warheads or as to the expected accuracies. Moreover, conservative Soviet defense planners would have to assume that our MIRV's were both larger and more accurate than we claim them to be.

Thus, there is good reason to believe that the Soviets will see our MIRV deployment as a threat to their land-based deterrent and that they will thus have to take further action to expand or protect their ICBM forces.

In presenting this evidence on the first-strike capabilities of our MIRV's, I do not contend that we are trying to achieve a first-strike posture with regard to the Soviets. But I do contend that it is perfectly plausible, if not exceedingly likely, that the Soviets fear our MIRV as a potential first-strike weapon.

If they do feel threatened by our MIRV's they will certainly respond with further deployments, just as we have done with the Safeguard ABM. And thus the arms race will be escalated another costly notch.

## FIRST STRIKE

One more point is worth making about MIRV and the possibility of a first strike. Not only is MIRV deployment likely to escalate the arms race by forcing the other side to deploy offsetting offensive or defensive weapons, but MIRV deployment actually makes the likelihood of a first strike greater.

If a MIRV-equipped missile is destroyed on the ground in its silo, several warheads will be destroyed. Thus, there is a considerable advantage to an attacker if he can destroy MIRV missiles in their silos, as in a first-strike attack.

Furthermore, once a MIRV-equipped missile is launched, it has the potential to destroy several of the enemy's missiles in their silos. Thus, again there is an advantage to the side that launches first.

This foreboding pressure to strike first is further heightened when one or both sides have city defense ABM systems. That side which has both MIRV and ABM might conclude that by attacking first, enough of the other side's missile force would be destroyed so that the ABM would be effective in meeting the diminished retaliatory attack by the other side.

Thus, should one or both sides deploy MIRV's or both MIRV's and ABM, in times of high tension, there will be greater pressure to strike first than there is now.

## ARMS CONTROL

If MIRV deployment both makes the threat of a first strike greater and further escalates the arms race, it seems fair to ask what can be done to stop its deployment by both sides.

This question is, of course, the subject of the arms limitation talks. But whether those talks will ever have a realistic opportunity to discuss and decide the possibility of a mutual moratorium on MIRV

deployment is in doubt. This doubt arises for two causes.

First, surveillance satellites which are capable of counting and locating ABM and ICBM missile sites, are not capable of distinguishing missiles with MIRV warheads from those with single warheads. The photographic and other equipment carried by these satellites is not capable of piercing the shroud covering the missile, nor of seeing through the concrete covers of the missile silos. Thus without on-site inspection, it is not possible to police an arms control agreement barring MIRV development.

Second, if a MIRV deployment moratorium cannot be enforced through satellite verification, and on-site inspection is not allowed, such a mutual moratorium could only be enforced if both sides were convinced that the other side had not proceeded far enough with its MIRV testing to justify deployment in secret of the MIRV warheads.

This point—the time at which one side is observing the MIRV test of the other concludes that even if tests were halted immediately they could no longer have high confidence that the tests had not proceeded far enough that the MIRV might be deployed secretly—is the point generally referred to as the point of no return in MIRV testing.

There is a good deal of controversy as to whether the point of no return has already been passed in the U.S. testing program. If it has not already been passed, it seems certain that it will be passed if the tests are continued successfully through this summer. By that time the tests will be better than half over, and most of the major tests will have been completed.

At this point the United States has conducted at least 13 MIRV flight tests. The tests of the Poseidon MIRV have been called "highly successful" by the Pentagon. The Minuteman III tests have been stretched out, but Secretary Laird still expressed confidence that the system would perform as intended by the time it is deployed in 1971.

Thus, there is some question as to whether the Soviets could ever be convinced that we were not secretly deploying MIRV's even if we were to stop testing right now. However, there is a chance that they might be so convinced. In order to offer them that chance in the arms talks, it might be that we have to halt testing of MIRV's now and provide the Soviets with the opportunity to agree to a MIRV moratorium before the point of no return is passed.

## TIMING

In deciding whether the United States can afford to defer MIRV testing and therefore MIRV deployment for a while longer, it is important to remember that the Pentagon justifies the MIRV as an ABM penetration system. In fact in this year's posture statement, the Pentagon notes:

MIRV deployment is necessary because we must continue to plan our strategic offensive forces on the assumption that they (USSR) will have deployed some sort of an ABM around their major cities by the mid-1970's.



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Yet at this time we have no intelligence estimate which indicates that the Soviet Union will have such a city defense ABM deployed in 1971 when the first U.S. MIRV's will become operational. In fact, the lead time for city defense ABM deployment is considerably longer than the lead time for MIRV deployment. Thus, we could actually wait until there was firm evidence of a Soviet nationwide ABM before we put MIRV's on our missiles.

These leadtime differentials, and the fact that the U.S. MIRV deployment is scheduled for several years in advance of the threat it is said to meet, indicate that we could tolerate a few months delay in MIRV development with no loss in security.

## CONCLUSION

Thus, Mr. Chairman, with MIRV development we face another costly escalation in the arms race which will not contribute to the increased security of either side. Moreover, this development will make a nuclear first strike strategy considerably more attractive than it is now.

These awesome prospects can be avoided if we can get a mutual moratorium on MIRV testing and deployment with the Soviet Union. Whether we can work out such a moratorium depends in part on not going too far in our MIRV testing. Since deferring these tests for a few months would not jeopardize the national security, and might actually contribute to that security should an agreement be reached, I strongly urge the members of this body to advocate and support a halt on U.S. MIRV development pending the commencement of the SALT talks and continuing thereafter so long as the Soviet Union refrains from testing its multiple warheads, and in any event pressing for a mutual moratorium on MIRV development in these talks.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I regret that the general debate was so abbreviated that I was not present to hear the previous discussion between the chairman of the Joint Committee and my colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Koch).

First, I would like to say that I share very intensively the concern that my colleague, the gentleman from California, has expressed with regard to the further testing of MIRV weapons. Some weeks ago I introduced a resolution in the House, which now has 29 cosponsors. I regret that the gentleman from California prefers the form of resolution that was introduced in the other body by Senator BROOKE. But that is his privilege. I do not know that there is any enormous difference between the two. In any event, I think it is of great importance that the disarmament talks—the SALT talks—proceed with the utmost urging, and there is no doubt that a mutual freeze on the development of the MIRV weapon, as well as on the deployment of the ABM, would be helpful to

our national security, as well as making possible a better use of our national resources.

But as I understand it—having had a conversation with the distinguished chairman of the Joint Committee—there is nothing in this legislation which purports to make any decisions with regard to either of these questions.

I have also discussed the matter of the ABM part of it with Senator GORE of the other body, and he assured me he had agreed to the Joint Committee's report on that basis. The report specifically states that the funds requested for ABM would be needed whether or not we decide to proceed with deployment of the ABM safeguard system. I assume that the same is true with regard to the MIRV.

May I ask the gentleman, the chairman of the Joint Committee, whether I am correct in my understanding that this legislation before us does not, if passed, constitute any decision by this body with regard to the desirability of proceeding with the deployment of the ABM safeguard system.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, that is my understanding, that the money in this bill is for research and development of all type warheads and has nothing to do with deployment.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

Would I be correct in my understanding that the same is true with regard to the question of the testing of the MIRV weapons, that that decision is presently in the hands of the President and the Defense Department, and there is nothing in this legislation to indicate a decision one way or another on that?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is my understanding, with this qualification, that the research and development and testing of warheads that has been going on—as the gentleman knows—since 1945, continues.

In the case of these different types of warheads, the scientific technology used in one warhead is applicable to the other. When it comes to testing the nuclear warhead for Minuteman or Poseidon, or if there should be a MIRV type, the nuclear warheads are tested underground and are not tested in flight.

However, there are flights in which dummy components of what we would call a multiple reentry vehicle would be tested by the flight of missiles. We are continuously testing missile flights to Kwajalein Island from the U.S. air base at Vandenburg. There have been in the past multiple entry vehicle tests both by the United States and the Soviet Union. This is nothing new, but they have always been dummy components and not the real thing.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the chairman.

In passing, I might say it was my understanding from testimony of the Defense Secretary Mr. Packard and testimony we heard coming from Secretary Laird that tests conducted by the Soviet Union have been, as far as is apparent, of MRV's, multiple reentry vehicles, and not MIRV's multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

I would like to explain to the gentle-

man, as far as testing underground is concerned, that is not the matter that we who are in favor of suspending flight tests have in mind. We are not concerned with underground tests.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

(By unanimous request, Mr. BINGHAM was allowed to proceed for an additional minute.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, it is not the underground testing we are concerned about. It is the flight tests which are under the control of DOD, as I understand it, that would indicate to the Soviets that at a certain point we have developed an operational MIRV, that is what we are concerned about.

I understand this legislation does not make any decision with respect to whether those tests should be continued or not. Is that correct?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, again I will have to repeat what I said to the gentleman, and I am trying to phrase my words carefully.

Testing of the missile with the component dummy parts has occurred in the past 2 or 3 years. It is occurring now and will continue to occur, and at a specific time when the tests are considered to be successful, it will be assumed then that there would be a utilization of it by putting nuclear components in the warheads of our Minuteman and Poseidon or any other missile we thought it was adaptable to.

Mr. BINGHAM. I understand that, Mr. Chairman. What I am concerned about is that we not come to a point later in the session when perhaps somebody debating a resolution such as the gentleman from California (Mr. COHELAN) is talking about, or my resolution, might run into the argument, "Oh, no; we decided that question when we passed the AEC authorization bill."

I want to be sure we will not be foreclosed from debating that when the time comes by reason of the fact that we pass this legislation.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am sure the gentleman will be given that opportunity under the rules of the House. I will be happy to discuss that matter with him at that time.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. One hundred and fifteen Members are present, a quorum.

The gentleman from Illinois, (Mr. ANDERSON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I have listened with great care and great interest as well to the remarks both of the gentleman from California (Mr. COHELAN) and of the gentleman who just addressed the Committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).

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I spoke on this subject earlier today when we were under general debate on this bill, and I indicated I was firmly of the conviction that there was no inconsistency between a position in support of this legislation—I refer, of course, to the authorizing legislation for the Atomic Energy Commission—and a position which I took last week expressing the hope that the President of the United States would take the initiative of proposing a mutual moratorium on the further flight testing of MIRV.

The gentleman from California has mentioned that he is circulating a counterpart of the so-called Brooke resolution among his Democratic colleagues. I intend to do the same among my Republican colleagues, because I see the desirability at this particular juncture in history of trying to take some positive action of trying to seize the initiative for a mutual moratorium.

However, I would take issue with my friend from New York, who referred to the resolution which he introduced in this body earlier this month, which now has some 29 cosponsors, and which he feels is not substantially different from the resolution I will circulate, the so-called Brooke resolution. I have before me a copy of that resolution, and I find, on page 2, subparagraph 2 of the resolving clause:

That the United States should defer further MIRV testing until every effort has been made to achieve a mutual freeze on MIRV development.

It seems to me that represents a substantial difference between the position of those of us who are urging a mutual moratorium. The so-called SALT talks, which presumably will begin between the 31st of July and the 15th of August, could well go on for a period of several years. The Soviets might well argue that during all this period they were trying to reach an agreement with us on a mutual freeze on MIRV development. During all that time they would be free, under the gentleman's resolution, as I understand it, to continue flight testing because no agreement had actually been arrived at. It seems to me we would then be running the very considerable risk that they would be testing to our disadvantage.

So I want to make it clear that I perceive a very definite distinction between the gentleman's resolution and the one I intend to circulate.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Is it not true that the Brooke resolution does contemplate a first move by the United States to suspend the MIRV testing, to be continued as long as we are satisfied no MIRV testing is going on on the other side.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. That is not my understanding. My understanding of the Brooke resolution is that it proposes we say to the Soviets, "If you will indicate to us that you will stop further flight testing of this weapon, we

will do the same and continue to desist from testing until such time as you have broken the moratorium."

Mr. BINGHAM. If the gentleman will yield further?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BINGHAM. The gentleman is mistaken, I believe. I do not have the resolution in front of me, but it does not contemplate any prior agreement of that kind.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. COHELAN. I have a copy of the resolution which is contained on page S6619 of the Record of June 17. The gentleman in the well is correct. It reads as follows:

The Government of the United States should declare its intention to refrain from additional flight tests of the MIRV vehicles so long as the Soviet Union does so.

Now, while I have an opportunity, I would like to make this observation if the gentleman will yield further.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Yes.

Mr. COHELAN. I would prefer personally that we take the initiative. In the remarks I made earlier, which I hope Members will read, I advance the argument on this question and point out why we should act and why we can afford the risk. However, I am actually sponsoring, along with my colleague from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON), the Brooke resolution. I do this because I believe most Members can and will support that position. It will also draw attention to the cost and arms escalation of this critical weapons development.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Now, if I may, I would like to explain why it is I am proceeding on the assumption that we should get some indication from the Soviet Union that they agree to this moratorium. I think it was in 1958 that former President Eisenhower proposed a moratorium, you will recall, on testing in the atmosphere. This went along until September 1961. I should go back and say that at the time President Eisenhower made his proposal there was no real indication from the Soviet Union that they agreed to the moratorium. Things ran along until September 1961, you will recall, when all of a sudden the Soviets broke the moratorium. Without as much as a "by your leave," they proceeded to resume testing in the atmosphere.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has again expired. (Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I think we have to have a decent regard for history in this respect and recall that particular example. Therefore I suggest when we propose a moratorium that even though we take the initiative in the sense that we make the proposal, because it certainly has not been forthcoming as far as I know from the Soviet Union, that we will still expect some indication on their part that they are assenting to the

moratorium and are not going to proceed with flight testing of this particular weapons system.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has again expired.

(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois, at the request of Mr. BINGHAM, was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BINGHAM. I want to pursue the question as to whether the Brooke resolution calls for a prior agreement on the part of the Soviets. It is quite clear, I believe, from the penultimate paragraph of the resolution, that it talks about the achievement of an agreement, but the final paragraph of the resolution refers to action that the United States indicates it is prepared to take provided the Soviet Union will do the same; not provided that they agree to do the same but that they will do the same. There is a lot of difference. You do not have to have prior agreement but simply action by the United States and a response by the Soviets at the same time without explicit agreement. Then you proceed to try to reach an agreement.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I will simply say in reply to the gentleman from New York that I have tried to familiarize myself with the literature in this area and the debate which surrounded the introduction of this resolution in the other body. It seems to me that the legislative history, if you can call it that, of this resolution to date indicates as far as its sponsor is concerned that what he had in mind was a mutuality of obligation. I take that mutuality of obligation to extend to this business of indicating somehow that one side will agree in advance they will not test while the other side is similarly not testing.

Mr. BINGHAM. If the gentleman will yield for one further comment?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BINGHAM. If that is so, it seems to me it is most unfortunate, because then no MIRV freeze will occur until we can arrive at an agreement.

The gentleman knows how difficult it is to arrive at agreements with the Soviet Union.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I would have to disagree with the gentleman. As a matter of fact, the very reason I am suggesting that we ought to propose a moratorium in this country is to avoid the necessity of waiting while these long and perhaps even tedious negotiations drag on in Geneva, or Vienna, on trying to come up with an overall disarmament agreement. It seems to me there would be no great difficulty involved in arriving at an informal agreement with the other side with respect to the testing of MIRV.

Mr. BINGHAM. Could the gentleman think of an instance where we have been able to arrive at such an informal agreement with the Soviet Union without going through all of the agony of negotiations?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I think the gentleman will agree with me that we have reached a point in history which is a sufficiently critical juncture that we

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ought to be willing to try to take the initiative and make such an attempt, even though the chances are not very bright in that regard.

Mr. Chairman, last Thursday evening President Nixon held a press conference in which he discussed a wide range of subjects. Of particular interest to me was his announcement that he intended to begin strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union around the first part of August, subject, of course, to Soviet acceptance of this invitation.

I think the President is to be commended for sensing the urgency of these talks and for rejecting any further delay in their commencement. I would hope that the Soviet Union will agree to the the July 31 target date so that we may begin substantive discussions on checking the dangerous arms spiral.

Last week, before this body, I expressed my concern over the delay in arms talks and over the development of MIRV missiles, the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles that both we and the Soviets are contemplating deploying. I expressed the belief that we should seriously consider proposing to the Russians an immediate and mutual moratorium on MIRV flight tests pending a formal agreement at the conference table.

I am disturbed by the fact that if a halt in these tests is not called soon, it may be too late to work out an agreement acceptable to either side. MIRV would introduce a warhead counting problem that could only be checked by onsite inspections, something neither side is likely to agree to. In addition, MIRV would signal a new escalation in the arms race that would not only involve great costs but would imperil the delicate balance of terror being maintained by both sides. The technology of MIRV is such that the greater it is perfected in accuracy, the more provocative it becomes as a potential first strike weapon capable of knocking out hardened missile targets. The introduction of MIRV will consequently put both us and the Russians in a constant state of fear over both the capabilities and intentions of the other side.

I was, therefore, encouraged by President Nixon's reference last Thursday to a mutual moratorium on MIRV flight tests as "a very constructive proposal." The President went on to say that the administration is "considering the possibility of a moratorium on tests as part of any arms control agreement." I think the President was correct in ruling out a "unilateral stopping of tests on our part." This would be unwise and a foolish risk that we could not afford to take. I have proposed a mutual moratorium and I was pleased with the President's comment:

Only in the event that the Soviet Union and we could agree that a moratorium could be mutually beneficial to us, would we be able to agree to do so.

However, I wish to reiterate my belief that a MIRV test moratorium cannot await a formal agreement at the SALT conference. We must head off this escalation now before either side is capable of deploying the weapon. I would urge

the President to follow up the remarks made at his press conference by proposing to the Soviets that we both cease MIRV testing as of July 31 and that the moratorium continue for the duration of the talks. I think both we and the Soviets are extremely apprehensive about the Pandora's box which would be opened by MIRV and that we both realize, in the President's words, "that a moratorium could be mutually beneficial to us."

Mr. Chairman, for these reasons, I have decided to introduce in this body, a resolution identical to the one introduced in that other body by Senator BROOKE, calling upon the President to propose to the Soviet Union an immediate and mutual moratorium on MIRV flight tests. I intend to circulate this resolution among my colleagues on this side of the aisle and urge them to cosponsor it with me. At the same time, the gentleman from California (Mr. COHELAN) will be circulating the same resolution among his colleagues on the other side of the aisle for the same purposes. I would ask that all the Members of this body study the resolution carefully, consider its merits and its urgency, and join us in expressing our concern over this crucial issue.

Mr. Chairman, at this point in the Record, I wish to include certain editorials and articles pertaining to this proposal and I call these to the attention of my colleagues.

The articles follow:

[From the Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1969]

#### MR. NIXON ON MIRV

President Nixon says his Administration is considering a joint Soviet-American moratorium on tests of multiple warhead missiles, but rules out any unilateral suspension on our part. Good enough, but we hope the U.S. sounds out the Soviets on some sort of informal moratorium in advance of the arms talks that may start later this summer.

When combined with missiles of appropriate size and accuracy, a MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) capability could be used for a nuclear first strike taking out much of the opponent's retaliatory force. Yet the posture of mutual deterrence, the bedrock of whatever stability a nuclear world can hope to find, depends more than anything else on each side's confidence that its retaliatory forces are secure from any such attack. MIRV technology threatens that confidence, and thus directly threatens nuclear stability.

President Nixon's remarks recognize the special importance of multiple warheads in suggesting a MIRV test moratorium as part of the arms control agreement. Such an agreement, though, is likely to take years of negotiation. The time during which the President's suggestion of a MIRV test moratorium remains feasible is measured in months at best.

A limitation on MIRV seems conceivable only while it remains in the test flight state, when both we and the Soviets can easily monitor the other's efforts. Once operational confidence is gained, any limitation could be enforced only through detailed on-site inspection of missiles, a possibility that flies in the face of the Soviet's historic opposition to any inspection of that kind.

Once MIRV is operational, each side would be forced to assume the other had deployed it. This would not absolutely preclude arms limitation, but it would force the nuclear race up to its next plateau in spending and warhead proliferation. Each side would in

fact, feel forced to proceed with its own MIRV. And since anti-ballistic missiles are the logical strategic response to MIRV, the question on the ABM would not be whether to deploy the current Safeguard proposal, but whether ABMs could be held to anything like the Safeguard's limited size.

Now, the United States is only a few months away from operational confidence in the key independent guidance technology, though it is not testing multiple warheads large enough to be especially useful in attacking the Soviet's hardened retaliatory missiles. The Soviets apparently are testing multiple warheads of this counterforce size, but their independent guidance capability seems much further in the future.

Anything the U.S. can do to stop the Soviet tests is manifestly in the American national interest. The U.S. MIRV would be absolutely necessary only if the Soviets deployed a large city-defense ABM system, a project with a long lead time allowing the U.S. to pick up MIRV development. Thus, the U.S. has little to lose and a great deal to gain from a mutual MIRV test suspension.

That is not to say the Soviets would necessarily feel they would suffer from such a limitation, for no doubt they would prefer that the U.S. does not deploy MIRV. Since their interest in arms talks probably stems from a desire to limit strategic spending, also, they would presumably see the advantage in not being forced on to the next plateau. Thus there is at least some chance the Soviets would agree to a test moratorium provided it is offered to them before they feel the U.S. has perfected its own technology.

In endorsing a mutual test suspension and commending Senator Brooke's activity in its behalf (President Nixon demonstrated that he understands this analysis of the MIRV problem. The same logic leads to the next step, approaching the Soviets immediately, while a mutual test suspension remains in the realm of possibility.

[From the New York Times, June 20, 1969]

#### MR. NIXON AND MIRV

No decision Richard Nixon will face as President is likely to be more momentous than the decision he faces within the next few days on the proposal to suspend the flight-testing of MIRV multiple-warhead missiles. Mr. Nixon yesterday described this proposal as "constructive" and said he would favor it if the Soviet Union would agree to do the same. But his attack on a "unilateral" suspension (of tests only the United States is now conducting) and his statement that this move must be part of an arms control agreement (which may take years to negotiate) confuse the issue.

Immediate suspension of MIRV tests is essential to keep the door open for a strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union that would freeze the existing nuclear balance, head off further escalation of the missile race and assure security to both sides. Continued testing for even a few more weeks threatens to take the world past a point of no return into an expensive and dangerous new round in the missile race. It promises a five-fold multiplication of nuclear delivery vehicles in the American strategic missile forces—from 1,700 to about 8,000, an expansion that the Soviet Union would doubtless match. Even if limits on Soviet and American missile strength were later to be set at these higher levels, an era of nuclear nervousness would be almost sure to replace the present situation of stable mutual deterrence.

The bipartisan resolution introduced this week by Senator Brooke of Massachusetts and 40 other Senators urging the President to seek an immediate moratorium with the Soviet Union indicates a growing realization in Congress that MIRV testing is now the main governor on the arms race. It is more urgent than the issues that have dominated the missile debate in recent months, such as



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the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system, or the Soviet offensive SS-9 missiles and defensive ABM deployments.

These systems can be fully discussed in the approaching strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union. They take years to build and there is time to negotiate cut-offs long before their expansion will significantly affect the nuclear balance. Moreover, they can be monitored easily by reconnaissance satellite without on-site inspection. MIRV is a wholly different matter.

The United States already has staged fourteen full-systems flight tests of silo-based Minuteman III and submarine-launched Poseidon missiles carrying from three to twelve MIRV warheads. The first two of 31 Polaris submarines to be refitted at great expense for the big, MIRV-tipped Poseidon missiles already have gone into drydock for that purpose.

The Johnson Administration proceeded on schedule with MIRV flight tests last August after advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that two years would be required to test to operational confidence. Within two months, it was thought, missile talks with the Soviet Union would be under way to halt MIRV and other aspects of the arms race. But the Soviet-American talks were delayed three months by Czechoslovakia, then another seven months so far by the determination of the Nixon Administration to re-examine the strategic balance and the American negotiating position at leisure.

Meanwhile, the American MIRV tests have moved much faster than the Pentagon originally indicated and operational confidence may now be reached in a matter of weeks, if the tests continue—a year ahead of schedule. Continuation of the testing this summer thus threatens to carry the world irrevocably into the MIRV era. MIRV can only be headed off in the test stage, since tests can be detected with relative assurance. Once deployed, MIRV can only be detected by on-site inspection more intrusive than even the United States, not to mention the Soviet Union, would be likely to accept. Satellite cameras cannot tell whether a missile is carrying one or ten warheads.

The American national interest lies overwhelmingly in heading off Soviet MIRV tests before they begin or, at least, before they get very far. The best way to achieve that would be suspension of American tests so long as the Soviet Union refrains from testing as well. An alternative would be an immediate approach to Moscow for a jointly announced test moratorium now. Postponement of this approach until the overall strategic arms talks begin in August—or, even worse, until agreement is reached there—would risk the true security interests of the United States and the world.

[From the New York Times, June 22, 1969]  
CAN THE ARMS RACE BE STOPPED IN TIME?  
(By Peter N. Gross)

WASHINGTON.—One day early in August, some Russian Diplomats and some American diplomats are planning to sit down together in Vienna, or maybe in Geneva, to decide whether there is anything they can do about setting some limits to the power each nation has to destroy the other.

President Nixon plunged into the final pre-conference review with his National Security Council last week, evolving the negotiating position the United States will take when it begins the long-heralded Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union. In Washington's jargon, this new and by far most ambitious round on disarmament talks has the label SALT; the acronym is the only whiff of whimsy in the grim and awesome undertaking. What is and is not discussed in these talks, for which, at his press conference on Thursday, President Nixon set an opening target date of July 31, will shape global strategy for a decade to come.

## TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES

As an opener, the Administration is likely to propose a freeze on deployment of both superpowers' arsenals of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Such is the advance of military technology in the 18 months since the missile talks were first contemplated that this once formidable proposal now looks like about the easiest place to begin.

There is reasonable parity now on these ICBM's; the Russians with 1,200 already in place or nearly so, the United States with about 1,000 Minutemen and 54 giant Titan II missiles.

From this relatively straightforward proposition, the talks could move into limitations on the other weapons systems, the bombers that once were the center of United States strategic defenses, the submarines that serve as mobile missile launchers, and on into the more sophisticated weapons of multiple warheads and antiballistic missile systems. That, at any rate, is the design of the talks as now projected from the American side.

The principle of this negotiating strategy is to start with what is already deployed before trying to regulate advanced weapons that are scarcely operational. It is a strategy full of pitfalls—and not only those set by the adversaries.

From the start of his Administration, President Nixon has made a point of consulting in detail with the European allies before deciding anything with the Russians. He sent one of his longtime aides, Robert Ellsworth, as his ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

If the task were simply to inform the European Governments what the United States hoped to achieve with the Russians on limiting advanced weaponry of the superpowers, Mr. Ellsworth's job in the coming weeks would be relatively easy. Instead, the Administration believes it has to impress upon the NATO partners that the opening of missile talks does not mean that conventional European defenses can be relaxed. On the contrary, American diplomats argued, any agreement to limit strategic weapons might well make the maintenance of regional and conventional forces more crucial, for there is where the pressure could be turned on in the years to come.

## DISSENT IN SENATE

Strangely enough, President Nixon has taken less care in his consultations in another direction—with the Democratic Congress. Consequently the loudest voice challenging the Administration's SALT position is coming, not from nervous allies or, as yet, suspicious Russians, but from the United States Senate. Legislators of his own party complain that the President is neither listening to their views nor bothering to inform them of his. Testimony from top Administration officials at formal hearings strikes the Foreign Relations Committee, the center of the opposition, as contradictory and cavalier. There is rumbling of a new "intelligence gap," as differing assessments of Soviet nuclear capabilities are called to the Senators' attention.

A bipartisan group of 39 Senators joined in sponsoring a resolution last week calling for a mutual moratorium on flight tests of multiple warhead systems as the first item of business in the arms talks. At his Thursday news conference, Mr. Nixon rather grudgingly called their suggestion "constructive insofar as they themselves are thinking about it"; he said the Administration was considering such a moratorium "as part of any arms control agreement."

But across the executive branch it seemed clear that limitations on the new generation of weapons would be well down on the conference agenda, and by the time the two sides got to doing anything about it, both

ABMs and multiple warheads might well be operational on both sides.

If that point is reached, the Senatorial critics say, it's the point of no return and there would be little likelihood of any agreement to limit these new weapons. Modern intelligence devices are perfectly able to determine how many missiles are deployed on launching pads; there is no way short of on-site inspection to know how many warheads are on board each missile. Neither country has shown much interest in on-site inspections so far—therefore, the critics say, there is no reasonable chance of an enforceable agreement once the multiple warheads now being tested become part of each country's arsenal.

What the Russians think about these points remains to be seen. Administration experts frankly admit that they have no real idea of how the Kremlin sees the forthcoming talks unfolding; all they know, they say, is that the Soviet Union is pushing ahead on the development of new weapons as fast, as the United States, if not faster. The time for stopping such development, called for by the Senators, has already passed.

This is the cloud under which the SALT undertaking now stands. The old underlying purpose—the prevention of a new spiral of costly arms production—is dangerously close to being defeated before the talks even begin.

[From the Washington Post, June 22, 1969]  
BUT PENTAGON BANKS ON IT: MIRV SEEN  
ADDING TO "MAD MOMENTUM"

(By Richard Harwood and Laurence Stern)

In the euphemistic phrasing of the war business, the new gadget is called a "bus." Its passengers are little warheads that could be dropped off "with a very nice area effect," as the Pentagon puts it, at such places in the Soviet Union as Minsk and Toms.

The official acronym is "MIRV" (as in Mervin). The letters stand for "multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle." They are rapidly replacing "ABM" as the symbolic focus of the arms control debate in the United States.

To many scientists and politicians, MIRV is the newest and most deadly accelerator of "the mad momentum of nuclear armaments." It insures, Sen. John Sherman Cooper told the Senate last week, that the United States and the Soviet Union can, in a single stroke, "multiply the number of deliverable nuclear warheads in the world by a factor of 3 to 10."

To the managers of the Pentagon, MIRV offers one of the best hopes for slowing down the arms race. It is, in their view, a trump card in the forthcoming arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. If the Soviets agree to abandon efforts to defend their cities against American missiles, then the United States could agree, the Defense Department suggests, to abandon or limit the deployment of MIRV.

President Nixon hinted as much Thursday when he said he is willing to talk with the Russians about a MIRV moratorium.

Actually the first indication of the Administration's negotiating flexibility on MIRV came nearly three months ago in a little-noticed exchange between Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard and Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.).

Gore asked: "Do you have any doubt that it is our intention to replace the Polaris with the Poseidon?"

Packard's response was: "It is our intention, Mr. Chairman, unless we conclude some agreements that would dictate otherwise."

Pentagon officials have some suggestions as to the general terms of such an agreement. "If they tell us they are not going to defend their cities," said one spokesman, "we'll lose a lot of interest in MIRV. Since its purpose is to penetrate Russian cities' defenses, MIRV is negotiable."



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Authoritative officials speak of a formula under which both sides would freeze the number of offensive missile sites and move into "thin" antiballistic missile systems. "That would, in effect, be disarmament," in the view of one Pentagon expert.

A more modest step, as some see it, would be a mere mutual freeze on the number of delivery vehicles, or buses. "If they freeze their delivery vehicles they can MIRV up to the kazoo and they would have no first strike," an official said.

This means, however, that each side would have to make the worst assumptions about how much megatonnage lies in the silos of the prospective enemy.

It could still be a prescription for further arms stockpiling by both the Soviet Union and United States.

As with all of the scenarios on nuclear war and its probabilities, MIRV has created deep divisions in both the scientific and political communities in the United States. It suggests to some that American war planners are seeking a "first-strike" capability against the Soviet Union. It suggests to others that the Defense Department is a sucker for gadgets, that it will buy any new weapon that comes along, irrespective of need. It suggests to still others that the Nixon Administration is not serious about arms control.

The view from the Pentagon on these issues is both reassuring and confusing. It is based on the promise that security is, in effect, found in insecurity, that the best hedge against a nuclear war is, in Robert McNamara's words, "the certainty of suicide to the aggressor." That is what is meant by the "balance of terror."

That balance, the Pentagon maintains, could be upset by the United States in only two ways—an infallible system of defense (ABM) protecting the country from "suicide" or an infallible system of offense to destroy virtually all Soviet weapons in a sneak attack.

MIRV has been called, by its critics, the forerunner to that kind of "first-strike" offensive system. But the Defense Department rejects the argument.

The main reason offered is that MIRV's warheads are too small and too inaccurate for use against Russian missile silos. The MIRV "bus" to be installed on the new Minuteman III missile, according to Defense officials, will carry from two to three 200-kiloton warheads. The "bus" on the new Poseidon submarine missile will carry up to 15 warheads of about 50 kilotons each (the Hiroshima bomb was 20 kilotons.)

In order for a 200-kiloton warhead to have a 70 per cent chance of knocking out a silo, it would have to land no farther than 200 yards away; a 50-kiloton warhead would have to land no more than 140 yards away.

This kind of accuracy, says the Pentagon, is not possible today nor in the foreseeable future; the best that can be done now is to guide a warhead to within about 440 yards of its target.

That is close enough to kill a target—a silo, for example—when large weapons are used, such as the 1-megaton warheads currently installed in Minuteman and Polaris. But it is too far away for smaller warheads to be effective.

Thus, MIRV's only present usefulness, its promoters insist, would be against "soft" targets such as cities.

There is general, although not unanimous, agreement in the scientific community that this description of MIRV's limitations is essentially correct.

But the Pentagon itself has cast doubt on this presumption by the conflicting statements it has issued. Although it now insists that MIRV is ineffective against silos, it took precisely the opposite view in January, 1968 when it put out a statement saying that "each new MIRV warhead will be aimed in-

dividually and will be far more accurate than any previous or existing warhead. They will be far better suited for destruction of hardened enemy missile sites than any existing missile warheads."

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird implied the same thing when he told Congress in March of this year that he planned to spend \$12.5 million to improve the Poseidon guidance system and thereby make it more effective against "hardened" targets, meaning missile silos.

Statements of this kind have alarmed many scientists, such as Wolfgang Panofsky, the Stanford physicist who was a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee from 1959 to 1964 and chairman of its panel on defense.

"They (such statements) are essentially threatening to the Soviets," Panofsky said, "and are technically wrong . . . From Laird's statement the Russians could not help but draw the worst possible judgment (about MIRV) . . . My own view is that this generation of MIRV is not a first-strike threat to the Russians. The verbiage that has gone with it is more of a threat than the technical side."

The "technical side," however, continues to bother MIRV critics such as Dr. Leonard Rodburg, a physicist at the University of Maryland. There may be, Rodburg says, limitations on MIRV's accuracy today. But there is no scientific barrier to far greater accuracy in the relatively near future, he believes. The work of such guidance experts as Dr. Charles Draper of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology may make it possible fairly soon to put a small MIRV warhead almost "on the silo door," Rodburg says. "With that kind of accuracy," he said, "you could destroy a silo with a satchel charge."

Whatever the implications of the Pentagon's conflicting descriptions of MIRV's mission, the present policy is to stress the limitations of the weapon. Dr. Roland Herbst, the Defense Department's deputy director of research, said last week that pinpoint accuracy for MIRV may be achieved "at some time in the future" but it is "not in the neighborhood at this moment."

Military pressure to develop MIRV began as early as 1962. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara at first said "no" to the new weapon. His reasoning was that the United States could already kill as many targets as it wanted to without going into MIRV deployment.

But at that time there were also military intelligence readings that the Russians were building an ABM system around Moscow. It turned out afterwards that what intelligence originally proclaimed to be ABM defenses were actually anti-aircraft installations to guard against advanced American bombers that McNamara never deployed.

The Pentagon debated two alternatives to the Soviet ABM. One was the use of penetration aids such as chaff and decoys for offensive missiles. The second was MIRV.

The first course was dropped on grounds that effective radar could distinguish incoming warheads from decoys and shoot them down—an argument that, ironically, opponents of the U.S. ABM used and Pentagon scientists dismissed. MIRV proved highly attractive to the military.

It promised a capability to hit more targets without violating McNamara's self-imposed freeze on the number of delivery vehicles. "MIRV was the best route to numbers," was one Pentagon spokesman's way of putting it.

And so, in an atmosphere of supersecrecy, the Defense Department began developing MIRV. No one mentioned the awesome acronym publicly until 1965 when a Pentagon official made reference to it at a press background session.

Pentagon newsmen were so astonished at the disclosure that they went back to their

briefers and asked if he had really intended to let MIRV out of the bag. Everyone agreed to delete the reference to the new weapon system.

It was almost two more years before MIRV surfaced publicly. But it was overshadowed in the strategic weapons debate by the ABM.

MIRV's development as a "city-busting" weapon is now continuing on a schedule that calls for the first warheads to be installed on two nuclear submarines in January, 1971. If the development is carried out as planned it will cost, according to present estimates, about \$17 billion—\$7 billion for Poseidon, \$10 billion for Minuteman III.

At present there are no clear answers to where the Russians stand on MIRV development. Last fall they tested the SS-9 missile with three huge warheads—presumably five megatons each. Whether these were guided warheads or simply gravity bombs, such as the Polaris A-3 missile has carried since 1962, is uncertain.

But no expert disputes the possibility that the Russians could quickly bring their MIRV technology abreast of the United States.

If both sides then proceeded to full-scale MIRV programs, their nuclear arsenals would increase enormously. The United States today possesses approximately 2350 strategic warheads, as against about 1100 for the Soviet Union. By MIRVing, the American arsenal could be raised to 8766 warheads with no increase in the number of delivery vehicles; the Russian arsenal could be raised to 5150.

This prospect is not disturbing to the Pentagon at the present time. The military reasoning is that both sides still would be left without a first-strike capability.

Disarmament proponents are less sanguine. They see MIRV's development as simply another useless step in the "mad momentum" of the arms race, a step that, if nothing else would divert billions needlessly to weapons that neither side requires.

[From Time magazine, June 27, 1969]

#### ARMS CONTROL: THE CRITICAL MOMENT

(NOTE.—The central fact today in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is that progress in technology has made it both necessary and possible to place restraints on the nuclear-arms race. The technological stars and planets are now in favorable conjunction—and they will not stay that way for long.)

Last week, after months of delay, the U.S. Government began to act on that warning from William C. Foster, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Johnson Administration. For the first time, President Nixon's National Security Council devoted a full session to defining the negotiating positions that the U.S. will take when it discusses possible limits on nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. A second Security Council meeting is scheduled for this week. The President also announced that, if the Soviets agree on time and place, SALT—the long-awaited strategic arms limitation talks—will begin between July 31 and Aug. 15.

#### UPSET BALANCE

The risks that William Foster describes are real. Central to them is a frightening new weapon called MIRV, for "multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle." MIRV, even more than the antiballistic missile, threatens to upset the uneasy balance of deterrence that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have achieved. It may also set off a domestic debate that could surpass in fervor the acrimonious ABM dispute.

Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are already testing multiple missile launchers, although the U.S. is believed to have a wide lead. The Pentagon argues for continuing the tests, and for development of MIRV, on the grounds that the U.S. system is nearly operational and stopping tests would simply

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give the Russians a chance to catch up. The technical teams at work on MIRV in private industry would have to be disbanded, and they could not be rapidly reassembled in case the U.S.S.R. makes a dramatic breakthrough. On the other hand, the President is under considerable pressure to suspend MIRV tests, thereby demonstrating to the Soviets, a deep U.S. commitment to arms control in anticipation of SALT.

Massachusetts Republican Edward Brooke last week lined up 39 Senators of both parties as cosponsors of a "sense of the Senate" resolution urging a halt to testing—if the Russians reciprocate. Nixon espoused the Brooke position cautiously, saying that "only in the event that the Soviet Union and we could agree that a moratorium on tests could be mutually beneficial to us, would we be able to agree to do so."

#### WARHEAD NOSE COUNT

Unless such a moratorium is agreed to early in SALT, many experts believe, the chance of real progress toward arms limitation is small. If both the U.S. and the Soviet Union proceed to MIRV deployment, the ensuing uncertainty would make a freeze on nuclear weaponry almost impossible to achieve. Policing an agreement to regulate the number of warheads installed in missiles would not be feasible. Spy satellites can count launch vehicles, but not their contents. Even an inspector on the ground would have to take a missile nose cone apart and physically count the number of warheads inside. Neither side will readily agree to let the other's technical experts get so close to the business end of its nuclear arsenal. By contrast, enforcing a ban on flight tests would be relatively easy. Each side can observe the rival's launches from a distance.

Further, mutual deterrence would be put in question. Since MIRV would multiply many times the number of warheads either side could deliver against the other, a thin ABM system like Safeguard would not be sufficient to preserve enough of the defender's missiles to allow him to strike back effectively after a massive surprise attack. Thus, the temptation to deliver a pre-emptive strike in an acute crisis like the Cuban missile confrontation would increase. This new step-up in the arms race,<sup>1</sup> coupled with the Safeguard ABM, would cost the U.S. at least \$20 billion and could lead to far vaster expenses if each side continued to expand its arsenal. These huge expenditures would bring no increase in security. More likely, both sides would become more vulnerable to attack.

Even in the absence of immediate new weapons deployments, the business of arms control is tremendously complex. Past agreements, such as the 1963 partial ban on nuclear-test explosions, were reached only after long negotiations and after Moscow and Washington came simultaneously to the conclusion that potential benefits outweighed the risks. Distrust between the two nations remains basic and deep. Intelligence experts and strategists deal in short-range "estimates" and long-range "assumptions" on what the other side is doing now and might do later. Military and intelligence professionals tend to be pessimists, and hence hawks. China's nuclear development has added a new factor of uncertainty. Despite these difficulties, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union recognize the immense stakes involved in arms limitations and seem prepared to go ahead.

<sup>1</sup> A recent study by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated that the nations of the world have expended more than \$4 trillion on wars and weaponry thus far in the 20th century. At the present rate of increase in military outlays, another \$4 trillion will be spent in the next decade.

#### SLIPPED LINKAGE

The President even seems willing to give up, at least for the present, his strategy of using arms talks as a carrot to gain other understandings. Nixon took office believing that the Johnson Administration had mistakenly pursued an arms pact with the U.S.S.R. without regard to basic political conflicts between the two countries. "What I want to do," he told his first presidential press conference, "is to see to it that we have strategic-arms talks in a way and at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union, acting together, can serve the cause of peace."

The goal that became known as "linkage" has turned out to be more difficult to achieve than he thought. Nixon hoped to calm the Middle East by working with the Soviets, but last week he admitted: "I see very little defusing." The Russians are evidently content not to have genuine peace between the Arab nations and Israel, but a state of controlled tension. Nixon wanted Moscow to help him get a settlement in Viet Nam by applying pressure on the North Vietnamese. Although the Russians reportedly have tried, Hanoi remains intransigent at the Paris peace talks. He also sought to reopen conversations on the status of Berlin; the Russians have not responded. While the Soviets rejected linkage of all these issues from the start, they have at least sounded eager to pursue an arms agreement. For now, that may have to suffice.

#### BUSLOAD OF MEGATONS

The standard ballistic missile carries only one nuclear warhead. That has long seemed inefficient to Pentagon planners, considering the huge cost of missiles and the space required to store them. In the early 1960s, they developed the first improvement: a multiple warhead known as MRV (for Multiple Re-entry Vehicle). It is a relatively crude device that drops unguided from missiles in clusters of three warheads. Some MRVs have been placed on presently operational Polaris missiles. A further and major refinement is MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle), which is similar to MRV but has its own propulsion and guidance systems.

Missiles equipped with the MIRV device have been compared to a space bus that travels above the atmosphere emitting warheads over specific targets. MIRVs could be carried only by the next generation of missiles—the Navy's Poseidon and the Air Force's Minuteman III, which will probably be operational within two years. Both have been successfully tested with MIRVs.

The Minuteman version, with a range of 7,500 miles, carries up to three warheads (each under one megaton) and some chaff that is released to confuse enemy anti-ballistic missile radar. Present plans call for deployment of 500 MIRVed Minuteman II's, in addition to 500 Minuteman II's with single warheads. All would be housed in 90-ft.-deep silos, located at least seven miles apart to prevent an enemy warhead from destroying two sites.

The Poseidon version can carry up to twelve warheads and has a 2,900-mile range. The Poseidon MIRVs are thus of the "low kiloton" type, designed to be used against cities, while the Minuteman III's might be used to hit the adversary's ICBMs in hardened silos. The Navy has begun to refit two of its Polaris submarines to handle Poseidons. According to present plans, 496 of the 656 missiles now aboard submarines will carry MIRVs.

Accordingly, by the mid-1970s the Navy and Air Force could be capable of launching a total of more than 8,000 warheads, compared with 2,700 presently.

The Russians, meanwhile, have completed a series of multiple-warhead test shots in the Pacific. A U.S. destroyer monitoring the tests reported that the SS-9 missile, which had never before flown more than 3,200 miles, is now capable of reaching most of the U.S. The reconnaissance vessel also learned that before the SS-9 splashed into the Pacific, the missile delivered three separate warheads. Since the SS-9, with a multiple warhead, can carry up to 15 megatons, Defense Department officials warn that it is a serious threat to U.S. missile installations. A five-megaton blast within a mile of a missile silo will destroy it.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has said that the Russians are not yet capable of launching MIRVs. But in his press conference last week, President Nixon hinted that the Soviets have developed some sort of control system for their MIRVs.

Intelligence reports have shown that the SS-9's reentry vehicles splashed down in a pattern. That design, when superimposed on a map of U.S. missile sites, was found to coincide with the distribution of ICBM silos. "There isn't any question," Nixon said, "that it is a multiple weapon, and its footprints indicate that it just happens to fall in somewhat the precise area in which our Minuteman silos are located."

The President's "footprint" statement was yet another disclosure of normally secret intelligence material to bolster the chances for approval of the embattled ABM. For the White House regards its Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system as the answer to the presumed Russian MIRV threat. Among his other warnings, Secretary Laird has said that the Russians are developing an ABM system of their own that can "loiter for a period of time until a specific target is selected."

More significant than stray tidbits of security data, of course, are the calculations of just what kind of weapons the Russians will actually build, and in what numbers. On this crucial point, the experts seem to disagree.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, a careful reading of the letter of the gentleman of New York set out under date of June 20 would indicate, I think, the concern that my colleague the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) has. I read, and I think I am reading in context from Mr. BINGHAM's letter:

I intend to offer a simple amendment to the AEC authorization fiscal year 1970 legislation specifying that no funds authorized in the legislation be expended for MIRV flight tests prior to—

Prior to—

the convening of the projected U.S.-Soviet arms control talks and until—

And until—

the possibility of a mutual U.S.-Soviet freeze on MIRV's has been thoroughly explored and considered at such talks.

What concerns me about this type of suggestion, I will say to my colleagues: Should progress be halted on strengthening U.S. capability for deterrents until we begin discussions with the Russians on the basis of the record of the Soviet Union? Let me give you just an example:

On August 22, 1958, President Eisenhower announced that the United States would not test atomic or hydrogen weapons for 1 year unless testing was resumed by the Soviet Union. This pledge led to an informal moratorium which was kept

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by the Kennedy administration. During the period of 1958 to 1961, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union met in Geneva to work out ways and means of developing a nuclear test ban agreement.

However, while these negotiations were in progress the Soviets on August 30, 1961, suddenly announced that they were resuming atmospheric nuclear testing. On September 1, 1961, they began their test series, thus breaking the informal moratorium.

The Soviet Union conducted a series of approximately 50 atmospheric nuclear tests with a total yield of about 120 megatons in the atmosphere.

The largest test was a terror weapon of approximately 60 megatons—equivalent to 60 million tons of TNT—detonated on October 31, 1961, despite a resolution adopted on October 27, 1961, by the United Nations appealing to the Soviet Union to refrain from carrying out such a test.

It was just a year later that the Soviet Union brought the world to the brink of nuclear war when it placed offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. At that time President Kennedy said:

This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

And that quotation comes from President Kennedy's statement made on October 22, 1962.

Past Soviet words and actions have not always coincided, whether we remember their invasion of tiny Finland before World War II, or last August, when they invaded helpless Czechoslovakia.

History is replete with examples of nations that have attempted to negotiate or have sought to appease aggressors from their position of weakness.

I, for one, agree we should negotiate with the Soviet Union at any time and at any place. But I strongly oppose unilateral disarmament in the hope, and what I consider the vain hope, that the Soviet Union will not repeat the pattern that it has repeated over all the years we have tried to reach some kind of peaceful agreement through international conferences.

Mr. CEDERBERG. I want to compliment the gentleman in the well, the gentleman from California, for the statement he is making. It is a statement in the best long-term interests of the United States. I join him in his remarks.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. COHELAN. While, as I have indicated, I favor the principle of the Brooke resolution, I personally would go further on the theory that we can afford the time. I would ask the distinguished gentleman the following questions:

Do you not agree that the MIRV's are justified by our defense planners as a

means of securing penetration of ABM defenses? Is not that basically the thrust of it?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Will the gentleman repeat his question?

Mr. COHELAN. My question is, Do you agree that our MIRV's are justified by our defense planners as a means of assuring penetration of ABM defenses?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is the Soviet ABM defenses?

Mr. COHELAN. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think that might very well be one reason. But there are a number of reasons.

If you have a multiple warhead—that is, multiple parts in the warhead—let us say three or five or seven or whatever the number might be—you gain the advantage of a spray shot that you have with a shotgun as against a rifle shot. A rifle shot is concentrated. There are other advantages but that would be one advantage.

Mr. COHELAN. But the gentleman would agree that in the literature this is one of the primary purposes for developing the MIRV; that is, to penetrate ABM defenses. Is this not one of its primary purposes in keeping the strategic balance?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes. It would be useful if there is an ABM system in being in the Soviet Union. Yes, it would be useful. But I also say that the Soviets are testing multiple warheads, and for us to deny ourselves the same privilege and the same right to keep up with the Soviet advances in technology, I think is nothing less than suicidal.

Mr. COHELAN. Is it not true in terms of their particular defenses that our intelligence does not permit us to come to the conclusion that they have anything there that we cannot handle at the present time? The point being that we can afford a little time because of the seriousness of this virtual quantum jump in weapons development. Would the gentleman say that that would be reasonable?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am not willing to concede that we should stop in our research and development and that we can afford that time, as the gentleman says.

To deny ourselves anything—I do not concede that that is for the benefit of the security of the United States.

They can stop this tomorrow if in the disarmament negotiations they come in and say, "Let us stop this." We can sit down and say, "All right, we will stop." They can do that with respect to nuclear weapons. They can also stop the development of nuclear submarines that they are turning out at the rate of one per month and we are turning out at the rate of 1½ a year.

Mr. COHELAN. Would the gentleman agree that our research is several years ahead of theirs?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will not speculate how far they have gone or how far we are ahead of them.

At one time I can remember when we had the atomic monopoly and many said it would be 10 years before the Soviets got an atomic bomb. They got it just 4 years later. They exploded one in Au-

gust 1949. We exploded our first device in 1945.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's there were many who said we should not develop a hydrogen bomb. In 1953 the Soviets exploded a hydrogen bomb. Obviously they were working on it for some time.

I do not know what they may be working on. I have some ideas. Some of them I can express and some I cannot because of their classification. But I am not willing to say that the Soviets are fools and that their trained scientists are not capable of making just as good weapons as we make.

They certainly made long-range missiles with 5,000- and 6,000-mile ranges, and they exploded a 60-megaton weapon. We never exploded anything anywhere near that large. I am not saying we could not. I know that we could. But I am not willing to compromise the strength of the United States on the basis of what the Soviets might or might not do.

(On request of Mr. COHELAN, and by unanimous consent, Mr. HOLIFIELD was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, if the distinguished chairman of the committee will yield again, does the chairman not now feel that this is a momentous breakthrough in the arms race?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. It is an important breakthrough, but not any more than the nuclear submarine or the hydrogen bomb or any other major advance in weapons systems.

Mr. COHELAN. You do not feel that this is in any way going to destabilize the strategic balance?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I certainly do not, no more than I think the ABM would destabilize, because they already have 67 ABM's around Moscow. They have several hundred additional in the Tallinn system, and you can guess what that constitutes. I am saying they have in existence devices such as the multiple reentry vehicle. I do not know what degree of sophistication they have achieved. I do not think anyone else in the United States knows. And neither do they know the sophistication of our weapons.

Mr. COHELAN. Let me ask one final question, to which I think I know the answer. As the distinguished chairman of this committee, would you favor a mutual moratorium in which both the United States and the Soviet Union would halt MIRV testing and deployment?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes, and not only MIRV testing, but nuclear submarine building, plane building, and all other forms of warfare—if we could get a genuine mutual agreement to disarm, coupled with on-site inspection, so that we would know we were not being played for suckers. But as long as we have not been able to get mutual inspection, I say we cannot go on Soviet promises, because history has shown they have not always kept their promises.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I actually had not intended to participate in the debate but merely to listen.



I was intrigued by the presentation of the distinguished chairman of the Joint Committee and his response to several questions. I, at first, believed and was worried that passage of this bill, which includes a sum of money to be used for the testing of MIRV, would in some way be a decision made by this Congress on a matter that is so momentous that it ought not be the subject of an hour or less debate, but rather be the subject of a comprehensive debate. That it is a controversial subject is apparent by the fact that at this point there are several pending resolutions concerned with the testing of MIRV.

There is the Bingham resolution, the Cohelan resolution, and the Brooke resolution, all of which indicate the concern of Members of both Houses that the question of whether or not we should proceed with the MIRV be given further consideration. I was reassured on that point by the colloquy which took place between my colleague, JONATHAN BINGHAM, and the distinguished chairman, when it was made clear that passage of this bill did not in any way foreclose the real debate on MIRV which is yet to come, and I am now reassured that we are not backing into something unintentionally.

I would assume, as I am sure everyone else in the House does, that when a momentous decision involving billions of dollars and the escalation of the arms race would be undertaken, that it would be undertaken in a knowing way, in a concrete way, that is to say, at a time when everybody would know what they were doing. When the distinguished Chairman said he did not believe in unilateral disarmament, I think he spoke for every Member of this House. I do not think there is any Member in this House who believes in unilateral disarmament. The real question, and the one that is not going to be debated in 5 minutes by this Member or any other Member, is, are we doing something which will prevent mutual disarmament when we proceed with the testing of MIRV? There is at least a considerable body of opinion which believes that the testing of MIRV might be irreversible in its consequences, and there are many of us who want to reflect on that and want to have considered discussions with respect to it before we make such a decision. The fact that the Chairman made very clear that this House will have an opportunity to make that decision at a later time and in a more deliberate way reassures me, and I thank him for that reassurance.

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the necessary number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I think this is about the end of the debate. I would like to bring forth a few facts, amongst which is the so-called MIRV is not some strange new weapon that suddenly developed from nowhere. It is no more than an ordinary progression in refinement of the original missiles we developed in a rather crude and unsophisticated state, which are gradually being improved, as is normal with any weapons system throughout the history of man. All of which is nor-

mal and expected and anticipated. MIRV is not any unbalancing shocker, as many would have us believe. It is no surprise to anyone familiar with defense or nuclear strategy.

The question has been raised as to whether or not the MIRV is a first-strike weapon. On that let us just look at what deterrence is. It is a capability to strike back devastatingly if somebody else starts something and nobody is going to start something unless he has a clear first-strike capability to eliminate his victim's capability to strike back. MIRV or no MIRV makes no difference in this regard. A multiple warhead missile is no more or no less a first-strike weapon than a single warhead missile. Total cumulative relative strategic power determines the first-strike issue.

As a matter of fact, one of the gentlemen who is quite often quoted on this subject, that is Wolfgang Panofsky, says the only first strike danger about MIRV is the talk that is going around about it being a first-strike weapon, when in fact it is no such thing and probably never can be.

Now if I may proceed, the converse of MIRV, of course, is simply going to a larger number of missiles with single warheads, which the Soviet Union has been doing up to the present time. But they have also been developing a MIRV capability—and let me assure Members of that and let me assure Members also, that no one can assure Congress the Soviet Union is not developing such a capability. It has been revealed they have conducted multiple intercontinental ballistic missile warhead tests. They have dropped them in the Pacific. By the pattern of the fall of these warheads we cannot tell whether these were unguided or individually guided warheads simply because individually guided reentry vehicles can be programed to fall in a random pattern so that their guided or unguided feature will never be disclosed.

With this kind of capability for deception in mind, I want to advise the gentlemen who have been endorsing the moratorium idea, that there is a pitfall in it they apparently overlook in so far as MIRV is concerned. We cannot tell what the other side is doing, and particularly we cannot tell what they are doing so long—so long, gentlemen—as these individual warheads are inside a nose cone of a single missile.

If we want to make sense in this area, we must limit or put a moratorium on the number of delivery vehicles—which is something we can check on—and not something which is inside those missiles, the warheads to wit, which we cannot check on.

Otherwise, we may be walking into a trap. Many of us were around here in the old days, when we had the Limited Test Ban Treaty to contend with. We found out that during those negotiations and our forbearance from nuclear testing was taken by the Soviets as nothing more than an opportunity to prepare for their tests behind the screen of a gentleman's agreement not to test.

Let me say this: This Nation today might not be a free nation except for the activities carried on by two men in this

Chamber today—Chairman HOLIFIELD and Representative PRICE. They were the men who in the days of the H-bomb argument helped this Nation resist the temptation to disarm itself by a unilateral decision to forgo development of the H-bomb. Incidentally, every single one of the arguments being made today against MIRV were made by the opponents of the H-bomb a decade ago. It is all the same—all the same, tired old arguments are being dragged out—only the players have changed. If it were not for Congressman HOLIFIELD and Congressman PRICE and their persuasiveness in behalf of the defense of this Nation, we would not have got the H-bomb just months earlier than on that shocking day the Soviets burst theirs on the world. It was as shocking a day almost, I remind Members, as that day on which sputnik orbited around the world—when the Soviet Union again surprised us with their capability to develop hardware of sophistication equal to ours.

I suggest that the Members of this body look to real experts who know atomic weapons and understand nuclear strategy—experts like Congressmen HOLIFIELD and PRICE—for advice in these vital defense matters. I respectfully suggest that some people new on the scene, have not forgotten the lessons of the past. They just never were around to learn them in the first place. Therefore they are neither reliable prophets nor knowledgeable advisers.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask unanimous consent that all debate cease in 5 minutes. We have discussed this thoroughly. This MIRV and ABM deployment situation is not exactly in the bill. It is something to come in the bill from the Armed Services Committee later on. While it is interesting, we have a \$14 billion appropriation bill in the wings waiting to come on, with the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. EVINS) and his committee. Unless there is a strong feeling we should have extended debate, I ask unanimous consent that all debate cease in 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. LOWENSTEIN) is recognized.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to no one in my respect for the gentleman from California and the gentleman from Illinois.

That, of course, is not at issue. I am curious about one thing. What is the objection to the resolution proposed by Senator BROOKE and cosponsors by 39 other Members of the Senate on the question of the testing and development of MIRV?

Of course we are not now debating MIRV specifically, but if we could agree on that very constructive and sensible resolution, we could proceed in general rapport on this matter. That would be a healthy, if unexpected, turn of events, it seems to me.

Is there disagreement about the proposal of Senator BROOKE, in which he has been joined by so many of his colleagues



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of both parties? I hear whispers here about the judgment—even about the concern for their country—of some Members of this House who have raised questions about MIRV. Does anyone doubt the judgment or the concern for the future of this country of these 40 Senators as well? Could we not undertake to conduct the discussion about this matter without drifting off into silly innuendoes?

In there anything in the Brooke resolution that is objectionable to anyone here? If so, may we hear what, so we can consider any objections on their merits?

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOSMER. This whole business of a moratorium is a negotiating tool in connection with the SALT talks, the strategic arms limitation talks, proposed for August between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The moratorium idea is a negotiating tool which should be in the hands of the administration, but should not be thrust in its hands by action of Congress, an action not requested of Congress by the administration. It is to be carefully noted that this negotiation tool, even in administration hands proved to be useless and dangerous in connection with the limited test ban talks. For this reason, that is, previous failure, no use of it since has been attempted. It was not used in the case of the outer space treaty talks or in the case of the nonproliferation treaty talks, nor is it being used in connection with the current talks on barring weapons of mass destruction on the ocean bottoms.

Those who now want precipitously to legislate a moratorium ought to reflect a little on the weakness of the reed on which they seek to lean.

That, in short, is my objection on the merits.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM) is recognized.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a couple of things clear. First, I too believe in the deterrent theory. It is our deterrent which assures the security of this country, and I certainly do not want to do anything to interfere with our maintenance of an effective deterrent. But I do not believe either the ABM or the MIRV are needed for that purpose.

Second, with regard to the remarks made by the distinguished chairman of the Joint Committee, I certainly do not believe we should proceed on the assumption that the Soviets are nice people, that they are easy to deal with, or that they have good motives. I have no such illusions. But I do believe we can achieve agreement with them on matters that are of mutual interest to us, as we did in the case of the Test Ban Treaty and as we did in the case of the Nonproliferation Treaty. I hope I am correct in saying the distinguished chairman is in agreement we did the right thing in pressing for both those treaties and that we are better off for having both those treaties.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL) is recognized.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I have heard some statements here that are of questionable basis in fact and certainly not germane to this debate.

It is a matter of record that we started the research and development in the authorizing Committee on Armed Services at least 3 years before there was any evidence of the opponent's anti-ballistic-missile capability or intent.

Second, while negotiations might be worthwhile, after one is thrice rebuffed one begins to realize it "takes two to Tango." Any American knows if you get in bed with a rattlesnake you expect to get bit.

I am for this bill the way it is.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. PODELL) is recognized.

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Chairman I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM) regarding funds for the proposed MIRV system of weapons. It is growing increasingly obvious that this system is the rebirth of the Hydra of old Greek mythology. A many-headed ICBM would replace single-warhead missiles we now possess in such numbers.

At one stroke ICBM's on both sides would rise from single threats to multiple ones to each party. Instead of a single warhead, there will be from three to 10 under each nosecone. Such a weapon is unwarranted at this time.

We must weigh our options carefully. At this time there is no pressing need for such a conversion of our major weapons systems by MIRV installation. As of today, there is a slim chance that meaningful disarmament may be made reality through effective inspection by spy-in-the-sky satellites. These are now so sophisticated that they are able, from their Polar orbits, to delineate individual telephone lines. Therefore, they would be able to provide a meaningful system of inspection if some disarmament was attempted under existing conditions.

However, if each power was able to lift the nosecone from each missile and replace its single warhead with from three to 10 individually targeted warheads, the best spying system available or projected would have no way of finding out or ascertaining how many warheads comprised the other side's capability. A terrifying element would be injected instantly into the geopolitical equation of each power. Was the other side attaining a first strike capacity?

Only an element of doubt is necessary. The arms race and its insane momentum takes over from there. Once the question exists, the other side must take immediate steps to match it. Hence, a new escalation to the arms race confronts us, and the mad roller coaster ride downhill toward inevitable destruction goes even faster. We are all captives on the same roller coaster.

For these reasons, I believe my colleague's points are exceptionally well made. There is no reason why we must at this point swiftly begin to MIRV our missiles, complete testing of the concept or appropriate money for warhead development or production. We already can kill our opponents many times over. If this system is developed, we shall be able

to kill them a few more times over. Hurrah.

It is wisdom of a far-seeing sort as well as the essence of moderation of hold off on procurement, development, and testing of this weapon. I concur with my colleague in his excellent effort to avoid this latest move toward frustration of final hopes for disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 12167) to authorize appropriations to the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 448, he reported the bill back to the House.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 406, nays 3, not voting 23, as follows:

[Roll No. 87]

YEAS—406

Abbitt	Bow	Clawson, Del
Abernethy	Brademas	Clay
Adair	Brasco	Cleveland
Adams	Bray	Cohelan
Addabbo	Brinkley	Collier
Albert	Brook	Collins
Alexander	Brooks	Colmer
Anderson,	Broomfield	Conable
Calif.	Brotzman	Conte
Anderson, Ill.	Brown, Mich.	Corbett
Anderson,	Brown, Ohio	Corman
Tenn.	Broyhill, N.C.	Coughlin
Andrews, Ala.	Broyhill, Va.	Cowger
Andrews,	Buchanan	Cramer
N. Dak.	Burke, Fla.	Culver
Annunzio	Burke, Mass.	Cunningham
Arends	Burleson, Tex.	Daddario
Ashbrook	Burlison, Mo.	Daniel, Va.
Ashley	Burton, Calif.	Daniels, N.J.
Aspinall	Bush	Davis, Ga.
Ayres	Button	Davis, Wis.
Baring	Byrne, Pa.	Dawson
Barrett	Byrnes, Wis.	de la Garza
Beall, Md.	Cabell	Delaney
Belcher	Caffery	Deilenback
Bell, Calif.	Cahill	Denney
Bennett	Camp	Dennis
Berry	Carter	Dent
Betts	Casey	Derwinski
Bevill	Cederberg	Devine
Blaggi	Celler	Dickinson
Blester	Chamberlain	Diggs
Bingham	Chappell	Dingell
Blackburn	Chisholm	Donohue
Blanton	Clancy	Dorn
Boggs	Clark	Dowdy
Boland	Clausen,	Downing
Bolling	Don H	Dulski

H 5110

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 24, 1969

Duncan  
Dwyer  
Eckhardt  
Edmondson  
Edwards, Ala.  
Edwards, Calif.  
Edwards, La.  
Ellberg  
Erlenborn  
Esch  
Ehlerman  
Evans, Colo.  
Evins, Tenn.  
Fallon  
Farbstein  
Fasell  
Feighan  
Findley  
Fish  
Fisher  
Flood  
Flowers  
Flynt  
Foley  
Ford, Gerald R.  
Ford, William D.  
Foreman  
Fountain  
Fraser  
Frelinghuysen  
Frey  
Friedel  
Fulton, Pa.  
Fulton, Tenn.  
Fuqua  
Galifianakis  
Garmatz  
Gaydos  
Gettys  
Glaimo  
Gibbons  
Gilbert  
Goldwater  
Gonzalez  
Goodling  
Gray  
Green, Oreg.  
Green, Pa.  
Griffin  
Griffiths  
Gross  
Grover  
Gubser  
Gude  
Hagan  
Haley  
Hall  
Halpern  
Hamilton  
Hammer-  
schmidt  
Hanley  
Hanna  
Hansen, Idaho  
Hansen, Wash.  
Harsha  
Harvey  
Hastings  
Hawkins  
Hays  
Hechler, W. Va.  
Heckler, Mass.  
Helsoski  
Henderson  
Hicks  
Hogan  
Hollfield  
Horton  
Hosmer  
Howard  
Hull  
Hungate  
Hunt  
Hutchinson  
Ichord  
Jacobs  
Jarman  
Joelson  
Johnson, Calif.  
Johnson, Pa.  
Jonas  
Jones, Ala.  
Jones, N.C.  
Jones, Tenn.  
Karth  
Kastenmeier  
Kazen  
Kee  
Keith

King  
Kleppe  
Koch  
Kuykendall  
Kyl  
Kyros  
Landgrebe  
Landrum  
Langen  
Latta  
Leggett  
Lennon  
Lipscomb  
Lloyd  
Long, La.  
Long, Md.  
Lowenstein  
Lujan  
Lukens  
McCarthy  
McClary  
McCloskey  
McClure  
McCulloch  
McDade  
McDonald, Mich.  
McEwen  
McFall  
McKneally  
McMillan  
MacGregor  
Madden  
Mahon  
Mailliard  
Mann  
Marsh  
Martin  
Mathias  
Matsunaga  
May  
Mayne  
Meeds  
Meskill  
Michel  
Mikva  
Miller, Calif.  
Miller, Ohio  
Minish  
Mink  
Minshall  
Mize  
Mizell  
Molohan  
Monagan  
Montgomery  
Moorhead  
Morgan  
Morse  
Morton  
Mosher  
Moss  
Murphy, Ill.  
Murphy, N.Y.  
Myers  
Natcher  
Nelsen  
Nichols  
Nix  
Obey  
O'Konski  
Olson  
O'Neal, Ga.  
O'Neill, Mass.  
Ottinger  
Passman  
Patman  
Patten  
Pelly  
Pepper  
Perkins  
Pettis  
Philbin  
Pickle  
Pike  
Pirnie  
Podell  
Poff  
Pollock  
Preyer, N.C.  
Price, Ill.  
Price, Tex.  
Pucinski  
Qule  
Quillen  
Rallsback  
Randall  
Rarick  
Rees  
Reid, Ill.

NAYS—3

Conyers

Saylor

Scheuer

Reid, N.Y.  
Reifel  
Reuss  
Rhodes  
Riegle  
Rivers  
Roberts  
Robison  
Rodino  
Rogers, Colo.  
Rogers, Fla.  
Ronan  
Rooney, N.Y.  
Rooney, Pa.  
Rosenthal  
Rostenkowski  
Roth  
Roudebush  
Rupke  
Ruth  
Ryan  
St Germain  
St. Onge  
Sandman  
Schadeberg  
Scherle  
Schneebeli  
Schwengel  
Scott  
Sebelius  
Shipley  
Shriver  
Sikes  
Sisk  
Skubitz  
Slack  
Smith, Calif.  
Smith, Iowa  
Smith, N.Y.  
Snyder  
Springer  
Stafford  
Staggers  
Stanton  
Steed  
Steiger, Ariz.  
Steiger, Wis.  
Stephens  
Stokes  
Stratton  
Stubblefield  
Sullivan  
Syrington  
Taft  
Taleott  
Taylor  
Teague, Calif.  
Teague, Tex.  
Thompson, Ga.  
Thomson, Wis.  
Tiernan  
Tunney  
Udall  
Ullman  
Utt  
Van Deerlin  
Vander Jagt  
Vanik  
Vigorito  
Waggonner  
Walde  
Wampler  
Watkins  
Watson  
Watts  
Welcker  
Whalen  
Whalley  
White  
Whitehurst  
Whitten  
Widnall  
Wiggins  
Williams  
Wilson, Bob  
Wilson,  
Charles H.  
Winn  
Wold  
Wright  
Wyatt  
Wyder  
Wylie  
Wyman  
Yates  
Yatron  
Young  
Zablocki  
Zion  
Zwack

## NOT VOTING—23

Blatnik  
Brown, Calif.  
Burton, Utah  
Carey  
Gallagher  
Hathaway  
Herbert  
Kirwan  
Kluczynski  
Macdonald, Mass.  
Mills  
Nedzi  
O'Hara  
Poage  
Powell  
Pryor, Ark.  
Purcell  
Roybal  
Satterfield  
Stuckey  
Thompson, N.J.  
Wolf

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Hébert with Mr. Pryor of Arkansas.  
Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Burton of Utah.  
Mr. Carey with Mr. Gallagher.  
Mr. Satterfield with Mr. Roybal.  
Mr. Mills with Mr. Wolf.  
Mr. Brown of California with Mr. Kluczynski.  
Mr. Stuckey with Mr. Blatnik.  
Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts with Mr. Nedzi.  
Mr. Purcell with Mr. O'Hara.  
Mr. Hathaway with Mr. Powell.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The doors were opened.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

## GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the bill just passed.

THE SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

## CORRECTION OF VOTE

Mrs. MAY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 87 I am recorded as not voting. I was present and voted "yea." I ask unanimous consent that the permanent Record be corrected accordingly.

THE SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Washington?

There was no objection.

## INDEPENDENT OFFICES AND DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS, 1970

Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 449 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

## H. RES. 449

Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12307) making appropriations for sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, offices, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes, all points of order against the provisions contained under the following headings are hereby waived: "Appalachian Regional Development Programs" beginning on page 3, line 22, through page 4, line 3; "Independent Offices—Appalachian Regional Commission" beginning on page 4, line 15 through page 4, line 21; "National Aeronautics and Space Administration" be-

ginning on page 21, line 13, through page 23, line 3; and "National Science Foundation" beginning on page 23, line 5, through page 25, line 2.

THE SPEAKER. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BOLLING) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH) and pending that I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the three specific waivers of points of order are necessary because the items on which the waivers are given or proposed by this resolution have not been authorized by law. I explained this to the House during the colloquy between the majority and minority leaders last Thursday. The items are, as anyone who listened to the reading of the resolution knows, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Science Foundation, and a part of the Appalachian development programs. The waiver makes it possible for Members of the House to work their will on the specific provisions of the appropriation, and the Committee on Rules felt that it was wiser to handle the matter in this fashion rather than permitting a situation to develop in which the Senate almost surely would add the items on the Senate side when the matter came up, and the only participation of the House would be in conference, and on the conference report.

Therefore the Committee on Rules recommends the waiver on these three points of order.

I urge the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. SMITH of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I concur in and agree with the remarks made by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BOLLING) in explanation of House Resolution 449, and urge the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. MILLER).

(Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, last July the President signed into law a bill which originated in the Committee on Science and Astronautics and which was the culmination of 3½ years of work. This is Public Law 90-407 which revised and streamlined the organic act of the National Science Foundation.

That law contains a provision requiring annual authorization of the Foundation's budget from this point forward. It was a provision not sought by this committee. It was added in the Senate and agreed to in conference.

When the conference report came before the House on June 27, 1968, no Member of the House raised any objection to the authorization provision, or any other part of the bill. The only discussion was between the distinguished

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

ABM SUPPORTED WITHOUT  
RESERVATIONFACT BOOK ON ANTIBALLISTIC  
MISSILE

full partnership in our society. It will be an appropriate forerunner of other measures which recognize the new awareness, idealism, and talents of our young citizens.

It is particularly critical that we afford our young people the opportunity to seek answers, to express their views, and to use their influence in the development of our national policies. Young persons want to do this—and they want to do it in an orderly and effective manner. That youth can participate—and participate in a constructive manner—was evidenced in the political campaigns of 1968. Those campaigns are over. Now it is not sufficient for us to look back and praise young people for their persevering efforts. Rather, our responsibility is to renew the efforts to bring youth into the discussion, formulation, and implementation of our policies. This is a worthy objective. Its accomplishment will benefit our Republic.

My support for this proposal is basically twofold. It is my belief that those in the age group of 18 to 21 are capable of discharging the right to vote in an intelligent and conscientious manner. And a democracy thrives when its base is broadened and additional persons are brought into the democratic process. Full participation is the ideal for which we strive. We accomplished this in giving women the right to vote, in eliminating the poll tax, in passing the Voting Rights Act, and in other measures. Now is the time to further extend our base by affording young people the opportunity for full participation.

Seven percent of our population is in the age group of 18 to 21. These approximately 13 million persons are actually adults in our society. They are in the education process; they have jobs. And for the most part, they can marry, buy insurance, sign wills, and are treated as adults in the courts of law and are brought into the Armed Forces to defend their country. Additionally, our young persons participate in the Peace Corps, in VISTA, and the community action and charitable programs. I feel the youth of today are better educated and more aware. And, more importantly, I think our young people possess a greater social conscience; are more perplexed by the injustices which exist in the world; and are more anxious to rectify these ills.

The future, in large part, belongs to youth. It is imperative that they have the opportunity to help set the course of that future.

My estimate of young people is high. It continues to grow. I feel that our youth is equal to the challenges of today and tomorrow. They will aid in bringing into being a better world than those of past generations have been able to create.

Mr. President, I realize that voting age lowering is only one facet of the report by the House Members. But I believe so strongly in this proposition that I have commented at length. It is gratifying that our colleagues determined that the recommendation for a lower voting age should be one of their key recommendations.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, a great verbal battle has raged in the Senate for many weeks over the merits of the anti-ballistic-missile system proposal.

While some observers have called this a battle for headlines, and because of numerous publications on the issue have also termed the controversy "the battle of books," I am aware of the deep-rooted misgivings some Senators have about the wisdom of the Safeguard proposal.

Nationwide polls have indicated that the American people by a substantial majority favor the deployment of the Safeguard proposal in the interest of the national security, and a vast majority do have an opinion on whether an ABM system is in the best interest of the security of the people.

It is time we heard from the experts whose whole concern is the protection of life and property in these United States. One such organization is the Civil Defense Association of Wyoming. The Wyoming Association on May 15, 1969, approved unanimously a resolution supporting the Safeguard proposal "without reservation." From personal knowledge, I categorically assert that the motives of this association cannot be impugned.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the complete text of the resolution adopted by the Civil Defense Association of Wyoming.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

RESOLUTION—APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE  
CIVIL DEFENSE ASSOCIATION OF WYOMING,  
May 15, 1969

Whereas Civil Defense is concerned with the protection of life and property under any condition; and:

Whereas the National posture for the protection of all citizens should be the concern of all elected officials at all levels of government; and:

Whereas the proposed Anti-Ballistic Missile System would provide the best known protection from a nuclear threat of an aggressor nation; and:

Whereas the National Fallout Shelter Program is the primary and only element of Civil Defense planning and programming for the protection of the population from nuclear accident or attack; and:

Whereas time is the most limited commodity during periods of international tension;

Now therefore be it resolved that the Civil Defense Association of Wyoming supports without reservation President Richard M. Nixon's proposed Anti-Ballistic Missile System, and encourages the Congressional delegation from the State of Wyoming and all other states in Region Six, Office of Civil Defense, to assist in bringing this protection to the population of the United States at the earliest possible date; and:

Be it further resolved that this resolution be forwarded to the United States Civil Defense Council through its Region Six representatives meeting at Joplin, Missouri, on 17, 18, and 19 June 1969, begging that body to endorse this action in support of President Nixon and his proposed national defense effort.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, as the vote on the Safeguard ABM system draws near, it becomes increasingly important for each Senator to inform himself fully on this critical issue.

In recent months we have received a deluge of material on both sides of the question. Unfortunately, much of this material tends to be colored by the views of the author, whether it be a prominent scientist opposing deployment or the Department of Defense trying to justify it.

For a fair, lucid, and factual presentation of the basic facts about the Safeguard system and an excellent summary of the best arguments for and against deployment, I commend to the attention of Senators, particularly those who have not yet made up their minds on the issue, the Democratic study group fact book entitled "ABM." The Democratic study group booklet provides all the basic information one requires to come to an informed judgment on deploying the Safeguard systems, in addition to a bibliography for further study of material available from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. It has been praised by Representatives who support and those who oppose the Safeguard system. I have found the booklet most useful.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Democratic study group fact book entitled "ABM," prepared by the Democratic study group in the House of Representatives, be printed in Record.

There being no objection, the study was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

ABM—DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP, U.S. HOUSE  
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1969

## I. INTRODUCTION

This DSG Fact Book is designed to provide Members of Congress with a basic understanding of the proposed SAFEGUARD ABM system, a history of anti-ballistic missile development and the ABM debate, and a fair and factual exposition of the arguments for and against SAFEGUARD deployment.

The controversy over the proposal to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system is certain to rank as one of the key issues of the 91st Congress. In addition to the immediate defense and foreign policy considerations involved, the ABM debate has other ramifications as well. It has helped stimulate a critical examination of national commitments and the size of the defense establishment needed to fulfill these commitments, and it is expected to produce closer Congressional scrutiny of future defense proposals.

SAFEGUARD authorization bills are currently being considered by both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. The first vote on the issue, however, is expected to come in the Senate. If authorization is approved, funds for SAFEGUARD will be included in both the Department of Defense (DOD) and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) appropriation bills later in the year.

II. HOW SAFEGUARD WORKS AND WHAT IT  
WILL COST

An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a missile armed with a warhead designed to destroy an enemy incoming intercontinental

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ballistic missile (ICBM) warhead. In order to accomplish its goal an ABM system such as Safeguard depends on the perfect working of three subsystems—radars, computers, and missiles—plus interconnecting communications and controls.

**Radars**

Safeguard uses two kinds of radar. A long range Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) picks up the incoming ICBM at a range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles (8 to 15 minutes flight time) from its target and fixes its trajectory. As the ICBM closes, a second radar, the Missile Site Radar (MSR) takes over and guides the ABM to the point of intercept. The MSR can handle many ICBMs and ABMs at the same time.

**Computers**

The computer system involved in Safeguard will be the largest and most complex ever built—the equivalent of 100 large commercial computers. Its function is to interpret radar signals, identify potential targets, track incoming objects, predict trajectories, distinguish between warheads and decoys, eliminate false targets, reject signals from earlier nuclear explosions, correct for blackout effects, program arm, and fire the ABMs—and correct itself—all in ten minutes.

**Missiles**

Two kinds of missiles are used in Safeguard. The *Spartan* has a range of about 400 miles and employs a warhead in the megaton range (1 megaton equals 1 million tons of TNT). *Spartan* intercepts its target above the atmosphere and destroys the incoming missile by radiation from the explosion of its warhead.

The second missile, *Sprint*, has a range of about 25 miles. It has an extremely rapid rate of acceleration and is designed to take care of those enemy missiles that get past the *Spartans*. Because it intercepts in the atmosphere, it has a much smaller warhead of a few kilotons (1 kiloton equals 1 thousand tons of TNT) and must therefore come much closer to the incoming missile. *Sprint* does not have to deal with decoys and other penetration aids as they will have burnt up or fallen behind the incoming missile as it enters the atmosphere.

**A typical site**

An ABM installation in the Safeguard system might have a PAR, but would definitely have an MSR, computer installations, 35 or so *Spartans*, slightly more *Sprints* (many more if it were in the Minuteman fields), command and control structures, and personnel barracks. The site itself, particularly the MSR, would be almost as vulnerable as a city or a bomber base and far more vulnerable than a missile site.

**Sentinel and Safeguard Compared**

While SAFEGUARD and SENTINEL consist of the same components and are essentially similar in deployment, the following differences should be noted:

1. Most of the SENTINEL installations were to have been near major cities. The SAFEGUARD installations have been moved from the vicinity of cities (except for the National Command Authority at Washington, D.C.), and reduced in number from 15 to 12. The same geographic coverage is given, except that the area around New Orleans, La., is left unprotected. The seven installations not located in the Minuteman fields (Malstrom AFB-Montana, Grand Forks AFB-North Dakota, Warren AFB-Wyoming, Whiteman AFB-Missouri) and Washington, D.C., are to be located at or near SAC bases to protect the manned bomber deterrent.

2. SAFEGUARD would have two additional PARs, located in Southern California and Georgia or Florida, to give the system the capability to respond to attack from any direction. 15 faces have been added to the

PARs and the MSRs to permit a 360 degree scan.

3. While SENTINEL had *Sprints* only at the PARs, SAFEGUARD will have *Sprints* at all sites. The sites in the Minuteman fields will have considerably more *Sprints* than the other sites.

4. Work was to have begun on all of the sites in the SENTINEL system. A deployment timetable is attached to the SAFEGUARD proposal; funds requested in Secretary Laird's FY 1970 DOD budget revision are to be used to begin work on the Malstrom and Grand Forks sites and procure land for the other ten installations.

**Status of Safeguard components**

The PAR is in the design stage; performance will be simulated by a radar operating at the Kwajalein test site and the first PAR built directly at an operational site. The first MSR has completed factory tests and is now being tested at Kwajalein. *Spartan* is in the flight test stage. *Sprint* is in the test firing stage. The computer system is partially operational at the contractor's plant, but the "time shared" approach necessary to govern the complete computer system is still being developed by data-processing theorists. The first two SAFEGUARD sites are expected to be operational by 1973.

**Cost**

The cost of the complete SENTINEL system was estimated by DOD at \$5.5 BILLION. The cost of SAFEGUARD is estimated at between \$6.6 and \$7 BILLION. However, DOD estimates do not include \$1.2 BILLION for *Spartan* and *Sprint* nuclear warheads, which appears in the AEC request. Thus SAFEGUARD would cost between \$7.8 and \$8.2 BILLION. DOD anticipates modifications in the system as it is deployed to take advantage of technological developments and to offset adversary improvements in offensive weaponry which would lead to additional funding requests.

The use of FY 1970 ABM monies is compared as follows:

[In millions of dollars]		
	Sentinel	Safeguard
Research and development.....	335	401
Procurement.....	736	361
Construction.....	647	97
Operations and maintenance.....	70	23
Military pay and allowances.....	-----	10
Total.....	1,788	892

In addition, a total of \$235 million unobligated FY 1969 SENTINEL money will be allocated for the SAFEGUARD program.

**III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ABM—AND THE ABM DEBATE****Summary**

The debate over an ABM began in the mid fifties when the Army instituted studies of the application of the NIKE AJAX and NIKE HERCULES anti-aircraft systems to defense against missiles. Rapid development of the ICBM by both the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the 1950s provided the impetus for ABM development. By 1959 the official consensus was that an ABM system that would protect the United States from massive missile attack was unworkable. President Eisenhower therefore halted NIKE ZEUS deployment.

Pressure for deployment, however, did not abate. In 1960 Secretary of Defense McElroy rejected Army requests for \$400 million for NIKE ZEUS production; when Congress appropriated the money anyway he refused to spend it. The Kennedy Administration opted for a strategy of deterrence through an "assured destruction" capability on each side and kept the ABM in the research and development phase. Technological advances and

an emerging Chinese capability, however, caused the Johnson Administration to authorize deployment of a "thin" cities-protecting ABM system in September of 1967. During 1968, heated controversy over the decision to deploy developed in the scientific community, in the Senate, and in the public at large.

In March of 1969 President Nixon announced the deployment of a modified SENTINEL, to be called SAFEGUARD, and in the course of defending this proposal during March, April, and May the Administration developed a number of justifications, some of them contradictory, for going ahead with an ABM. These justifications also represented policy reversals of positions taken by the Johnson Administration.

**Chronology**

February 1955. DOD contracts feasibility studies for the proposed Nike Zeus ABM with Bell Telephone Laboratories.

July 1955. Research and development focuses on the ICBM as the primary target of any emergent ABM system.

January 1957. Full system deployment of Nike-Zeus is ordered by the Army.

September 1957. The Atomic Energy Commission completes a feasibility study of the Nike-Zeus warhead.

June 1959. Joint AEC-Army activities commence on development engineering for a Zeus missile warhead.

August 1959. First Zeus missile is fired at the White Sands Missile Range.

November 1959. President Eisenhower orders cessation of Nike-Zeus deployment (radar ineffective, easily overwhelmed by decoys) but authorizes continuation of research and development.

April 1961. The Kennedy Administration decides to keep United States ABM development in the research and development phase.

July 1962. First successful ICBM-Zeus missile intercept is conducted.

January 1963. DOD authorizes the Army to begin research and development on the Nike X ABM system, which employs two types of missile and electronically operated radars that can handle numerous targets simultaneously.

March 1963. Contract for the *Sprint* missile—short range, rapid acceleration component of Nike X—is awarded.

Summer 1963. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in an attempt to force an Executive decision for the deployment of an ABM system, seeks the addition of \$196 million for ABM deployment to the defense authorization bill for FY 1964. The full Senate, however, rejects the move at the insistence of the Administration.

Fall 1963. The Soviet Union announces that it has produced a prototype of an effective anti-missile missile.

January 1964. President Johnson orders cutbacks in U.S. manufacture of fissionable materials and manufacture of arms, and urges the Soviet Union to do likewise as a step toward the "eventual abolition of arms."

July 1964. Testing of new multiple-array radar (MAR) system, a radically improved radar designed for Nike X, is initiated.

October 1964. Communist China detonates a low-yield atomic bomb—its first.

May 1965. Communist China detonates its second atom bomb, one of low-intermediate yield.

October 1965. NIKE X development study completed by the Army and presented to the Secretary of Defense.

November 1965. First successful flight conducted of the maneuverable *Sprint* missile, short range NIKE X component.

May 1966. China detonates its first hydrogen bomb.

October 1966. China tests its first missile-delivered device, equipped with a low-yield fissionable warhead.



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November 1966. Secretary McNamara announces that the Soviet Union has begun deployment of the Galosh (Nike-Zeus-type) ABM defense system around Moscow.

December 1966. China detonates its second hydrogen bomb.

Congress approves \$167.9 for ABM procurement without the request of the Secretary of Defense.

January 1967. President Johnson declares that no U.S. ABM deployment will be made until completion of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, and requests discussions for control of ABMs.

Defense Secretary McNamara, in his defense posture statement, presents a detailed argument *against* deployment of a complete, Soviet-oriented ABM system: "It is a virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent, which casts grave doubts on the deploying of the NIKE X system for the protection of our cities against the heavy, sophisticated missile attack that they could launch in the 1970s."

General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expresses disagreement with the McNamara position and recommends a "measure of defense" for the country. The JCS recommends a two stage deployment plan: (a) \$9.9 BILLION to provide 25 cities with ABM defense; (b) \$19.4 BILLION to add 25 more cities and thicken *Sprint* defense.

February 1967. The Soviet Union announces that it has developed an ABM system capable of protecting it against attack.

Dr. John Foster, then as now DOD Director of Research and Engineering, says: "As a matter of technical judgment I believe that these larger (ABM) deployments carry with them technical risks. The likelihood of large and sophisticated attacks with the deployment of significant U.S. defense increases the technical uncertainty of the defense system."

June 1967. The House Appropriations Committee report on the DOD appropriations bill for FY 1968 states: "It would appear that the initiation of deployment of 'light' or 'thin' defense, now, may very well be a most useful first step toward whatever level of ballistic missile defense ultimately appears necessary."

At the Glassboro Conference President Johnson declares his hope to work with the Soviet Union in limiting development of strategic nuclear weapons, including ABM systems.

Summer 1967. The FY 1968 military budget, containing a total of \$782.9 million for anti-ballistic missiles, is approved by the 90th Congress. Of these funds, \$297.6 million are allocated for ABM procurement, \$421.3 million for ABM research and development, and \$64 million for ABM construction. Of this amount, \$366 million is specified for the Sentinel system, an allocation that President Johnson requested in anticipation of a decision to deploy.

Heated controversy over the question of ABM deployment develops in Congressional debate over appropriations for FY 1968.

September 1967. Secretary McNamara outlines the futility of erecting a Soviet-oriented ABM but announces that "there are marginal grounds for concluding that a light deployment against this possibility (a U.S.-Chinese nuclear clash) is prudent." Intelligence estimates a Chinese nuclear capability of 20-30 ICBMs by 1975.

November 1967. DOD announces that the ABM system to be deployed (named Sentinel) is a thin configuration of the Nike X system, and identifies the first ten areas to be surveyed as possible site locations.

March 1968. President Johnson says the Sentinel program is of the highest national priority.

April 1968. In opening debate on the DOD appropriations bill for FY 1969 the Senate rejects, by a vote of 28-31, an amendment to

delay deployment of the ABM until certified as "practicable" by the Secretary of Defense.

June 1968. The Senate rejects by a vote of 34-52 an amendment to delay ABM construction funds for one year.

Foreign Minister Gromyko announces Soviet willingness to engage in talks with the United States about strategic arms limitations: "The Soviet Union is ready to enter an exchange of opinions... (on) the mutual limitation and later reduction of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive, including anti-ballistic missiles."

The House of Representatives rejects an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1969 to delete acquisitions of property and construction of related ABM facilities 37-106, on a teller vote.

August 1968. A Senate amendment to delete all funds for ABM construction is rejected 27-46.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia serves to jeopardize proposed arms control talks and stimulates pressure for ABM deployment in the U.S.

September 1968. Secretary Clifford directs that Sentinel be exempted from the expenditures reduction program.

October 1968. The Senate rejects, by a 25-45 vote, a proposal to delay construction of SENTINEL for one year.

December 1968. Citizen opposition to proposed sites at Boston, Chicago, and Seattle becomes vocal.

January 1969. Secretary Clifford in his report accompanying the DOD FY 1970 budget request concludes: "... even if the Soviets attempt to match us in numbers of strategic missiles we shall continue to have, as far into the future as we can now discern, a very substantial qualitative lead and a distinct superiority in the numbers of deliverable weapons and the overall combat effectiveness of our strategic offensive forces."

President Nixon takes office and initiates a DOD review of strategic offensive and defensive priorities.

February 1969: President Nixon on the 6th says: "I do not buy the assumption that the ABM was simply for the purpose of protecting ourselves against attack from Communist China."

On the 13th Secretary Laird stresses the priority of a Chinese-oriented ABM: "I am more concerned about that defense (against the Chinese threat) than I am about any other kind of defense at the present time."

On the 20th Secretary Laird says that an ABM system is necessary because the Soviet Union is deploying a "sophisticated new ABM system."

March 1969. At a press conference on March 14 President Nixon announces deployment of a modified Sentinel, to be called Safeguard, because: "The Soviet Union has engaged in a buildup of its strategic forces larger than was envisaged in 1967."

On the 20th Secretary Laird reverses his earlier position and says the Soviet Union is not deploying a "third generation" ABM system around Moscow but is only testing such an improved system.

The following day Secretary Laird says the Soviet Union is "going for a first-strike capability, and there is no question about it."

On the 27th Secretary Laird submits his amendments to the FY 1969 supplemental and FY 1970 DOD budget to the House Armed Services Committee and requests \$900 million for Safeguard procurement and construction. In addition to this, \$330 million from FY 1969 could be carried over to FY 1970 for Safeguard costs. Secretary Laird estimates the total cost of the system at \$6-\$7 billion, an increase of \$500 million to \$1.5 billion over the Johnson Administration request. In the report accompanying his requests, Secretary Laird says Safeguard deployment is necessary because "the option of safeguarding our deterrent forces against this potential threat (the Soviet

threat) cannot be preserved by research and development alone."

April 1969. Following Secretary Laird's "first-strike" remark, a controversy develops within the Administration over Soviet capabilities and intentions. Secretary Rogers at a press conference on the 7th seems to contradict Secretary Laird: "... insofar as whether they (the Soviets) are doing it (deploying the SS-9) with the intention of actually having a first strike, I don't believe that."

Spokesmen for the Administration contradict Secretary Laird's statement on the necessity for going beyond the research and development stage. On the 15th, Vice President Agnew characterizes SAFEGUARD as "really just a rather small research and development project, with two test sites, at Minuteman bases." Two weeks later, Deputy Secretary Packard echoes Agnew and calls SAFEGUARD "really a prototype deployment—a kind of research and development."

Doubt begins to arise over Secretary Laird's estimate of the Soviet threat. Former Deputy Secretary Nitze, testifying on behalf of SAFEGUARD before the Senate Armed Services Committee, declines to endorse Secretary Laird's view that the Soviet Union is working toward a first-strike capability. CIA Director Helms, testifying before a closed session of the Foreign Relations Committee, reportedly characterizes the Soviet threat as the same that faced the previous Administration.

Public and Congressional controversy continues. Governor William Guy of North Dakota, slated to receive one of the first two SAFEGUARD sites, announces his unqualified opposition to the project and concludes "our Nation is being swept along by contrived hysteria to keep the pipeline of the defense industries full." Administration and opposition head-counters agree that the decision in the Senate will hinge on how six uncommitted Senators divide on the issue.

May 1969. It is learned that the total cost of the SAFEGUARD system as announced by Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Packard (\$6-\$7 billion) does not include the costs of the nuclear warheads. The warheads are in the AEC budget and will add at least \$1.2 billion to the original estimate.

Later in the month the Defense Marketing Survey, a McGraw-Hill service for defense contractors, concludes DOD costs for SAFEGUARD will be \$12.2 billion.

On the 9th, Governor Forrest Anderson of Montana, site of one of the first two SAFEGUARD installations, states: "I have concluded that the proposed ABM system—called SAFEGUARD—would not be in the best interest of Montana and I seriously question whether the system would enhance our national defense posture."

On the 10th, Rear Admiral Levering Smith, Director of Strategic Systems Projects for the Navy questions Secretary Laird's evaluation of the future vulnerability of the Polaris submarine deterrent: "I am quite positive that the new generation of Russian submarines that are getting close to operational status, that are now being tested, will not be able to follow our Polaris submarines." Admiral Smith also denies that the Soviet Union has new anti-submarine warfare methods, such as superior sonar or a satellite detection capability, that would make the Polaris fleet vulnerable.

On the 12th, Dr. John Foster, DOD Director of Research and Engineering, upgrades the possible SS-9 threat as stated by Secretary Laird and Packard (500) to 600 by 1975. He takes heated issue with those scientists who question SAFEGUARD's reliability.

May 1969. On the 13th, Deputy Secretary Packard reverses an earlier position and says that SENTINEL monies are being used for production of SAFEGUARD missiles and

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radars. Packard previously had taken the position that new Congressional authority was required for work on SAFEGUARD.

On the 19th, House Speaker McCormack tells the Democratic and Republican leadership that he prefers to have the House vote on SAFEGUARD after the Senate rather than first.

The nation's two largest unions, the UAW and the Teamsters, announce their opposition to SAFEGUARD deployment, and a number of city councils and big city Mayors question the need for the system.

At the end of the month, new groups supporting SAFEGUARD are founded. Dean Acheson is announced as the organizer of one and it is revealed that a second has been organized among financial supporters of President Nixon by a White House aide. These groups join the American Security Council and the Liberty Lobby in backing SAFEGUARD.

June 1969. Controversy develops over a classified Pentagon chart that reportedly shows SAFEGUARD to be a very poor defense of retaliatory Minuteman Missiles. Sources say that the chart shows the addition of only a few SS-9s would overcome the SAFEGUARD ABM.

Later in the month the Pentagon releases a White Paper that says the Soviet Union is testing MIRVs in the Pacific. The next day other intelligence sources outside the Pentagon, particularly the CIA, support Secretary Roger's contention that the Soviet warheads being tested are not independently targeted.

Secretary Laird tells the House Appropriations Committee that a projected Chinese deployment of 25 ICBMs would justify going from the two-site configuration currently requested to the complete 12-site Safeguard system.

#### IV. POINTS OF CONTROVERSY

A number of points of controversy have arisen in the course of the debate over the SAFEGUARD system. The following fifteen questions are those that are most often raised by supporters and opponents of deployment. Because in most cases the opposition is responding to arguments for deployment advanced by supporters, the *Con* arguments require somewhat more space than the *Pro* for elaboration.

*Will the United States second strike capability be vulnerable by 1975?*

*Pro*

Yes. Recent Soviet developments in the weapons field pose a threat to all three elements of our retaliatory mix (Minuteman and Titan, Polaris, and our manned bomber force):

1. The Soviet Union is continuing to deploy the large SS-9 missile; its present force of 200 may go to 500 by 1975.

2. The Soviet Union is testing Multiple Re-entry Vehicles and will be able to deploy them on SS-9 missiles by 1975.

3. The Soviet Union is developing a fractional orbiting bombardment system (FOBS) and serially producing Polaris-type submarines. A FOBS capability and a large Polaris-type force could neutralize our bomber deterrent in 1975.

4. The Soviet Union is developing an anti-submarine warfare capability (ASW) that by 1975 could neutralize our Polaris deterrent.

5. The Soviet Union has deployed the GALOSH (NIKE ZEUS-type) ABM around Moscow.

*Con*

No.

Recent developments in the weapons field were known to the previous Administration which concluded that the U.S. second strike capability was invulnerable for the foreseeable future:

1. The accuracy of the SS-9 against hard targets is very doubtful; by 1975 we will still vastly outnumber the Soviet Union in accurately deliverable megatonnage.

2. The Soviet Union is far behind the U.S. in targeting Multiple Re-entry Vehicles independently and their progress in this field is more than matched by ours.

3. The U.S. has discarded FOBS as impractical and is far ahead of the Soviet Union in ASW capability, which will neutralize any Polaris capability they may develop. 40% of our bomber deterrent is on ground alert and could avoid FOBS or Polaris-type attack.

4. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has made a break-through in the ASW field; on the contrary, the evidence indicates they are far behind us.

5. The Soviet Union has halted work on GALOSH. In any event, we have more than overcome whatever advantage the Soviet Union may have obtained by limited deployment.

Even granting Soviet superiority in all strategic weapons categories and assuming we did not launch on warning, it would still be impossible for the Soviet Union to reduce our second strike capability below a level that would destroy 70% of the industry and 30% of the population of the Soviet Union. A perfectly working SAFEGUARD might increase our retaliatory capability marginally, if it were not offset by Soviet MIRV deployment.

*Will Safeguard deter arms control talks?*

*Pro*

No.

The Soviet Union agreed to arms talks only four days after former President Johnson decided to deploy SENTINEL. Since June of 1968, the Soviet Union has been pressing for initiation of these talks, despite the fact that the U.S. was, until March of 1969, proceeding with the full SENTINEL program.

Further, there has been no slackening of Soviet interest during the months SENTINEL was under review by the new Administration.

Finally, the U.S. has agreed to include defensive systems in any arms control discussions and is prepared to abandon SAFEGUARD if an agreement is reached.

*Con*

Yes.

SENTINEL had a very minor anti-Soviet capability, while SAFEGUARD is increasingly being justified in terms of the Soviet Union.

If the U.S. deploys SAFEGUARD and MIRV, it is likely that Soviet defense planners will assume that the U.S. is going for a first strike capability and delay the start of talks until parity, in their eyes, has once more been achieved. The current Soviet line, perceived from diplomats, is that parity has been reached in offensive and defensive capability. In their eyes a major spending program on new weaponry, such as SAFEGUARD, would upset the balance and make agreement impossible because the Soviet Union refuses to negotiate from a position of inferiority. Soviet comment since March is becoming increasingly critical of SAFEGUARD.

In addition, a newly deployed ABM system and the danger inherent in that deployment seems quite contrary to the spirit and intent of the non-proliferation treaty.

*Will Safeguard strengthen our bargaining position with the Soviet Union?*

*Pro*

Yes.

SAFEGUARD will give the Soviet Union an added incentive to come to the bargaining table and enter into meaningful agreement on the limitation of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems.

It will also give the U.S. an additional counter to be used in the talks.

*Con*

No.

The deployment of SAFEGUARD ties the hands of the United States in future negotiations. To deploy the system would strengthen the position of those in the Soviet Union who argue that the U.S. is too com-

mitted by its economic system and its pressure groups to an arms race to be seriously interested in its abatement.

The Kremlin defense establishment will certainly demand a new Soviet weapons system to use as a bargaining card against SAFEGUARD. Once new systems are initiated on either side, they become almost impossible to dismantle because they create their own constituencies.

Although both President Nixon and Secretary Laird have talked about using SAFEGUARD as a bargaining card with the Soviet Union, a question on whether or not the U.S. would consider abandoning SAFEGUARD if the Soviet Union showed a similar willingness elicited the following response from the President: "The abandoning of the entire system, particularly as long as the Chinese threat is there, I think neither country would look upon that with much favor."

There is an inherent contradiction in using SAFEGUARD both as a bargaining card with the Soviet Union and as protection against the Chinese threat.

*Will Safeguard escalate the arms race?*

*Pro*

No.

SAFEGUARD is defensive in nature and will not provoke the Soviets; the Soviets have always favored defensive systems.

Since the proposed system is designed to protect the nation's retaliatory capability it is not provocative and will require no reaction at all from the Soviet Union.

While U.S. attitudes are presently mixed with some favoring offensive systems and others supporting defensive systems, the Soviet attitude seems almost universally to favor emphasis on defense. Thus, it appears that similar U.S. emphasis on defense would probably be the most stable method of avoiding an offense-defense arms race.

*Con*

Yes.

We reacted to the Soviet GALOSH (NIKE ZEUS-type) deployment around Moscow by building up our multi-warhead (MIRV) capability with Poseidon and Minuteman III. On March 19, DOD requested authorization of \$12.4 million to improve Poseidon's effectiveness against hard targets, or second strike missiles, thus increasing our preemptive first strike capability. \$160 million has been requested for an Advanced Manned Strategic Bomber (AMSB) to counter GALOSH. These developments with the deployment of SAFEGUARD will make the Soviet Union extremely uneasy about U.S. first strike intentions and lead them to take similar actions bringing a new and dangerous degree of uncertainty into the strategic balance.

Since the most likely Soviet response to SAFEGUARD will be to accelerate their MIRV program, and ours is proceeding at a rapid pace, the time when the strategic balance can be stabilized by agreements that can be verified is rapidly disappearing. Once MIRVs are operational, unilateral policing by satellite of an arms control agreement will be impossible. It is very unlikely that either the U.S. or the Soviet Union would sign an agreement without a unilateral policing capability.

*Do we need Safeguard because the Soviets have Galosh?*

*Pro*

Yes.

SAFEGUARD is necessary to retain nuclear parity with the Soviet Union and to show that we, too, are defense-minded rather than offense-minded.

If we lose the lead time necessary to build and install a defensive system of our own, there would be no way to redress the balance. We would be subject to the Soviet nuclear blackmail we have avoided for 20 years.

If there is no ABM in the Soviet Union or in the U.S., any country with a Polaris submarine becomes a superpower. Therefore,

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many countries would be tempted to acquire nuclear missiles.

Con

No.

This action-reaction reasoning will only lead to further escalation of the arms race; the U.S. currently has the capability in offensive weapons to easily overcome Galosh, which is deployed only around Moscow.

Former Secretary of Defense Clifford said in 1968 that Galosh resembles "the Nike-Zeus system which we abandoned years ago because of its limited effectiveness." We do not need to react to a Soviet ABM system by building one of our own, particularly as the Soviets have slowed down, if not actually halted, their deployment efforts because of technical difficulties scientists say our system will have.

As for the Tallinn system, which has in the past been used to justify a U.S. ABM, current intelligence shows it to be a very thin Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft defense.

Is Safeguard reliable?

Pro

Yes.

DOD states that all of the components will work and the system as a whole will work. *Spartan* and *Sprint* have both been flown. PAR is a variant of a radar in existence and a prototype MSR is being tested. The complex computer systems required to operate these components are feasible and have been demonstrated in Apollo.

The problems confronting Safeguard are no more insurmountable than those confronting the development of the hydrogen bomb.

Con

No.

The scientific community is almost unanimous in questioning Safeguard's reliability. Safeguard has the most elaborate, sophisticated, dynamic combination of rocketry, radars, computers, electronics, and other technology ever proposed; moreover, it can never be tested as a system.

With regard to the missiles, *Spartan* and *Sprint* have a probability of failure of 34% to 59%, thereby requiring at least 3 missiles to achieve 97 percent probability of destroying an incoming warhead.

As far as the radars are concerned, statistically there is a 72% chance that one or more radars will be out of service at any particular time in a system of 12 MSRs. The remaining 11 are subject to blackout, which even proponents admit has not been overcome. The MSR is ten times as vulnerable to overpressure as the silos it is defending and will therefore be targeted first because its destruction destroys the entire installation.

In the case of the computers, it is debatable whether a program could ever be written to deal with the various forms of attack that can be anticipated.

Moreover, the entire command and control network upon which the system depends is as vulnerable as any of its components.

The hydrogen bomb analogy is specious; the scientific issue over the H-bomb was whether a specific design concept could in theory be developed into a workable weapon. The questions surrounding Safeguard are not theoretical but practical and technological.

Will penetration devices render Safeguard ineffective?

Pro

No.

Penetration devices other than real or dummy warheads of the same size and weight as the real one will fall behind or burn up in the atmosphere and expose the real warhead to *Sprint*.

By forcing an opponent to use penetration devices of weight equal to the weight of a warhead one cuts down the weight of the destructive payload each ICBM can deliver,

forcing him to achieve almost pinpoint accuracy if his target is a hardened Minuteman.

Con

Yes.

Against *Spartan*, the following penetration devices could be employed:

1. Decoys and chaff clouds, which need not survive re-entry to fool *Spartan*.
2. Active radar jamming.

3. The defense radar, particularly the PAR, can be blacked out with precursor nuclear explosions. In heavy, well-timed attack the defense's radars could even be blacked out by the defense's own nuclear explosions.

Against *Sprint*, an attacker could send several warheads in the same missile and rapidly exhaust the supply of *Sprints* at a particular installation.

Will Safeguard be obsolete by the time it is operational?

Pro

No.

SAFEGUARD is expected to be effective well into the 1980s against the threats it is designed to counter. Careful study has provided reasonable assurance that the system can evolve to handle future penetration aids developed by China or the Soviet Union.

SAFEGUARD, which will be deployed in phases, takes into account the development of new weapons technology.

Neither China nor any other nation new to the nuclear missile field can leapfrog decades of development of highly sophisticated weapons systems.

Con

Yes.

By the time SAFEGUARD is even partially operational, in 1973, the Chinese will have developed penetration devices, thus rendering the system ineffective against them. It is already obsolete against the Soviet penetration capability, should they choose to deploy it.

While the defense may be able to develop more sophisticated technology which could offset some of the penetration devices, the offense is capable of the same thing. All SAFEGUARD will do is to escalate this technological buildup into a never-ending spiral.

Is SAFEGUARD necessary to meet the Chinese threat?

Pro

Yes.

While the Chinese nuclear program has slipped recently, it is anticipated that by 1975 they could have 20-30 ICBMs. Because the Chinese are more unpredictable than the Soviets, they may make an irrational attack despite such a small force.

There is also the possibility that the Chinese might, in the absence of an offsetting U.S. defensive capability, be able to exploit a limited strategic offensive capability for purposes of nuclear blackmail to the detriment of the U.S. interest in Asia.

It seems both imprudent and unreasonable for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be completely without protection against any country with less nuclear power, such as China. If both countries have no defensive systems, any country with ten missiles is a superpower—it can destroy ten large cities.

Con

No.

Our deterrent power would certainly prevent the Chinese from launching an attack, the Chinese could penetrate the city-defense aspects of SAFEGUARD in any event, and there is no basis for assuming China would commit national suicide by launching an attack on the U.S.

We have deterred the Soviet Union's very powerful nuclear missile force for many years. There is no need for a system to deter a Chinese nuclear capability that is 1/10 of the Soviets and 1/30 of our own.

The Chinese need to deploy only a small number of ICBMs in order to penetrate

SAFEGUARD and attack our cities. It is much more likely that the Chinese are developing ICBMs to be in a position to deter us—something they cannot do now.

As for being irrational, despite verbal support, China has done no more than the Soviet Union in rendering open aggressive support for foreign insurgencies and much less in risking nuclear retaliation on behalf of such insurgencies. If China is determined to attack us, there are more effective methods than ICBMs. A nuclear weapon could be smuggled aboard a neutral ship or a biological weapon carried in a suitcase, for example.

If one were to concede the possibility of blackmail, it would be more likely that China would target her ICBMs against U.S. missile bases on China's periphery or against the cities of our allies than against the continental United States.

Will Safeguard defend the United States against accidentally launched ICBMs?

Pro

Yes.

One cannot eliminate completely the possibility of an accidental launch in a world where thousands of missiles are ready to be launched on a moment's notice.

If such an accident occurred, even a thin ABM system is likely to work well since there would presumably be only one, or at most a few, missiles to destroy.

It could repay the entire cost of the missile system several times over if one accident were prevented.

Con

No.

Unless SAFEGUARD is expanded beyond the Administration's current request, it could only defend against such an accident were the missile launched at one of the two Minuteman sites currently scheduled for deployment, and then not until 1973.

Accidental launch should be controlled instead by an agreement with the Soviet Union on the installation of self-destruct mechanisms so that accidentally launched missiles can be destroyed in flight. Should this be impossible, defense against accidental launch could be obtained at a fraction the cost of SAFEGUARD by deploying a few *Spartans* and unprotected radars designed for this purpose.

Will Safeguard erode Presidential control over the launch of nuclear weapons?

Pro

No.

While specific details of the decision-making process must remain classified, the decision to fire will completely reflect the authority of the President.

While the decision to launch must be made in a short period of time, the decision to arm the warhead of the missile can be made after the missile has been fired.

Con

Yes.

The time from verification to decision to fire would not be more than a few minutes if there is to be any chance of a successful intercept. The President is therefore given only the opportunity to ratify what the computers say is inevitable, and cannot weigh evidence or consult with advisors, particularly if at the moment of attack he is away from the National Command Authority in Washington, D.C. Most proponents of the system maintain that it will not work unless the launch process is begun at the moment of detection. In the case of an accidental launch, the necessity to activate the system with no delay would be even more urgent.

Does SafeGuard give the U.S. an extra option?

Pro

Yes.

Instead of having to resort to our retaliatory force in case of attack, SAFEGUARD would give us the option of sending up anti-

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ballistic missiles to destroy the incoming missiles.

The reliance on a missile to destroy another missile rather than a retaliatory force to destroy people and property is an added protection in preventing nuclear holocaust.

Con

No.

Since the system, in its entirety, can never be tested, U.S. planners would be more inclined not to trust SAFEGUARD than to wait out a first strike attack. We would in all probability fire our Minutemen at our attacker in the 10-30 minute warning time available—thus leaving SAFEGUARD defending empty holes.

Having an extra option could actually work against us. If the Soviet Union believed that we would rely on SAFEGUARD and not send up our Minutemen and they thought they could break through SAFEGUARD, they would be more confident of a successful first strike.

Defensive missile systems generally add the option of limited strategic nuclear war and thereby increase its possibility. Very few strategic planners think such an exchange could be kept limited.

Is Safeguard worth the cost—in terms of money and national priorities?

Pro

Yes.

Due to the phased deployment plan for Safeguard, the government will not ask for large sums of money at one time. Therefore, we can afford to deploy the system and still meet our domestic needs.

If the system changes in character, thereby costing more money, the decision would be based on the judgment of a conscious government and public debate.

Con

No.

The Safeguard system will almost certainly increase in cost, as has been the case with virtually every other military project. In the two years since ABM deployment was first proposed, the cost has more than doubled—from \$3.5 billion in 1967 to \$8.2 billion now. The 12 major systems developed by DOD since 1950 exceeded their original estimated cost by an average of 220% and as much as 700%.

U.S. expenditures can be more effectively used for domestic needs and preventing war through arms negotiations. Also, the continual buildup of armaments, of which Safeguard is a part, has caused the longest inflationary period and the highest taxes in the history of the country.

Will Safeguard eventually grow into a thick system?

Pro

No.

Safeguard does not provide the city base necessary for a thick system and the phased deployment called for preserves the option of curtailing and re-orienting the system.

Safeguard would be more difficult than Sentinel to convert to a thick system because the emphasis has been shifted from the defense of cities to the defense of our deterrent forces.

The President has directed the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—a nonpartisan group of private citizens—to make a yearly assessment of the threat which will supplement our regular intelligence estimate. Based on the advice of this group and our intelligence agencies, the President will decide whether to halt or expand the system—but not without the proper public debate.

Con

Yes.

The forces that have been pushing for an ABM system since the late 1950s regard the two initial installations in Montana and North Dakota as just the beginning of a full system. The Pentagon this year is requesting

appropriations to purchase land for all 12 Safeguard sites. Once Safeguard has been completed, these same political and economic forces will push for its expansion to a thick defense against all possible contingencies, at a cost of \$100 billion.

Because Safeguard already provides some defense for our cities, the addition of more *Sprint*s and some re-deployment could convert the system to a thick cities defense fairly easily. The Soviet defense planner must allow for this possibility and expand and adjust his capability accordingly. Any cities defense weakens the Soviet deterrent and enhances the U.S. first strike capability.

The cities defense mission of Safeguard must already be considered its primary mission because two thirds of the monies requested by the Administration are to be allocated for components for this type of defense and one third for components designed to defend our deterrent capability.

Is not Safeguard better than no system at all?

Pro

Yes.

SAFEGUARD deployment will create a basis for further improvement, innovation and growth as the threat develops.

Deployment of SAFEGUARD will allow an operating military organization to exist, manufacturers to make equipment, and serious research and development and planning of strategy to take place.

Useful, vital data will be collected, and our understanding of the problems confronting missile defense improved, including estimates of future costs, performance, deployment time, and situational impact.

In matters concerning the national security, it is better to err on the side of over-protection than in the other direction.

Con

No.

Lives are threatened because SAFEGUARD disrupts the nuclear balance, accelerates the arms race, and increases world tension—particularly if it is not effective. By raising the threshold of anxiety, SAFEGUARD will inhibit those shifts in policy necessary to a more peaceful co-existence.

Even conceding the need for defense of the U.S. retaliatory capability, SAFEGUARD is ineffective because it is made up of components designed for the defense of cities. A cost-effective defense of our deterrent would in the first place concentrate on the number of ICBMs needed for assured retaliatory capability—say two Minuteman wings—and not try to defend bomber bases. Secondly, it would not use long range PARs or *Spartans*, which are useless against a heavy and sophisticated attack, but would use cheaper, harder radars and a cheaper, lower altitude-intercept version of *Sprint* deployed in great numbers for terminal defense. Defense of hard targets does not require the range or the cost of the SAFEGUARD system. Finally, such a system could rely on simpler computer programming because the tactics available to an attacker are limited if a hard silo is his target.

#### V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON EACH SIDE

##### The Case for SAFEGUARD

SAFEGUARD is essential to the national security of the United States. With its recent buildup in offensive and defensive strategic force, the Soviet Union could acquire a first strike capability by 1975. If we are to counter this threat to our retaliatory force in time, it is necessary to begin deployment of the SAFEGUARD system. Sufficient progress in this field cannot be maintained by research and development alone.

Should the U.S. and the Soviet Union reach agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons systems, we are fully prepared to halt deployment of the system. In the meantime, SAFEGUARD provides an added

incentive for the Soviet Union to come to the bargaining table and gives us an additional bargaining card for use in the discussions. The Soviet Union generally favors defensive systems and has expressed no concern with SAFEGUARD.

SAFEGUARD will also protect us from attack by China, which is expected to have between 20 and 30 ICBMs with which to strike at the United States by 1975. In addition to guarding our cities from Chinese attack, SAFEGUARD will provide defense against accidentally launched missiles.

There is no question that the United States has the technical capacity to build SAFEGUARD. The components have been developed and tested over a period of fifteen years and there is no doubt that the system as a whole will operate effectively. The system is well within the economic resources of the country. In fact, the current deployment schedule will permit a saving in FY 1970 of \$1 billion over the SENTINEL request of the previous Administration.

It is important that the President have the option of countering an attack with defensive missiles. With such an option, the decision to launch a second strike can be delayed and the possibility of nuclear holocaust avoided. Finally the SAFEGUARD system will serve to strengthen any agreement on reducing the level of offensive weaponry by reducing the temptations to cheat on such an agreement.

In sum, it is the judgment of the Administration that the initial deployment of SAFEGUARD system is the minimum step necessary to protect the national security of the United States at this time.

##### The case against SAFEGUARD

The proposed SAFEGUARD system is unreliable, unnecessary, uneconomical and undesirable in that it would be detrimental to the national security of the United States. The system threatens the national security because it offers no protection from our adversaries while setting off another round in the arms race and making agreement on the control of strategic weapons systems impossible to obtain.

The Soviet Union will clearly respond to SAFEGUARD by accelerating its MIRV program, just as we responded to GALOSH with Poseidon and Minuteman III. Our MIRVs are close to operational; MIRV deployment on both sides will make a unilaterally verifiable agreement impossible. Soviet spokesmen are increasingly expressing concern with SAFEGUARD, once we begin deployment, those in the Soviet Union who oppose Soviet participation in arms control talks will control Soviet defense policy. SAFEGUARD is also undesirable because there is danger it will erode Presidential control over firing of nuclear weapons. In fact, some ABM proponents say delegation of Presidential authority will be required for SAFEGUARD to be effective.

SAFEGUARD is unreliable because it can be easily overwhelmed by an enemy offense and can never be tested except under combat conditions. It is unnecessary because with its Minuteman, Polaris, and bomber forces the United States has more than sufficient power to absorb an attack and retaliate devastatingly against the Soviet Union—and this capability will be retained for the foreseeable future without SAFEGUARD. It is uneconomical because its proponents see it only as the first step toward a thick system which will cost 100 billion and seriously erode our ability to deal with our pressing domestic needs.

China will be incapable of attacking us without committing national suicide for the foreseeable future; should she wish to attack us, she will have by 1975 the capability to wipe out one or two U.S. cities in spite of SAFEGUARD. As for protection against accidental attack, such protection should be obtained by agreement with the Soviet Union on the installation of self-destruct mechanisms on all ICBMs. Finally, if the Pres-



ident had SAFEGUARD and considered it an extra option in the event of attack, an opponent might come to the conclusion that he would use it and not launch our retaliatory capability and thereby be tempted into a first strike.

SAFEGUARD, like NIKE ZEUS, will be obsolete by the time it is deployed. While research and development on ballistic missile defense should continue at the Kwajalein Island facility, the decision to deploy should be deferred until the conclusion of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Our national security requires that we give highest priority to bringing the nuclear arms race under control.

#### VI. SELECTED LIST OF SAFEGUARD SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS

##### Pro

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia University, political scientist.

Dr. Lee Dubridge, Science Advisor to President Nixon.

Dr. Freeman Dyson, Princeton University, nuclear physicist.

Dr. Richard Foster, former Director of Strategic Studies, Stanford Research Institute, strategic analyst.

Dr. Richard Latter, Rand Corporation, nuclear physicist.

Dr. Philip Mosley, Director of the European Institute, Columbia University, political scientist.

Dr. Frederick Seitz, President of the National Academy of Sciences, nuclear physicist.

Dr. Edward Teller, founding Director of the Livermore Laboratories, nuclear physicist.

Dr. Alvin Weinberg, Director of the Oak Ridge Laboratories, nuclear physicist.

Dr. Eugene Wigner, Princeton University, nuclear physicist.

##### Con

Dr. Jerome Weisner, a former Science Advisor to President Kennedy and Johnson, Provost of MIT.

Dr. George Kistiakowsky, former Science Advisor to President Eisenhower, chemist.

Dr. Donald Hornig, former Science Advisor to President Johnson, physicist.

Professor Marshall Shulman, Director, Russian Institute, Columbia University, political scientist.

Dr. Herbert York, former DOD Director of Research and Engineering, nuclear physicist.

Dr. Donald Hornig, former Science Advisor to President Eisenhower, Chairman of the Board of MIT.

Professor Allen Whiting, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan political scientist.

Dr. George Rathjens, Director of Weapons Systems Evaluation, Institute for Defense Analysis, strategic analyst.

Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, Director, High-Energy Physics Laboratory, Stanford, nuclear physicist.

Dr. Jack Ruina, former Director of Advanced Research Projects Agency, DOD.

#### VII. GLOSSARY

**ABM (anti-ballistic missile).**—A missile, or combination of missiles, radar, and computers designed to intercept and destroy incoming missiles before they reach their intended targets.

**Area defense.**—A concept of ABM defense in which areas of the country, hundreds of miles across, are given protection from attack by exo-atmospheric interception of incoming missiles by long range defensive missiles tipped with large nuclear warheads. This type of defense is effective only against small attacks.

**Assured destruction.**—That level and deployment of nuclear capability which serves to deter deliberate nuclear attack by an opponent by maintaining at all times a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon the opponent, or com-

bination of opponents, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike.

**AMSA (advanced manned strategic aircraft).**—A Mach II-plus aircraft designed to launch a nuclear missile along a flat trajectory to avoid an opponent's defensive system.

**Blackout.**—The temporary disabling of defensive radar by ionizing the air at about 45 miles altitude with the beta radiation of a nuclear explosion. This radiation and the fireball itself cause reflection or absorption of radar waves for a ten minute period thereby screening the incoming missiles from the defense.

**Damage limitation.**—The ability to reduce the damage of a nuclear attack by deploying ABMs to defend cities and/or targeting offensive missiles on an opponent's missile silos.

**Deterrence.**—A defense strategy that depends on each side having the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other after absorbing a surprise first strike.

**First strike capability.**—The ability to launch a nuclear attack upon an opponent without receiving an unacceptable loss in return.

**FOBS (fractional orbit bombardment system).**—A nuclear delivery system intended to deliver its warhead to a target on a trajectory about 100 miles above the earth rather than along a ballistic trajectory outside the atmosphere, in order to avoid defensive radar. A fractionally orbited missile carries a smaller payload and is less accurate than an ICBM.

**Galosh.**—A Soviet ABM system comparable to the NIKE ZEUS, comprising 67 missiles on launchers around Moscow. It has been partially deployed but work has now ceased on this system.

**Hardening.**—Re-inforcing the geological surroundings of a missile silo to withstand the overpressure of a nearby nuclear explosion. The harder the silo, the greater the accuracy required on the part of an attacker to destroy the missile in its silo.

**ICBM (inter-continental ballistic missile).**—A long range (6,000-8,000 miles) multistage rocket capable of delivering nuclear warheads to enemy targets.

**Kiloton.**—The nuclear explosive equivalent of 1,000 tons of TNT (Hiroshima bomb equals 20 Kilotons).

**Launch on warning.**—A concept of defense that depends on assuring an opponent that one's retaliatory capability will be launched upon detection of incoming missiles rather than absorbing the first strike and then launching the retaliatory attack.

**Megaton.**—The nuclear explosive equivalent of one million tons of TNT.

**Minuteman.**—The basic U.S. ICBM. Minuteman I yields one megaton, Minuteman II has a higher yield and/or trade off with penetration aids, Minuteman III is designed to carry MIRVs.

**MIRV (multiple independent reentry vehicle).**—A system of multiple warheads in which several carried by one re-entry vehicle can be maneuvered on independent courses to different targets.

**MRV (multiple reentry vehicle).**—A system of multiple warheads carried in one re-entry vehicle but cannot be directed to different targets.

**MSR (missile-site radar).**—Performs surveillance and detection, target track, missile track, and command functions for the anti-ballistic missiles in the SAFEGUARD system. It is of shorter range than the PAR and takes over from it after initial acquisition.

**NIKE X.**—The thick U.S. ABM system, designed in 1963 but never deployed, utilizing the components of the SENTINEL and SAFEGUARD systems.

**NIKE ZEUS.**—A first-generation U.S. ABM system, utilizing unsophisticated radars and the Zeus missile, authorized in 1957 but never deployed.

**PAR (perimeter acquisition radar).**—A long-range detection radar designed to detect incoming missiles at a range of 1,000-2,000 miles and track them until they come into the range of the MSR.

**Penetration aids.**—Devices such as decoys, chaff, radar jamming, and precursor nuclear explosions used to assist the offense in overwhelming the defensive ABM system.

**Polaris.**—The basic U.S. submarine-launched missile, with a range of approximately 2,800 miles. 16 Polaris missiles are carried on each of 41 Polaris submarines.

**Poseidon.**—A U.S. submarine-launched missile, scheduled to replace Polaris missiles on 31 of the 41 Polaris submarines and to carry up to ten independently targeted warheads.

**Re-entry vehicle.**—That part of an ICBM that separates from the launching stages and carries the warhead(s) along a ballistic trajectory outside the atmosphere and then back into the atmosphere, where it then continues to target.

**Reprogram capability.**—A system in which an offensive missile signals its launch-control point if it has launched its re-entry vehicle properly thereby allowing the offense to program a backup missile if something has gone wrong.

**Sambis (sea-based anti-ballistic missile intercept system).**—A concept proposed for future development by the U.S., involving a network of anti-ballistic missiles on surface and/or submarine vessels.

**SS-9.**—A large (20-25 megaton), reportedly inaccurate, Soviet missile, also capable of delivering a number of smaller yield warheads and capable of knocking out Minuteman missiles in their silos.

**SS-11.**—The basic Soviet ICBM, equivalent to the Minuteman I.

**Safeguard.**—An ABM system configured from the components of the NIKE X system, including PAR and MSR radars and Sprint and Spartan missiles, to be deployed in two phases, the first phase to protect U.S. retaliatory Minutemen at two sites and the second phase to protect two more Minuteman sites, seven SAC bases, and Washington, D.C., and to protect U.S. cities from Chinese or accidental attack.

**Sentinel.**—The Johnson Administration's deployment of the basic NIKE X components, designed to protect U.S. cities from Chinese and accidental attack and provide eventually some protection of the U.S. retaliatory force, now abandoned.

**Spartan.**—A long-range (400 mile) missile component of SAFEGUARD, three stage, solid fueled with a nuclear warhead in the megaton range, fired from an underground silo.

**Sprint.**—A short-range (25 mile) missile component of SAFEGUARD, two stage, solid fueled with a nuclear warhead in the kiloton range, fired from an underground silo, highly maneuverable and with a high rate of acceleration.

**Tallinn system.**—Soviet anti-aircraft defense system having no ABM capabilities, installed around Moscow and Leningrad.

**Terminal defense.**—A concept of ABM defense that relies on short range missiles close to the target to intercept those missiles in a heavy attack that get by the long range ABMs. This type of defense is used to protect high value targets (cities, bomber bases, Minuteman fields) tens of miles across.

**Thick system.**—A thick ABM system provides defense against heavy attack with long range missiles and large numbers of short range missiles located close to targets.

**Thin system.**—A thin ABM system provides defense for large areas of the country against light or accidental attack with long range missiles designed to intercept the incoming ICBMs outside the atmosphere.

**Titan.**—A large (5-18 megaton) liquid-propellant U.S. ICBM. (The Titan II, of which 54 are deployed, is to be replaced by 1970 with Minuteman II.)

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## CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

## NATIONAL COMMITMENTS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the resolution.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Senate Resolution 85, expressing the sense of the Senate relative to commitments to foreign powers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution.

Mr. CHURCH obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Iowa yield, without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## OF PRESIDENTS AND CAESARS—THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the Roman Caesars did not spring full blown from the brow of Zeus. Subtly and insidiously, they stole their powers away from an unsuspecting Senate. They strangled the Republic with skillful hands. Gibbon describes their method in this stately passage from the "Decline and Fall":

It was on the dignity of the Senate that Augustus and his successors founded their new empire . . . In the administration of their own powers, they frequently consulted the great national council, and seemed to refer to its decision the most important concerns of peace and war . . . The masters of the Roman world surrounded their throne with darkness, concealed their irresistible strength, and humbly professed themselves the accountable ministers of the Senate, whose supreme decrees they dictated and obeyed . . . Augustus was sensible that mankind is governed by names; nor was he deceived in his expectation, that the Senate and the people would submit to slavery, provided they were respectfully assured that they still enjoyed their ancient freedom.

Senators of the United States may still enjoy their ancient freedom to debate and legislate, but through our own ne-

glect, we have come to deal increasingly more with the form than with the substance of power. Again and again, the Senate has acquiesced, while American Presidents have steadily drawn to themselves much of the power delegated to Congress by the Constitution. In the process, especially in the field of foreign commitments and the crucial matter of our military involvement abroad, Congress as a whole—and the Senate in particular—has permitted a pervasive erosion of the bedrock principle on which our political system was founded, the separation of powers.

For this reason, the national commitments resolution—Senate Resolution 85—may be the most significant measure that the Senate will consider during the current session of Congress. It seeks to set in motion a process pointing toward the restoration of the vital balance in our system prescribed by the Founding Fathers. The erosion of congressional power in the field of foreign policy has gone so far that a full return of the pendulum cannot be expected with passage of a single sense-of-the-Senate resolution. But here we must make our start.

The resolution, as reported with but one dissenting vote by the Committee on Foreign Relations, speaks for itself:

Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in recent years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government through means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment.

## THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

As crisis has followed upon crisis in these last 30 years, the concentration of power in the hands of the President has grown ever more rapidly, while the Congress has been reduced to virtual impotence in the making of foreign policy. The cause of this change has been the climate of crisis itself, each one of which necessitated—or seemed to necessitate—decisive and immediate action. As each crisis arose, the President assumed, and the Congress usually agreed, that the Executive alone was capable of acting with the requisite speed. No one thought very much about the constitutional consequences of Presidential dominance in foreign policy; we tended to think only of the crisis we were dealing with, of the assumed need for speedy action, and of the importance of national unity in a time of emergency.

Now, however, we must think about constitutional problems, because nothing less than the survival of constitutional government is at stake. Our democratic processes, our system of separated powers, checked and balanced against each other, are being undermined by the very methods we have chosen to defend these processes against real or fancied foreign dangers. There is no end in sight to the era of crisis which began some 30 years ago. We cannot safely wait for quieter times to think about restoring the con-